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Predicting The Probability Of Negotiation In Civil Conflicts: An Empirical Investigation Of Intrastate Conflicts Between 1989 And 2008

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**PREDICTING THE PROBABILITY OF NEGOTIATION IN CIVIL CONFLICTS:
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF INTRASTATE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
1989 AND 2008**

by

ILKER KALIN

DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Graduate School

of Wayne State University,

Detroit, Michigan

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

2018

MAJOR: POLITICAL SCIENCE

Approved By:

Advisor

Date

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my love, Duygu Turanli, who has always provided me with an endless sense of motivation and inspiration. She has always pushed me to finish this work by infusing indispensable amounts of encouragements and empowerments. She has patiently listened me talking about my work for hours and has never seemed to be bored of. I am grateful to her not only for supporting me in the dissertation process but also for being on my side in every aspects of life.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

"There is no honorable way to kill, no gentle way to destroy.

There is nothing good in war, except its ending."

Abraham Lincoln

"Negotiation and discussion are the greatest weapons we have for promoting peace and development."

Nelson Mandela

Since the end of the Cold War, 121 armed conflicts have taken place across the globe, with 94 percent of these conflicts taking an intrastate nature and only one third of them reaching an agreement between factions (Harbom, Högbladh, & Wallensteen, 2006; Högbladh, 2011). While many of these have had at least some attempt at negotiation, even partial but aborted agreements at times, the parties involved in civil conflicts have often refused to hold talks or, when talks occurred, were more likely to remove themselves from the negotiation table at arbitrary stages during discussions and resume fighting. Scholars still question, however, what brings parties to negotiate in the first place. Specifically, the timing and conditions leading themselves to negotiation have long been questions for policy-makers and scholars. This study aims to provide an improved understanding of the conditions leading to negotiation during civil conflicts by focusing on especially difficult negotiation issues in particular. In other words, a systematic analysis of what makes the parties to civil conflict decide to negotiate is presented. By doing so, it is hoped to identify resolutions for long-lasting hostilities and to thereby contribute to world peace.

Fisher, et al. (1981), in their well-known assessment *Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In* have argued that this is an era of negotiation and that all individuals are negotiators in their daily lives. Employees discuss raises with their employers, consumers bargain over the price of a car or house, governments (such as the United States,

Iran, and other global powers) come to deals over nuclear weapons. These are all negotiations, and any negotiation can be delayed or negatively impacted in international contexts. The question remains, however, why are negotiation difficulties so frequent when it comes to civil conflicts? Why do some conflicts experience negotiations but not others? Why does a government negotiate with one group but not with the others? What are the conditions that prepare the ground for negotiations between parties during civil conflicts?

Most of the existing scholarship on conflict resolution has focused on the cost of conflicts and wars, concluding that as the cost of combat increases the parties increasingly prefer to settle rather than continuing in aggression since the cost may continue to mount every day. However, the arguments presented here are derived from the costs and benefits of negotiation in its various forms in hopes of answering the questions above. Kaplow (2015) was the first to mention that negotiation itself might inflict costs and benefits to parties engaged in civil conflicts. Earlier, while examining international wars, Ghosn (2010) also observed that negotiation may be associated with some costs and benefits. However, there seems to have been few studies conducted which concern the possible costs and benefits of a negotiation, while others only consider negotiation as a costless decision. Regardless, Kaplow (2015) argued that parties involved in civil wars often do not negotiate when they perceive such negotiation as being costly. Several measurements of the costs and benefits derived during negotiation were then presented by Kaplow, including the fear of losing external and/or internal support, the risk of granting legitimacy to the other side, and the difficulty of finding a reliable partner with whom to negotiate. Building on this insight and further theoretical premises to be discussed, this current study uses several additional measurements (such as terrorism, the role of third parties, characteristics of the governments or insurgent groups involved, political ideologies of the participants, and the government's respect or lack thereof for human rights) to capture with a large dataset the costs and benefits of negotiation more thoroughly in civil

conflict contexts. It is argued that the manner in which negotiations are perceived by the parties involved in civil conflicts, as well as what benefits and costs they may incur, influences the ultimate negotiation decision, a factor referred to here as “*the negotiation calculation*”¹ of parties in civil conflict.

1.1. Statement of the Problem

Over years, scholars have focused on civil war settlement, third party mediation and guarantees, and the duration of peace (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Pearson & Lounsbury, 2009; Walter, 2002). Focus has been mostly on “successfully negotiated settlements” as a type of conflict termination rather than the negotiation process itself (Pearson et al, 2011). The extant literature fails to explain the conditions for negotiation as a process, a gap which this dissertation aims to fill by exploring the conditions leading to negotiation during various stages of conflict. Without such, the existing scholarship would fail to explain why the parties involved decided to negotiate in the first place. It is believed that any negotiation attempt, at any stage of the conflict, may be a sign of the willingness of the parties to discuss the issues regarding the conflict further. Therefore, it is imperative to isolate and examine the circumstances of negotiation attempts, regardless of their implementation or success. However, the failure or success of prior talks do matter and may influence the prospect of future talks and therefore must still be accounted for. Therefore, while focusing on the decision to initiate negotiations assists in explaining what brings parties to the reconciliation table, examining different types and levels of negotiation that occur separately throughout the conflict, regardless of their success or failure, enables understanding of the negotiation calculation as a process during the conflict where certain conditions are present and/or absent.

¹ The term was first coined by Kaplow (2015) as “the negotiation calculus”.

Another pitfall obvious in the literature is the assumption by most studies and scholars that negotiation is a costless choice, which thus influences their treatment of the subject. These studies further assume that when parties engaged in civil conflict face a choice between war and peace, they are faced with a costly lottery with the dichotomous option of either fighting or settling (Fearon, 1995). As a result, only a few studies have examined the influencers which facilitate the decision to hold talks during civil conflicts (Pillar, 1983; Bapat, 2005; Thomas, 2014). Even in these studies and despite fighting being associated with costs (such as a deteriorating economy, war weariness, casualties and deaths, and political party extinction for examples) in them, the decision to settle is still presumed to carry no cost at all. This study challenges that assumption by arguing that negotiation is somewhat associated with costs and benefits as well. Further, the perception of the costs and benefits of the negotiation from both government and insurgent perspectives may include differing factors.

Overall, current research on the determinants of negotiations during civil wars fails to address this dialogue as a process and to account for the influence of the negotiation calculation itself. While this dissertation understands negotiation as a process, it specifically examines the initiation of negotiations during civil conflicts, seeking to illuminate the significance of the perception of the costs and benefits of negotiation has on bringing (and keeping) parties into peace talks.

1.2. The Nature and Significance of the Research

If consideration of the costs and benefits associated with negotiating during civil conflicts is neglected, biased knowledge on the determinants of negotiation is the inevitable result. This work highlights the fact that negotiation is not a costless choice. Rather, the parties to civil conflict, under certain conditions, perceive negotiation as costly while at other times believe it to be to their benefit. Therefore, this dissertation provides eight measurements (*reputation, legitimacy, valid spokesman, external pressure, terrorism, foreign military*

intervention, human rights, and mediation) for assessing the perceived costs and benefits of civil conflict negotiation. It is important to note that this research is merely an attempt to conceptualize the possible indicators for the occurrence of negotiation during civil conflicts at a theoretical level so that researchers and analysts can give meaning to the correlation between the indicators and the practical occurrences of negotiation. For instance, if an insurgent group relied heavily on terrorism-based engagement, such as assassination of a political figure, a suicidal attack targeting civilians, or hostage taking, in a given year, the “cost of war” explanation would predict an increased probability of negotiation resulting from potential increases in costs, such as during a hurting stalemate, or an increase in the group’s “power to hurt” that coincides with a decrease in the government’s power to retaliate such damage (Zartman, 1993; Thomas, 2014). However, this dissertation asserts that while government’s “no negotiation with terrorists” posture typically holds true, they are more likely to negotiate with certain terrorist groups more-so than others. Accordingly, this study distinguishes between terrorist groups in regard to their constituent and target audiences. Therefore, it is argued that governments would be less likely to negotiate with groups who target civilian populations than those who do not. Similarly, governments would be relatively more likely to negotiate with groups who provide public goods and services (such as healthcare, food, security, and education) than those who do not provide any of these. The logic behind these assumptions is that while it is true that governments would be unwilling to negotiate with terrorists because they would appear weak and acquiescing to terrorism, this would be even truer if a government negotiated with a terrorist group that had a negative constituency and negative target reputation. In other words, the government would fear that such a negotiation could potentially harm its public image and thus undermine its popular support. Therefore, it is argued that some features of terrorist groups may be associated with positive reputations such as providing public goods

and services, and these features therefore might lower the cost of negotiation with them by their government opponents.

It should be noted that while back-channel negotiations or secret talks between parties are not coded in this study, any formal talks involving both parties participatory in the conflict and concerning conflict-related issues (such as ceasefires, exchange of prisoners, or the creation of humanitarian zones) are included as negotiations in this analysis. Pruitt (2005) argues that not all negotiations are formal, and most formal negotiations are preceded by informal talks, secret talks, two-way channels, and shuttle diplomacy. However, the reason secret talks are not included here is because the data selected use open source information and do not access reliable information on these underground meetings. Although including these cases into datasets would be ideal, it is believed that the use of overt negotiations would be adequate for assessing the goals of this study. While the dissertation is unable to bring in informal prior talks in civil conflicts for the aggregate data analysis, it provides insights into these covert talks in the case studies.

Urlacher (2011) argues that not all negotiation attempts are carried out in “good faith.” Therefore, there are other motivations beyond merely reaching an agreement. For example, parties may initiate a so-called negotiation in order to buy time, gain legitimacy, recover, or obtain international attention. However, while the data analysis does not allow consideration of these possibilities, an attempt is made to grasp the intentions of parties when negotiating and to take these into consideration as case studies. Further, it is important to note that even if a negotiation attempt is not undertaken in good faith, the cost-benefit calculation for the negotiation as made by the involved parties would still hold true.

On the other hand, although a civil war may have continued for many years, not every year of the conflict is necessarily bloody or even deadly. Cases have been observed where there have been no, or very few, combat-related deaths during a given year. In this case, one may

argue that the parties would prefer a continuation of *status quo* and have no intention of seeking a resolution or agreement since the costs of experiencing the war are not onerous and the benefits of their negotiating its completion are not as apparent.

It is important to understand how government and insurgent groups perceive the option of negotiation under different conditions. Their preferences may change as the conflict evolves, since the government is likely to reject legitimizing the insurgents by negotiating with them in the beginning, only to later, as the course of the war progresses, reassess the relative valuation of such talks for example (DeRouen & Bercovitch, 2008). However, if predictions are based only on the cost of war, the perceived value of negotiation itself is not being considered. With this type of thinking, researchers will continue to fail at explaining what brings parties to negotiations and why they are motivated to engage in such dialogue. If the costs and benefits of negotiation are omitted from the study, the whole picture of how the parties involved in civil conflict assess their choices cannot be seen.

It should be noted that throughout this dissertation, use of the term “war” is generally avoided in favor of the term “conflict.” There are two important reasons for the selection of this verbiage. First, existing scholarship (Small & Singer, 1982; Gleditsch et al., 2002) offers a variety of thresholds for defining a “civil war,” while simultaneously limiting other researchers to a certain set of cases. For example, one of the most common thresholds for a civil war is 1,000 battle-related deaths. When this threshold is used, a number of cases that this dissertation aims to consider and explain would be missed. Second, this threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths is used by this study only to differentiate between low-level and high-level conflicts but not to segregate lower-level conflicts from the aggregate dataset. Therefore, the term “civil conflicts” was chosen for priority usage in order to encompass any conflict which causes 25 or more combat-related deaths.

This study, differing from existing examinations of negotiations during civil conflicts, will contribute to the field of conflict resolution and peace research in several ways. First, the study provides six additional measures for assessing the costs and benefits of negotiation theory, first coined by Kaplow (2015), in order to better understand the concept. Second, unlike previous studies, this assessment differentiates insurgent groups based on their reliance on terrorism and typical terrorist activities. In this way the study aims to demarcate a line between militarized insurgent groups and those that employ terrorist tactics against civilians (as well as within the terrorist groups) based on their activities. Except for a single study, Thomas (2014), there has been no effort exerted to explain this distinction. However, offering variation among terrorist groups based on their activities is even beyond the scope of that study. While commentators have noted a tendency by governments to not engage in formal negotiations with "terrorists" (and a tendency by said governments to label their opponents, at least initially, as "terrorists"), such distinction that would enable researchers to distinguish terrorist groups based on their individual characteristics has not yet been pursued in studies on negotiation decisions. Thus, this approach is a promising contribution to the field. Lastly, while most studies focus on the government's agency in making negotiation decisions, this study attempts to examine the negotiation calculus from the perspective of both sides. Accordingly, the study explains the indicators suggestive of a propensity for negotiation by indicating how these are costs or benefits to both sides.

1.3. The Negotiation Puzzle in Civil Conflicts

Negotiating during civil conflicts seems to be a complicated puzzle. Such conflicts, by their inherent nature, encompass obstacles that inhibit peaceful negotiations. Scholars often emphasize that intrastate are different from international wars, given that there are different issues at stake. Zartman (1993) argues that intrastate conflicts seem to be more durable than interstate ones, having the ability to last for decades without arriving at either a victorious or

negotiated solution. Other scholars have identified impediments to negotiations during civil conflicts, pointing to various factors such as the lack of trust between the parties involved and the commitment problem, the attributed legitimacy of the actors involved, the problem of a reliable spokesman, indivisibility of the issues, the actions of spoilers, and information asymmetry among others (Walter, 1997; Walter, 2002; Powell, 2006; Zartman, 1995; Powell, 2002; Kaplow, 2015; Iklé, 1971; Pillar, 1983; Steadman, 1997; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Findley, 2013).

Bapat (2005) adds another dilemma to the puzzle. He argues that the relatively rare occurrence of negotiation during civil conflicts is due to the unwillingness of governments to negotiate during an early stage in the fighting and the unwillingness of insurgents to negotiate at later stages. In the beginnings of a conflict governments see full victory as a better option since the insurgent faction is relatively weak and therefore they use all their resources to suppress the uprising. However, if the insurgency manages to survive and continue the conflict, they gain strength and thus tend to refuse talks despite being more amenable to the idea of negotiating during the early years of the conflict.

On the other hand, the Prospect Theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), presents another obstacle to bargaining and negotiation. Quattrone and Tversky (1988) further argue that loss aversion, which is defined as the tendency of individuals to prefer the avoidance of losses over accepting equivalent gains, plays a key role in negotiations because it prevents the involved parties from reaching an agreement as a result of its leading them to resist making concessions to each other. McDermott (2009), considering the Prospect Theory, argues that “each side will want the other to give up twice as much land, or twice as many weapons, in order to experience the bargain as fair” (p.95). From this perspective, one can see why it is difficult to reach a successful resolution to a civil conflict negotiation, given that the starting point of each actor is to give up only half of what they are willing to take from their adversary.

In essence, the problem seems to be that each actor's "goal is to give up as little as possible, while obtaining as much as possible" (McDermott, 2009, p. 87).

1.4. Research Objectives: *The Negotiation Calculation*

To solve the puzzle and lay out the conditions that overcome barriers to negotiation during civil conflicts, relying on the Uppsala Conflict Database for information on the timing and circumstances of negotiation processes, this study utilizes logistic analysis along with four case studies in order to highlight the conditions which make negotiation a more favorable alternative than fighting for the parties involved in civil conflicts. Focus is placed on the conditions prior to negotiations when parties assess the utility of such engagement for their cause in relation to the futility or prospect of continued fighting. Simply, it is argued that the perceived costs and benefits of negotiating, in proportional relationship to the perceived costs and benefits of fighting, affect each parties' assessment of the conflict. As a result the "negotiation calculation" of parties to civil conflicts, which is hidden in the perception of the actors (i.e. government and insurgent group), is proposed. Similarly, Kim and Mesquita (1995) argues that decision makers' behaviors can be predicted by understanding their perception of the circumstance during conflicts.

In seeking to grasp the negotiation calculus thoroughly and to formulate clearer hypotheses, this study relies on two major theories of decision-making: Expected Utility and Prospect Theory. While the former has been very dominant in the field of international relations with its normative explanations and predictive power, the latter, as a psychological model of decision-making, provides additional insights into the negotiation process during civil conflicts. Although many scholars have incorporated the Prospect Theory into theoretical models within specific subfields of political science such as international conflict, bureaucratic politics, bargaining, and negotiation studies, it has not previously been given much attention generally (McDermott, 2004; Levy, 1996; Levy, 1997; McDermott, 2009).

Due to the complexity and nature of this study, the two theories are used as complementary to each other. Moreover, it is important to note that the format of a dissertation is not suited to test these theories broadly, and it therefore is not in the goal of this study's empirical findings to support or reject the validity of the two theories. Extant scholarship has already used experimental or game theoretical models to test the validity of expected utility theory (De Mesquita, 1980; 1983; 1988; Bennett & Stam, 2000; Rabin, 2000). Prospect Theory, used mostly for individual level decision-making and experimental models, has also been shown to be more influential for grasping the perceptions of individuals. For conflict studies, these theories help to understand the decisions of actors and delineate assumptions about the process of decision-making in order to formulate hypotheses and theories (For further discussion of the rational choice model and prospect theory, see Levy (1997)). While testing the validity of these theories has been and must be the purview of other studies, the assumptions of the hypotheses proposed in the following section and the theoretical framework of the study have been based on the tenets proposed by both expected utility and prospect theory.

In some sense the main argument of this study, that the costs and benefits of negotiation influence its occurrence and nature, could be likened to the expected utility theory presented by Bueno de Mesquita (1983) which attempts to explain causes of wars by focusing on how political leaders calculate utility. Similarly, it is argued here that when negotiations are less costly than continued fighting, the involved parties are more likely to engage in negotiations. However, when parties see negotiation as being costly, especially in relation to the costs of the war itself, they are less likely to participate in talks. Therefore, the cost or benefit of negotiation could be more salient for one party in comparison to the other(s). Presumably, if both sides consider negotiation to be costly relative to continued fighting, then the likelihood of talks occurring would be low. If the two sides judge negotiation costs to be low, however, talks become a more likely occurrence that becomes more so as war costs mount. In the event that

the parties diverge in their cost assessments, negotiation may still be possible but might require that the “pot be sweetened” by the involvement of a third party. Accordingly, warring parties’ perception of the cost or benefit of negotiation versus fighting will make negotiations with them either more or less likely. It is therefore important to note that these calculations may consistently correlate with the types of parties involved. For example, some assessments may weigh more than others for insurgent groups as compared to governments.

However, since the Expected Utility theory gives every probability and utility equal weight, it may fall short of understanding the negotiation calculation which is shaped by the actors’ perceptions (Levy, 1997). This is where the Prospect Theory is useful for giving more insight into and capacity for modeling the perceptions of specific actors. Moreover, in a civil conflict situation, it is extremely difficult to determine the utility for given decisions since “costs and benefits are not measured only in absolute terms, but in relative ones as well” (McDermott, 2009, p.92).

Prospect Theory is, in essence, a behavioral model of individual decision-making under risk and has important implications for negotiation situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). To begin with, Prospect Theory claims that humans are more sensitive to changes in their assets than to their net assets held, and therefore they assess the changes as *gains* or *losses* from their respective reference point, which is typically their current situation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Moreover, the theory asserts that people tend to over-value prospective losses in relation to similar gains, and while they seek risks in the face of losses they become risk-averse for gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This phenomenon is known as *loss aversion*. What this means is that individuals would prefer avoiding losses over acquiring comparable gains; that is to say, they will risk more to maintain their current situation (status quo) than to make further gains.

Therefore, in consideration of loss aversion during a negotiation situation, the risk factor may be the prospective threat of losing a given value which can take the form of many things such as money, security, power, or human lives (McDermott, 2009, p.91). Alternatively, in a civil conflict, the value could also be reputation, external support, regime survival, internal cohesion, or credibility among others. This human tendency can also be interpreted as *concession aversion* during a possible armed conflict negotiation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1995). As for the cost-benefit analysis of negotiations, parties to civil conflict “treat the costs of moving away from the status quo as losses and the benefits of moving away from the status quo as gains, and then overweight the former relative to the latter” (Levy, 1997, p.90). As such, parties to civil conflicts may see the concession as losses. For instance, when a government is at war with multiple insurgent groups, it might see every concession to an insurgent group as a loss (referring to the deviation from its current status quo and deriving a possible reputation as a concession-prone government) and therefore would be unwilling to negotiate.

Another implication of the Prospect Theory for negotiations is the framing effect. In an experiment conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), the authors observed that the change in the frame of a situation influences individuals' preferences between options although all the parameters remain the same. In the experiment, the respondents were asked to choose between two options in response to an outbreak of an Asian disease. The respondents' answers varied based on whether the options were presented in terms of how many people would live or how many people would die even though the number of people who would be saved or killed and the probability of each case would remain the same across all of the options. Therefore, how a negotiation is framed would change the perception of parties involved in civil conflict.

If the negotiation is framed as risky, it would be treated as a cost by the parties involved and they would be unwilling to negotiate. Meanwhile, if framed as a key opportunity, the negotiation would be seen as a benefit and the parties would be more willing to negotiate. Third

parties may play a key role in framing the conflict. Neale and Bazerman (1985) argue that third party involvement might increase the probability of negotiations by helping the parties to frame the conflict in more acceptable ways. Accordingly, the parties' perceived cost of negotiation may decrease in the presence of a neutral third party or mediator, and in return, the probability of the parties holding peace talks increases; the opposite might occur if an outside sponsor or intervener objects to negotiations and reassures or even spurs the allied party about continuing the fight.

Overall, by basing the arguments of this study on the assumptions embedded in expected utility theory and prospect theory, a negotiation calculus can be proposed in which parties to civil conflicts assess their respective risk-perceptions, costs (losses), and benefits (gains). By doing so, the study attempts to understand the conditions necessary for negotiations to occur in various forms and circumstances of civil conflicts. Moreover, as an attempt to fill chasms that exist in the existing scholarship, negotiated settlements are not studied as a conflict termination but rather focus is placed on all negotiations which occur at any stage of a conflict.

1.5. Definitions of Terms

Before considering the research questions and hypotheses of this study, it is necessary to clarify some terms used within it. The definitions below are derived from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, which is also the main data source utilized in the dissertation.

1. **Armed conflict:** "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths (see item 8 in the definitions) a year" (Gleditsch, et al., 2002; Allansson, Melander, & Themner, 2017; Themner, 2011).
2. **Party:** "A government of a state or any opposition organization or alliance of organizations. UCDP distinguishes between primary and secondary parties" (Ibid.).

- a. **Primary Parties:** “Primary parties are those that form an incompatibility (see item 7) by stating incompatible positions. At least one of the primary parties is the government of a state” (Ibid.).
 - b. **Secondary Parties:** “Secondary parties are states that enter a conflict with troops to actively support one of the primary parties. The secondary party must share the position of the primary party it is supporting in the incompatibility (see item 7)” (Ibid.).
 - c. **Third Parties:** “A third party is a party that is involved in either helping the warring parties to regulate the incompatibility, the conflict behaviour or to regulate other conflict issues and work as an intermediary between the two” (Ibid.).
 - d. **Government:** “the party controlling the capital of a state” (Ibid.).
 - e. **Opposition Organization:** “Any non-governmental group of people having announced name for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility (see item 7)” (Ibid.).
 - f. **Dyad:** “A dyad consists of two conflicting primary parties. At least one of the primary parties must be the government of a state. In intrastate conflicts, the nongovernmental primary party includes one or more opposition organization(s)” (Ibid.).
3. **State:** “A state is an internationally recognised sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an internationally unrecognised government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory” (Ibid.).

4. **Terrorism/Terrorist Attack:** “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (GTD Advisory Board, 2017).
5. **Insurgents:** The terms “insurgent group” and “insurgents” are used for “oppositions/opposition groups.” Inclusion of a group as “insurgent group” is based on whether it is listed in the UCDP Armed Conflict Database.
6. **Terrorists:** The term “terrorists” and “terrorist groups/organizations” are used for the groups that are listed in the GTD (GTD Advisory Board, 2017).
7. **Incompatibility:** “The stated general incompatible positions. The incompatibility, as stated by the parties, must concern government and/or territory” (Themner, 2011).
 - a. **Incompatibility concerning government:** “Incompatibility concerning type of political system, the replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition” (Ibid.).
 - b. **Incompatibility concerning territory:** “Incompatibility concerning the status of a territory, e.g. the change of the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession or autonomy (internal conflict)” (Ibid.)
8. **Battle Related Deaths:** “Counted as battle-related deaths is the use of armed force between warring parties in a conflict dyad, be it state-based or non-state, resulting in deaths.” The UCDP uses a 25 battle-related death threshold per year in order for a dyad to be considered active.
9. **Negotiation:** “Negotiations are talks that are held between at least two of the warring parties in a state-based conflict. To be classified as negotiations talks have to be connected to one or more issues related to the armed conflict, such as ceasefires, an exchange of prisoners, or the incompatibility” (UCDP).

1.6. Research Questions

This study addresses and answers the following set of questions:

1. Under what conditions are parties of various civil conflict types more likely to negotiate?
2. What do the parties in civil conflicts take into account when assessing the costs and benefits of both conflict and negotiation?
3. Which specific costs and benefits of negotiation seem to be most compelling under certain specific circumstances? For example, where acts of “terrorism” are or are not involved?
4. Why do some governments negotiate with one insurgent group but not with others? Why do some governments refuse to negotiate, and under what circumstances? Conversely, why do some insurgents negotiate with governments, and under what circumstances?
5. How do these varying conditions across and within warring dyads affect the assessments of the parties (government and insurgent group) about negotiating and about resumption or continuation of fighting?

The first research question has been studied previously by many scholars, and various conditions and causes have been identified. However, while this study supplements the prior studies and fills in gaps that the literature fails to explain, it seeks a different, more nuanced, answer than these studies by specifically considering the impact of negotiation costs and benefits on negotiations. Although the argument that these have an impact on the negotiation process has been addressed previously by Kaplow (2015), this study extends it by adding additional measurements and more detailed explanations as well as expanding the available dataset with the help of case studies. Furthermore, although the data used in this study do not allow to capture what the parties to civil conflict negotiated in a given negotiation period, case

studies will provide more insight into what was negotiated, such as ceasefire, prisoner exchange, or conflict settlement.

The second research question results from the lack of a specific measurement or costs-benefits of negotiation calculation in the field. Given that only a few scholars (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001; Ghosn, 2010; Kaplow, 2015) have raised the question of the costs and benefits of negotiation, the existing scholarship suffers from a lack of understanding on how negotiations may carry costs or benefits for the respective parties in civil conflicts.

The third question aims to fill another knowledge gap as there has not been much effort previously to differentiate terrorism and insurgency in the context of civil conflicts. Although scholars, such as Sambanis (2008) and Findley and Young (2012), have attempted to differentiate terrorism and civil wars from each other, they have not offered explanations for how the difference would affect negotiation initiations or outcomes in the conflicts. There seems to have been only one study, Thomas (2014), which attempts to explain the affect terrorism has on gaining concessions from governments in the context of civil wars. Yet, since Thomas (2014) focuses only on the number of terrorists attacks in a given period of time as an independent variable to explain the number of concessions extracted from governments, the study does not offer much in the way of explanation as to how the characteristics of a terrorist group would influence the government's perception and calculation of negotiating with them.

When it comes to negotiation, most studies focus either solely on insurgents or terrorists, with only limited efforts to explain terrorism and coverage of civil war in a single study. However, this dissertation will contribute to this body of literature by differentiating between insurgents and "terrorists" while simultaneously showing how governments respond to various terrorist activities in terms of negotiating during a period of civil conflict and focusing on the unique characteristics of the terrorist organizations.

The last two questions are the result of the need for dyadic analysis in order to gain a better understanding of negotiation in civil conflicts since it takes at least two to negotiate. While previous research on conflict settlement has focused on country level analysis, more recent studies have called researchers' attention to dyads (Walter, 2002; Licklider, 1995; Thomas, 2014; Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009). With the fourth and fifth research questions, the study seeks a dyadic understanding of negotiation during civil conflicts. By doing so, this study explains how the characteristics of government and insurgent groups play a role in their calculations of the costs and benefits of negotiating.

1.7. Hypotheses

Departing from the extant scholarship, this dissertation hypothesizes that negotiation inherently (and as defined by the parties) carries some benefits and costs. When the sides involved evaluate their decision to fight or negotiate, they do not simply rely on the cost of conflict as scholars mainly assume, but also account for the costs and benefits of the prospective talks. Accordingly, due to the fear of losing public support or damaging its reputation, a government may see negotiating with an insurgent group as costly at times, particularly when the group relies heavily on terrorist activities such as attacking civilians or forcefully recruiting children. However, at other times, governments may leave openings for possible negotiations with an insurgent group such as when the group has a legally recognized political party. In such case, negotiations could seem less costly than fighting due to the presence of a "legitimate" or authoritative negotiating partner. Moreover, it is not always the government who decides to initiate negotiations or not as insurgent groups themselves may see open talks with "evil" governments as politically dangerous in terms of support by their own constituents. Therefore, this study looks at the negotiation calculation from the perspective of both sides. Also, the dissertation puts forward hypotheses in the form of "negotiation is more/less likely to happen" because it gives researchers the flexibility to interpret the probability of negotiations occurring

for each of the given indicators (Pruitt, 2005). Examining whether the parties to a civil conflict might perceive the negotiation as costly, the following hypotheses have been suggested:

Hypothesis 1: Reputation

Negotiation becomes less likely to happen as the government perceives potential fights with additional insurgent groups.

This hypothesis derives from the idea that governments do not want to be perceived as concession-prone (Walter, 2002). The government, therefore, may understand negotiation with an insurgent or a terrorist group as a loss of status quo (loss of reputation). Given that most of the time governments are not willing to grant legitimacy to any insurgent group, a possible negotiation already poses a cost for the government. Therefore, every additional insurgent group involved increases the perceived cost of negotiation in the eyes of the government. This is because governments may be concerned that other insurgent groups would demand the same (or similar) privileges granted to the first insurgents with which the government comes to terms. As a result, the government would be more likely to adopt loss aversion behavior in the presence of multiple groups. In other words, when there are more than one insurgent group in a state, any type of negotiation with an insurgent group might mean, for the government, that it is sending signals of weakness to them. This hypothesis may be termed the “reputation hypothesis” as the government makes it about its own “reputation” when there are additional factors still at play. Therefore, governments may perceive negotiation as being costly when they are fighting with multiple actors.

Hypothesis 2: Legitimacy

Negotiation is more likely to happen if the insurgent group is connected to a legal political party or faction or has been in existence a relatively long time.

Legitimacy of the actors has been pointed to as the biggest impediment to negotiation during civil conflicts (Zartman, 1993; Walter, 2002; Bapat, 2005). Most of the time,

governments do not recognize insurgent groups as legitimate actors for initiating a talk with, often labeling them as terrorists, traitors, and criminals. Therefore, it is safe to assume that negotiation with an insurgent group poses a cost to the government due to legitimacy issues. However, is this the case for all civil conflicts? This dissertation asserts that painting all insurgent group with the same brush would lead us to flawed conclusions. Therefore, it is argued that some groups may appear more legitimate than others, and this, in turn, would decrease the perceived cost of negotiation by governments. Two ways are therefore suggested for an insurgent group to be considered as somewhat legitimate, or at least a de facto one. First, if the insurgent group is linked to a legal or proto-legal (seeking representation) political party, the group can represent its goals and demands more clearly through non-violent means rather than having to resort to the use of arms. As the government might see the insurgent`s message more clearly under these conditions than it would on the battlefield, the legitimacy of the insurgent group would increase in the eyes of the government. Therefore, governments may perceive negotiation with insurgent groups who are linked to a legal political party as less costly than others. Second, insurgent groups can sometimes gain de facto legitimacy in the eyes of the public or other states, even though the government of the host state does not recognize them. The long existence of insurgent groups may be another one of the indicators of de facto legitimacy. In simple terms, in these cases, the insurgent group is present whether it is accepted or not. Therefore, governments can neither further ignore the existence of the group nor its legitimacy. By this, the problem of legitimacy is an issue that negotiation during a civil conflict must overcome, and its perceived cost to the government therefore decreases. Thus, this hypothesis is referred to as the “legitimacy hypothesis.”

Hypothesis 3: Valid Spokesman

Negotiation is more likely to occur if the insurgent group has a known representative who speaks for them.

Finding a representative of the group(s) in order to initiate talks is a prerequisite for any sort of negotiation (Zartman, 1995). By definition, negotiation requires at least two parties to consider the confrontational issues. While on the government's side there are official(s) who can speak with authority for the government, it is not always easy to identify a representative for an insurgent group, even if the government is eager to settle a conflict through negotiation (Cunningham, 2013). Not all insurgent groups are the same, as stated previously, and some are more structured than others. As such, it is easier for governments to initiate peace talks with an insurgent group when said group has a leader or some sort of hierarchical structure. Therefore, governments perceive such negotiation as less costly when the insurgent group has a valid spokesman to speak for them.

On the other hand, a valid spokesman not only overcomes the issue of a representative for the insurgents, but also resolves the credibility problem to a degree. Accordingly, during civil conflicts, governments are concerned that insurgents might renege on their promises at any point of the negotiation process. Therefore, in negotiations with insurgent groups which have strong leaderships, governments may assume an increased likelihood of receiving what has been agreed on more than with other groups which have no representative to speak for them. Ergo, the cost of negotiation in the presence of a strong leader of the insurgent groups seems less costly to the government. The name of this hypothesis is the "valid spokesman hypothesis."

Hypothesis 4: External Pressure

Hypothesis 4a: Governments are more likely to negotiate if the insurgent group has a transnational constituency or actually receives foreign assistance.

Hypothesis 4b: Insurgents are less likely to negotiate when they receive external military support.

Zartman (1995) argues that very few intrastate wars are purely internal. This is to say that the government, the insurgent group, or both, receive external support during the conflict. This support might extend from military assistance to financial support or even diplomatic influence. In this dissertation, the insurgents' external support (its transnational links) is of more concern because civil conflicts are often seen as asymmetric conflicts where, without the help of outside support, the insurgents may be weaker than the government in terms of factors such as military capability, financial power, and legitimacy. However, as Zartman (1995) argues, they often receive help from outside.

On the other hand, there may be different interpretations of external support in the context of negotiation. Therefore, it is argued that external pressure for negotiations could go two ways. First, the insurgent groups which have a transnational constituency can bring international pressure through the influence of diaspora groups in order to encourage the government to negotiate or make concessions. In the presence of outside pressure to solve the issues regarding the conflict being directed toward the government, the regime may desire meeting the demands of the outsiders and come to see negotiation (or making some concessions) as being less costly than fighting. For instance, Turkey may serve as an example of this phenomenon. Kurdish diaspora groups throughout Europe have pressured Turkey, via the European Union (EU), to improve living conditions for the Kurdish people in Turkey. Since 2001, the country has thus implemented some kinds of democratic reforms in order to meet the EU's candidacy requirements. These include legalizing use of the Kurdish language in public, allowing Kurdish TV and radio broadcasts, and providing access to Kurdish language courses. More importantly, in 2009, the AK party (the current governing party in Turkey) initiated a democratic opening known as the "Kurdish opening," which allowed for dialogue with the PKK (Ciftci & Kula, 2015). This may be interpreted as a tendency by the government to meet external demands for the sake of international diplomacy and foreign policy gains they perceive

as good. On the other hand, this can result in more counter trends with the recent developments regarding to the accession status of Turkey to the EU. After the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, the relationship between the EU and Turkey started to sour due to the EU's concerns over the rule of law in relation to large scale purges and violations of human rights taking place in Turkey. As a result, the European Parliament voted for the suspension of Turkey's EU membership status in 2017 (Reuters, 2017). This development decreases Turkey's prospect of accession to the EU. In parallel to this, Turkey's willingness to meet democratic standards and values decreases as well. Second, the presence of outside support for insurgent groups can affect the decision of the negotiations. Insurgent groups desire maintenance of their outside support, and therefore cannot make a decision against the external groups' wishes. In such a case, the insurgent groups perceive negotiation as a cost which may, in return, cause them to lose their external support.

So, in the first argument, government sees negotiation as less costly because external actors are seeking concessions from them. However, in the second hypothesis, the insurgent group perceives negotiation as costly because there is a risk that they could no longer enjoy the foreign support on which they previously relied if any negotiation attempts threaten such support for the insurgent group. In that case, the risk of losing their current status (losing the support) may lead to loss aversion. It is important to highlight that while the former looks at the negotiation cost from the perspective of the government, the latter takes the insurgent's assessment of the cost into account. Regardless, both represent external pressure even though they are leading to different perceptions involved in the negotiation calculation. Therefore, these hypotheses are label as "external pressure hypotheses".

Hypothesis 5: Terrorism

Hypothesis 5a: Negotiation is less likely if the insurgent group is terrorism-oriented.

Hypothesis 5b: *Negotiation is more likely to happen if the terrorism-oriented group has built a positive reputation with regard to its constituency by providing public services, such as health, school, and media.*

Hypothesis 5c: *Negotiation is less likely to happen if the terrorism-oriented group has built a negative reputation with regard to its constituency by engaging in some activities such as child recruitment, forceful recruitment, and forced funding.*

Hypothesis 5d: *Negotiation is less likely to happen if the terrorism-oriented group has built a negative reputation with regard to its target audiences by conducting extreme violence and targeting children.*

In the literature on conflict resolution, there are no clear distinctions between insurgents and terrorist groups when it comes to negotiation, although the general position of governments is that they do not concede to terrorists nor negotiate with them, Neumann (2007) argues that they often negotiate with them in regarding various issues. However, the question is whether there is a type of terrorist group with which governments are more likely to negotiate. Is such a distinction among terrorist organizations even possible? Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016) respond to this by introducing the Reputation of Terrorist Organizations (RTG) dataset. The authors created a measurement for both positive and negative reputation factors of terrorist organizations. While some activities of a terrorist organization, such as providing services like health, school, and media build a somewhat positive reputation of the group in the eye of its constituency (the group of people the terrorist group claims to represent), other activities such as abductions, forceful recruitment, and mass killings causes a negative reputation. It is argued here that this reputation of the terrorist organization plays a major role in the government's perception of the cost of engaging in negotiations with the organization. Accordingly, as a terrorist organization builds a negative reputation in the author-derived scale, it may also generate bitter, hostile, anger, and revengeful feelings in the public. Moreover, these negative

perception of the public toward the terrorist group would be higher if it conducts extreme violence on civilians and children. This raises the cost of negotiation very high for the governments since they would neither want to lose their public support nor seem weak for acquiescing to terrorists. On the other hand, as a terrorist organization builds a positive reputation, it must also become a more legitimate actor, at least for some portion of the public. In return, governments may see a negotiation with this terrorist group as less costly.

Prospect theory places a high importance on how issues are framed (McDermott, 2009). Governments may use somewhat more positive frames for a negotiation with a terrorist group with positive reputation. At least, they can generate excuses about a more peaceful and united society in the absence of violence. With these two hypotheses, the goal is to explain how the various actions of terrorist organizations affect the negotiation calculation in the eye of the governments. Simply, these are referred to as “terrorism hypotheses.”

Hypothesis 6: Human Rights

Negotiation is less likely to happen if the government breaches human rights.

Along with hypothesis 4b (external pressure), this hypothesis also considers the negotiation calculation from the perspective of the insurgent group. There have been few, if any, attempts in the literature to include the government’s respect for human rights as an indicator of the prospect for negotiation in civil conflicts. Moreover, it is not always the government which is not willing to negotiate, there are cases where the government accedes to the demand to negotiate and the insurgents forego the chance to negotiate, as seen in Sri Lanka, Eritrea, and the Western Sahara (Zartman, 1995). Therefore, how costly or beneficial the insurgent group perceives negotiation to be in a given case cannot be neglected. Just as governments not to acquiesce to the violent actions of terrorists, argued by Hypothesis 5d (terrorism hypothesis), an insurgent group would not ignore the violent and disrespectful actions of the government either. Accordingly, the same logic in the terrorism hypotheses can

be applied to other insurgent groups. The insurgents would perceive negotiation as less costly with a government which has a reasonably good reputation of respect for human rights than with a government that has little to no respect for such. While such governments are less likely to have civil wars in the first place, “good” does not mean “perfect,” and therefore the scale can be consulted in order to identify how the variation in the scale helps explain the decision to negotiate. The logic here is that the insurgent groups are concerned about their internal cohesion and appeal for constituents. However, in the second scenario, when they initiate any form of negotiation with a government disrespectful of human rights, disagreements may arise among the members of the group, and the group might therefore lose its internal cohesion and external credibility. Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky (1995), argue that when legitimate rights are violated or moral outrage is incurred, the loss might be perceived as more unacceptable to the parties. Therefore, actions such as human rights violations incurred by the government make the insurgents see the loss of negotiating more costly.

On the other hand, it is not right to expect that all insurgent groups would be equally concerned about liberal values (such as human rights). However, the hypothesis would still hold true because government observation of human rights can at least be interpreted as a sign of a partner reliable during negotiations. In other words, if the negotiation fails and fights begin anew (presuming that there is a lull or ceasefire during the negotiations), the members of insurgent groups may expect fair trials and justice in the future rather than torture and political killings. In essence, the insurgent groups feel they at least have better chances with a respectful government than a disrespectful one. Of course, another reason for the talks in the first place can be the cynical one of simply taking the opportunity to rest, rearm, and regroup for the next round of fighting.

Hypothesis 7: Foreign Military Intervention

Hypothesis 7a: *Negotiation is more likely to happen in the presence of a third party intervention.*

Hypothesis 7b: *Neutral foreign military intervention will increase the likelihood of negotiation compared to biased foreign military intervention.*

Third party states regularly practice foreign military intervention in order to influence the evolution of civil wars. While some scholars have argued that military interventions increase the duration of the wars, others have asserted that the direction of military intervention plays a major role in determining the probability of negotiation (Regan & Aydin, 2006; Regan, 2002; Pearson & Baumann, 1988; Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). As such, Pearson and Baumann (1988) categorize foreign military interventions into three types: neutral, supportive, and hostile.

Neale and Bazerman (1985), in their experiment consisting of 100 college student participants, found that third parties may play a key role in helping the contestants to reframe the conflict in a more positive way. This finding might hold true for international and internal conflicts as well. However, third parties should be neutral, and their aim should be only to resolve the conflict. Moreover, from the perspective of Prospect Theory, McDermott (2009) argues that in many situations, since the cost of negotiating is more salient to the parties than the cost of walking away, individuals would be more likely to avoid the cost which seemed certain to them at the beginning (the cost of negotiation). As a result, they will be more likely to walk away rather than to negotiate. As discussed as the negotiation puzzle in civil conflicts above, the parties' lack of trust, commitment, and goodwill to each other are the main obstacles in the way of a possible negotiation. Accordingly, such issues are perceived as the cost of negotiating by the parties. However, the presence of a neutral third party might lower the cost of negotiation by offering at least a guarantee for security in the case of a failed negotiation.

As such, the cost of negotiation is initially perceived as certain (unavoidable) by the parties and would become less certain because the third party would provide commitment and trust in certain benefits during negotiations. In other words, intangibles (like goodwill and trust) which are perceived as certain costs by the parties at the beginning would appear as certain benefits in the presence of a third party, and thus will increase the likelihood of a negotiation (McDermott, 2009). Also, mediators should frame the negotiation as cost-cutting rather than taking benefits in light of the insight on loss aversion where individuals tend to overvalue losses compared to benefits (Pruitt, 1983; McDermott, 2009).

In regard to the costs and benefits of negotiation hypothesis, this dissertation argues that an unbiased third party would decrease the cost of negotiation for parties to civil conflict by granting legitimacy to rebels, preventing the conflict from escalating, and lowering the concerns of both parties regarding trust and commitment. In other words, in the presence of a neutral foreign military intervention, negotiating would be less costly (including political costs) for both parties than continued fighting.

Hypothesis 8: Mediation

Negotiations are more likely to occur in the presence of a third party compared to conflict episodes where there is no third-party assistance.

The extant literature puts a great emphasis on the problem of commitment during civil strife as an impediment to maintaining resolutions (Walter, 1997, 2002; Fearon, 1995; Kydd, 2005; Powell, 2006). Commitment problems occur when parties in conflict do not trust each other, since both believe that the other side will not comply with the agreement. Walter (2002) argues that the commitment problem is one of the most significant problems in civil wars. However, mediation may help parties solve their commitment problems and it is more likely to have negotiated settlements in the presence of a third party. This can particularly be true due to the potential for indirect, or “shuttle,” diplomacy so that the parties do not have to meet at

the same table. Berkovitch and Jackson (2001) define mediation as an extension of negotiations where the parties to civil conflict are open to the help of a third party to resolve their issues. Mediation can also take a number of forms, ranging from neutral to partisan or directive stances, and from “good offices” to a guarantor or brokering status (e.g., rewarding the parties for settlement). In this sense, mediations could be considered subsets of negotiations for some civil conflicts. Therefore, it is crucial not to rule out the effect third parties and mediation have on negotiation. As understood from the literature, third parties may play a role in civil conflicts by providing a trustworthy, face-saving, and informative ground for negotiations. Moreover, the presence of a third party might change the parties` perception of the costs and benefits of negotiation.

In this dissertation, mediation is considered a factor that would lower the cost of negotiation for both party. However, it is important to note that meditation is not the focus of this research but since it is difficult to separate negotiation from mediation in many cases, the dissertation includes mediation as an independent variable in order to control for its effect.

1.8. Alternative Explanations

The above hypotheses stand for the measurement of the negotiation calculation. However, the extant literature has made other arguments on what causes parties to choose negotiation over fighting, and is focused highly on either the cost of war or the type of war (Blainey, 1988; Fearon, 1995; Mason & Fett, 1996; Walter, 2002; Dukalskis, 2015; Licklider, 1995; Mason, 1996; Stedman, 1997; Walter, 2002; Dukalskis, 2015).

The Cost of Conflict

Although the cost of conflict is not the primary focus of this dissertation, it will still make propositions about how the costs of conflict influence the participants` assessment of the conflict and the expected utility of negotiation. Expected utility theorists argue that the relative costs and benefits of a victory or negotiated settlement affects the parties` decision to fight or

negotiate. Parties calculate which direction they would be better off, how long it will take to win a victory, how much it will cost, and what the payoffs (or losses) of a negotiation may be (Walter, 2002). In other words, the cost of war argument suggests that when the cost of continuing to fight is high for the parties involved in civil conflict, they will prefer stopping the conflict, or as Zartman (2000) puts it, they will seek a “way out.” This cost is often measured by the number of casualties, the years passed since the beginning of the conflict, or the occurrence of a military stalemate. In addition to these measurements, some authors have lately added a new variable to the cost of war: the administration of a territory by an insurgent group (Kaplow, 2015; Dukalskis, 2015). In accordance with the literature, it is expected here that the probability of negotiation will be higher when the costs associated with the conflict are higher.

The Type of Conflict

In addition to the cost of war, the type of war is also controlled for, following the footprints of previous studies. Civil wars are mostly fought over the control of governance or specified territory (Walter, 2002). Scholars have argued that the issues at stake during a civil conflict matters for negotiating peace (Pillar, 1983; Licklider, 1995; Fearon, 2005). This is often associated with the indivisibility of issues in civil conflicts. In this sense, there are mixed results in the literature. While some argue that territorial issues are easier to resolve (Mason, 1996; Stedman, 1997), others find that territorial goals may negatively affect the resolution of civil conflicts (Walter, 2002; Dukalskis, 2015). As a result, the issue for which the conflict is fought has been controlled for by determining whether it is a fight for the control of the government or a territory.

In addition to the issues at stake, the level of violence exerted by the parties involved in the civil conflict are controlled for in addition to whether it is an internationalized war with the involvement of foreign states. To determine the level of violence, the number of deaths in

the conflict for a given year has been relied upon, making use of a 1000 battle-related death threshold which is the most accepted criterion for civil wars in previous scholarship that determines whether the conflict is a civil war or a low-level conflict. As such, if the conflict cannot exceed the 1000 casualty threshold, it will be considered a low-level conflict. By doing so, differing from the literature, this study is able to show how the level of violence affects the negotiation calculation. As a result, it is argued that low-level conflicts are more likely to experience negotiation.

Moreover, potential differences between intrastate conflicts and internationalized intrastate conflicts could be another concern. As far as awareness allows, there has been no effort to explain how internationalized conflicts are different from conflicts without any external state involvement when it comes to negotiating peace. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the two types of conflict, and this typology is included as a control variable.

1.9. Main argument

The costs-benefits of negotiation approach advanced by this study does not directly contradict the other existing approaches, such as the cost of war or type of war discussed above. These approaches clearly play important roles in participants' assessment of the conflict. However, the existing literature has missed a major point that impacts this negotiation decision in civil conflict contexts. Namely, it paints negotiation decisions as merely the only option left after deciding that the cost of war is too high to prevail. However, negotiation itself inherently encompasses some costs to parties during civil conflicts, and these costs affect the decision of the parties involved. This dissertation names this assessment by the parties as "the negotiation calculation." By providing several factors to measure the costs and benefits of negotiation in the eyes of both governments and insurgents, this attempts to conceptualize the drivers of negotiations during civil wars as costs or benefits to the parties involved in civil conflict. Also,

to see the effects of the above mentioned factors (such as the cost of war and the type of war), these factors have been retested and used as control variables.

1.10. Dissertation Outline

The dissertation is structured into six chapters. In this introduction chapter, the chasms in previous negotiation scholarship, the importance of the research questions, the contribution of this study, key concepts, the negotiation puzzle in solving civil conflicts, and the theoretical framework (by putting forward a set of hypotheses) have been introduced. The following chapters in the dissertation are organized as follows:

Chapter 2 discusses the extant literature on negotiations to set the stage for both quantitative and qualitative analyses of this study. First, the chapter draws a bigger picture by incorporating interdisciplinary understanding of negotiation. Then, the understanding of negotiation is narrowed down to civil conflict settings. Later, how the literature on conflict resolution scholarship has treated negotiation as a process and as a type of termination in civil conflicts are explained. Next, the chapter goes on to introduce the grand theories of negotiation, such as *bargaining theory* and *ripeness theory*. Lastly, the suggested indicators of negotiation in civil conflicts are presented by collecting them under three categories: the cost of war indicators, the type of war indicators and the costs and benefits of negotiation indicators.

Chapter 3 describes the method and methodology both of the logistic regression and case studies. The chapter, first, explain the weaknesses and strengths of the logistic analysis and case studies in this study as well as their necessity of importance for the set of research question of this dissertation. Next, it describes the population and sample for the aggregate data analysis by summarizing all the datasets merged together for this research, namely the Uppsala Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al, 2002), the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) (Cunningham et al, 2013), the Reputation of Terror Groups dataset (RTG) (Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016), International Military Intervention dataset (IMI) (Pearson &

Baumann, 1988; Pickering & Kisangani, 2009), the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay, 2014), and Negotiation and Mediation Events dataset (Svensson, 2007). Then, the chapter explains the research design of dissertation for the logistic analysis and case studies. It concludes with the operationalization of variables in the logistic analysis and dataset.

Chapter 4 presents the findings of aggregate data analysis and discussion of the hypotheses. First, the chapter starts by discussing the summary statistics of aggregate data as well as several independence and association tests between the indicator of negotiation and the occurrence of negotiation. Next, the chapter continues to present the results of logistic analysis in ten models. Then, each model is discussed in details in relation to the respective hypotheses. Later, the chapter explains how the warring dyads have been selected for case studies based on the results of logistic regression and additional considerations. The chapter lends support to the costs and benefits of negotiation explanation. It concludes with a general summary and discussion of the results.

Chapter 5 provides an in-depth explanation of four representative case studies: the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, the Government of India and the Kashmir Insurgents, the Government of Colombia and the FARC, and the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. The chapter follows the same structure while analyzing all four cases, one by one. First, the background of the conflict is introduced. Second, the costs and benefits of negotiation explanation is applied to each case. Next, negotiation setting and chances throughout the conflict settings are explained. Last, the chapter concludes each case with a discussion part. At the end, the chapter gives comparison across the conflict settings and draws general conclusions applicable to the other civil conflicts around the world.

Chapter 6 summarizes the study by reminding the theoretical framework and the design and method of the dissertation. Also, findings of both logistic and case study analyses are

summarized and discussed. Lastly, based on the findings and limitations of the research, recommendations for future studies are made.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

"Peace is not absence of conflict, it is the ability to handle conflict by peaceful means."

Ronald Reagan

"Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

John Fitzgerald Kennedy

In general, negotiation is defined across many fields as discussion among two or more disputants who are trying to work out a solution to their problem (Conflict Research Consortium-University of Colorado, 2005). Negotiations may occur from personal to corporate or even international levels. With this wide range of negotiation types, it has thus been of interest to scholars of many varying fields. Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) categorized the study of negotiation in all fields into three main traditions. The first tradition consists of early studies which are considered merely general advice books for the negotiator as well as more recent similar works (de Carlieres, 1716; Nicolson, 1964; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Zartman, 1977; Zartman & Berman, 1982; Lewicki, Saunders, Minton, Roy & Lewicki, 2011). Rational choice and game theorists make up the second tradition in negotiation studies, with their mathematical and modeling approaches to explaining the actors' behaviors in a negotiation (Shelling, 1960; Raiffa, 1982; Roth, 1985). The third tradition is often called behavioral tradition. While it bases its theoretical point and explanations on mathematical modeling, it focuses more on describing, explaining, and predicting than offering a prescription (Druckman, 1977; Kremenyuk, 2002; Pruitt, 2013; Zartman, 1978).

When it comes to the study of negotiation in the context of world politics, the signs of all three traditions are present and the main goal is to explain why states cooperate when they do. Bercovitch and Jackson (1997) define negotiation as "a process by which states and other actors communicate and exchange proposals in an attempt to agree about the dimensions of conflict termination and their future relationship" (p.25-26). It is obvious from the literature

that much more effort has been put into explaining the process of negotiation during international conflicts rather than intrastate ones (Kremenyuk, 1991; Hopmann, 1996; Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001; Zartman, 2007; Ghosn, 2010). While negotiation in civil wars is given less attention by scholars, it has been acknowledged by many that intrastate conflicts tend to last longer than interstate ones, with intrastate conflicts having the ability to last for decades without arriving at a victorious or negotiated solution (Walter, 2002; Zartman, 1993). However, there have been many studies attempting to explain civil conflicts and their resolutions as well. It should also be noted that in the post-cold war era, there was an apparent shift from most civil wars being settled by military victory to a good proportion settled by negotiation; however, it is not clear if that is continuing now in an era where the UN cannot act as effectively because of recurrent major power conflict on Security Council.

Accordingly, negotiation studies vary across the field of conflict resolution. What scholars of war and peace have suggested about negotiation and how different uses of negotiation have been implemented over time in the literature will be discussed below. The following section divides the said literature into categories based on their approach to negotiation during civil conflicts. Accordingly, the studies which see negotiation as an “outcome” of conflict and the studies which consider it as a “process” are discussed first. Later in the chapter, two important theories regarding negotiation during civil wars are presented: the bargaining theory of war and the ripeness theory. Then, the determinants of negotiation in civil conflicts are presented as the cost of war. Lastly, a review of the literature, by collecting indicators of negotiation under a new perspective (namely the costs and benefits of negotiation), brings the chapter to a conclusion.

2.1. Negotiation as “Settlement” and “Process”

The study of negotiation during civil conflicts takes a different path than other fields such as communication, psychology, and business among others. This is not only because it

occurs at the country or international level and the issues at stake are more complicated, but also due to the way scholars treat negotiation in their studies. Most of the research on civil conflicts has treated negotiation as merely one possible outcome of a conflict and used it as a point of conflict termination. Following this approach, scholars have focused on civil war settlement, third party mediation and guarantees, and duration of peace over time (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Pearson & Lounsbury, 2009; Walter, 2002). As a result, the extant literature has been filled with mixed results regarding the question of how parties decide to continue fighting or to start negotiations. On the surface, focus has been on negotiated settlements versus fighting on to victory or mutual destruction in order to explain the duration of peace or the recurrence of conflict. While some have argued that decisive victories are less likely to devolve than negotiated settlements, Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel (1996) have found that agreed settlements, once attained, provide more stability during the post-conflict period (Fortna, 2004; Licklider, 1995; Diehl, Reifschneider, & Hensel, 1996). In the interim, other scholars do not observe any significant effect of either type of outcome on the recurrence of violence (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Walter, 2004).

Taking negotiation as just an outcome of conflict contradicts, however, with the very definition of negotiation presented at the beginning of this chapter. Accordingly, negotiation is defined as a serial process of discussions among the involved parties in order to resolve their issues, not just an outcome. The general concept of negotiation, therefore, implies a process rather than an outcome. In this regard, Pearson et al. (2011) recognize this pitfall in the literature by stating that the focus has been mostly on “successfully negotiated settlements” as a type of conflict termination rather than negotiation itself as a process.

Moreover, there have been other serious attempts to dissolve negotiation down into multiple stages in order to examine it as a process (Pearson et al., 2011; Findley, 2013; Walter, 2003; Hopmann, 1996). In this regard, Ghosn (2010) and Findley (2013) argue that it is

important to examine negotiation at different stages because the factors that bring parties to the negotiation table may be different from those for the success of the negotiation. While Ghosn focuses on interstate disputes, Findley extends this argument for the resolution of civil conflicts as well. Accordingly, Findley (2013) found different effects as the result of the number of actors and stalemates during bargaining at different stages of the peace process. The author breaks the peace process into three independent stages, namely “deciding to negotiate,” “reaching to an agreement,” and “implementing the agreement.” While Findley (2013) has reported a positive effect resulting from being at a stalemate and/or the involvement of more actors during stage 1 (decision to negotiate), he also found the opposite pattern at stage 3 (implementing the agreement). That is to say, being at a stalemate and with an increased number of actors at that point decreases the likelihood of implementing the agreement. The study did not show significant results during stage 2 (reaching to an agreement).

Pearson et al. (2011) emphasize that in most civil conflicts, parties engage in some sort of tacit or direct bargaining regardless of the types, conditions, and options of conflict settlement. As seen from many cases (such as Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Ukraine, Myanmar, Turkey, South Africa, and Liberia among others), it is possible for governments and insurgent groups to sit down long enough, or to engage intermediaries to explore or communicate some form(s) of negotiation. Some would even say that implementing or signaling some sort of ceasefire or concession is a form of pre-negotiation. Although negotiation does not necessarily lead to peaceful resolution, it is the first step for warring parties to take toward a peaceful settlement. As such, one should ask what leads to this variation across countries, or more specifically dyads (government and insurgent groups).

2.2. Grand Theories in Negotiation Studies

To explain why actors in an interstate or internal conflict agree to negotiate or prefer to fight, scholarship has relied heavily on rational choice theory, assuming that actors in a conflict

assess their utility and make only decisions which maximize their gains. Under this assumption, various arguments and theories of war have been developed over time. However, two of them have been given more importance than others: bargaining theory and mutually hurting stalemate.

Bargaining Theory of War

Bargaining theory can be found in fields other than political science, in particular economics. While bargaining in economics concerns a seller and buyer who want to agree on a price, and is also the resolution of legal disputes in law, it has many applications in political science, ranging from parliamentary dynamics, government formation and legislative rule-making, to international politics (Cooter & Rubinfeld, 1989; Reiter, 2003). Most studies in international politics see both conflict and cooperation as a product of bargaining (Reed & Sawyer, 2014). Moreover, in international politics, bargaining is used to explain interstate cooperation, security issues, state behaviors, wars, and agreements. In this way the bargaining model of war encompasses the beginning, duration, termination, and consequences of war as a whole. According to this theory, war itself is part of the bargaining process (Reiter, 2003).

Thomas Schelling was one of the first proponents of the idea that war is a bargaining process. Accordingly, Shelling (1960, 1966) framed war as a bargaining model by using game theory before further arguing that “most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations” (1960, p.5) and “war is always a bargaining process...” (1966, p.142). Carl von Clausewitz was another supporter of this perspective that views war as bargaining. His thoughts on war reflect it as being a whole process of bargaining, and as such Clausewitz described war as “politics by other means” (1984, p.87). In this view, war can be seen as an extension of accomplishing the political goals of a state. In his own words, Clausewitz in *On War* (1976) explains that “the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose” (as cited in Reiter, 2003).

Moreover, many have followed the perspective of war as a bargaining process. These scholars have revised this theory, and made contributions to it by the addition of various cases and explanations. One such, Blainey (1988), follows the logic of Clausewitz and notes that war is a process of determining who is stronger and involves bids and responses to either capitulate or resist. In other words, it is a form of negotiation. Similarly, Pillar (1983) suggests that military activity affects the outcome of the conflict more through changes in the other side's expectation than through physical effects. Both Blainey and Pillar consider war as a form of bargaining, or negotiation, which helps the warring parties to decide what is beneficial to them in the given information context of the war. By the same token, Bernstein (2012) states that "negotiating and war fighting must go hand-in-hand; they are ultimately, and, perhaps ironically, two sides of the same political coin" (p.24), implying the notion that each side is trying to get the other to concede. However, there are exceptions to this when signals get mixed and bombing continues while peace feelers are extended – as in US-North Vietnam failed peace overtures.

To explain negotiations during civil conflicts much of the literature draws from the rational perspective, which is also associated with the bargaining studies (Wagner, 2007). The idea is that parties choose either to fight or settle going forward based on their expectation from each outcome, and that conflict costs (such as battlefield attrition and monetary expenditure) condition the decisions (Fearon, 1995). Fearon (1995) argues that political leaders confronted with the two options, fighting or negotiation, prior to open conflict make up their minds based on their calculation of each outcome. By this perspective, this is the only way to explain why wars occur given the fact that wars are costly and risky. On the other hand, peace may also be seen risky, and some theorists posit that fear of losses may outweigh prospect of gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988; McDermott, 2009)

Similarly, Powell (2002), relying on Rubinstein's model type (1982) which pictures bargaining in international relations as a non-cooperative game, describes bargaining as "deciding how to divide the gains from joint action" (Powell, 2002, p.2). According to Powell (2002), since each actor in a conflict wants to maximize its gains they will be willing to cooperate when acting jointly promises a larger gain. Moreover, Powell (2006) in his model of war that considers the cost of the conflict, finds that settling a dispute in a short time is a better option for combatants since fighting is damaging and becomes more costly over time.

On the other hand, Wagner (2000) approaches negotiation from a different perspective than both Fearon and Powell by arguing that war itself is a negotiation process. His argument runs counter to the idea that decisions and commitments are made primarily before the war has begun. Rather, he argues that decisions are mostly made after the initiation of conflict, based on the expectation about how the war will end. Wagner criticizes the works by Wittman (1979), Blainey (1988), and Fearon (1995) which implicitly or explicitly suggest that war itself is not a part of a bargaining process but is an outcome of the costly lottery suggested by Powell (1996). Contrary to these studies, Wagner argued that bargaining does not end once the conflict erupts but rather continues along its course. According to Wagner, to understand fighting and bargaining one needs to understand the process of war, from its outbreak to its termination.

Overall, the bargaining theory of war is built on Shelling's and Clausewitz's view of war as a process or manner of bargaining. It derives from a broader theory, *rational choice*, that assumes that actors in a conflict (let it be it a political leader, insurgent group, or state in general) act in a way to maximize its gains and while doing so the actor uses the current information environment to take into consideration the relative powers of the actors and the expected utility of possible outcomes.

Ripeness Theory

Ripeness theory, first developed by Zartman (1989), has been one of the most influential concepts in peace and conflict studies and explains when and why the parties to a conflict would prefer negotiation over fighting. According to Zartman, “parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so—when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament” (2001, p.8). He then specifies two necessary conditions which render a conflict to be ripe for resolution: mutually hurting stalemate and seeking for a “way out.” Mutually hurting stalemate is a situation where both parties have come to believe that they cannot practically, or successfully, escalate the conflict in order to achieve their goals at an acceptable cost (Zartman, 1993). Therefore, they seek “a way out” of the conflict (Zartman, 2000). In other words, this is a situation where the parties are locked in conflict and lose their faith in any kind of victory in the face of impending conditions and thus wants to step outside of it for a more favorable outcome.

Similar to bargaining theory, the mutually hurting stalemate bases its theoretical point on rational choice theory because it is grounded in the cost-benefit analysis of parties in a conflict. From a rational perspective, scholars often mention that parties in a conflict make their own assessment of the situation (Zartman, 1989; Zartman, 1993; Zartman, 2000; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Stedman, 1991). Moreover, Zartman (2001) acknowledges that ripeness is a necessary condition for conflict resolution, but not a sufficient one. Accordingly, it is possible to observe cases where the conflict has reached to ripeness for resolution; however, political leaders have not seized the opportunity.

When it comes to operationalization of the concept, pinpointing the ripe moments, scholars have used various variables over time (Walter, 2002; Findley, 2013). It is important to note that “ripeness” or “mutually hurting stalemate” are perceived psychological states of

the actors in conflict, and therefore measuring the concept may be difficult at times. Regan (2002) argues that it is a vague concept and thus problematic to analyze empirically since it is difficult to pinpoint these moments. However, in order to operationalize the concept, it has often been understood as a military stalemate where the fighting capacity of both sides are perceived as equal. Zartman argues that being in such a stalemate could carry some costs to the parties in conflict. Therefore, they may seek a resolution to the conflict (Zartman, 2000). Accordingly, using military stalemate as an indicator of mutually hurting stalemate, Findley (2013) has found that while stalemates encourage negotiations they have less effect on the implementation of peace agreements. Moreover, a valid spokesman for each side has been identified as another indicator for ripeness. Accordingly, Zartman stresses that “the presence of strong leadership recognized as representative of each party and that can deliver that party’s compliance to the agreement is a necessary (while alone insufficient) condition for productive negotiations to begin, or indeed to end successfully” (2011, p.11). Lastly, Stedman (1991) points to the potential of leadership change because of the threat of domestic rivals as a sign of subjective perceptions of mutually hurting stalemate for the incumbents. However, it should be noted that the possibility of leadership change, in this sense, only takes into consideration the internal dynamics of a group (state or insurgent) while not accounting for the threat from the enemy.

Ripeness theory has been criticized by some scholars in several aspects (Pruitt, 1997; Pruitt, 2005; Amer, 2007; Walch, 2016). First, it is considered tautological since theory does not necessarily specify in practice the ripe moments. It simply cannot be known before the resolution has already taken place. Therefore, the theory suggests that “situations are either ripe or unripe” (Pruitt, 1997, p.238). Second, while the theory can explain the initiation of negotiations, it does not determine the success of the negotiations. Thus, it focuses on only the beginning of the process (Walch, 2016). Third, it is seen as a micro level theory. As such, Pruitt

argues “it would be richer if the antecedents of ripeness were organized on the basis of some broader theory” (1997, p.239).

Pruitt (1997, 2005) attempts to modify ripeness theory with “readiness theory.” While the ripeness theory requires a “mutual” perception of stalemate (or ripeness) in a conflict, readiness theory looks at the sides separately. Pruitt defines readiness as “the extent to which an individual disputant is interested in negotiation” (2005, p.6). Pruitt, emphasizing that ripeness is still primary in readiness, argues that “negotiation will only start if there is some degree of readiness on both sides and, hence, some degree of ripeness....The greater the readiness and ripeness, the more likely is negotiation to occur” (p.7). Accordingly, readiness theory aims to contribute to ripeness theory in two ways; by looking at the actors separately and treating readiness and ripeness as variables instead of a necessary condition. Thus, when readiness and ripeness are variables to explain negotiation, it is possible to talk about the possibility of negotiation based on the level of readiness and ripeness. This, in return, allows researchers to build compensatory hypotheses (Pruitt, 2005).

Overall, ripeness theory has been widely used in the literature to explain the initiation of negotiation in civil conflicts and why some attempts have worked while others have not. Although the theory has some limitation, such as pinpointing the ripe moments in a conflict situation beforehand, a better understanding and use of the theory comes down to a more accurate and effective measure of “ripeness.”

2.3. The Determinants of Negotiation

In light of the theories above, the extant literature has suggested various determinants of negotiation occurrence during civil conflicts. As a result, it is filled with a mixture of results. Scholars have mostly focused on the correlations between the suggested determinants and the engagement in negotiation. Simultaneously, these determinants of negotiation have been gathered under a broader theoretical framework in order to give meaningful explanation to the

correlations in hopes of explaining the causality between the variables. One of the most prominent suggestions proposed has been the cost of war. According to this theory, war is costly for each party, and as the cost gets higher, parties to a conflict prefer negotiation over fighting. This assumption derives from rational choice theory, which assumes the actors will choose what is maximizing their gains. Further, it has its theoretical foundation on the ripeness theory by assuming that as the cost(s) increase the conflict will be ripe for resolution. Scholars have suggested diverse variables to measure the cost of war. Moreover, other indicators of negotiation regarding the specific characteristics of civil conflicts (such as conflict over the control of a territory versus governance) have been put forward.

The Cost of Conflict

Scholars of conflict resolution have translated both the bargaining theory of war and Zartman's mutually hurting stalemate into the cost of war concept. Relying on these two theories, the cost of war presumes that as the cost(s) of war gets higher the actors in a civil conflict (who are assumed to be rational) will prefer negotiation as a "way out" (as in Zartman's argument) or as a preferable outcome in comparison to the expected futility of ongoing war. Scholars have therefore provided various measurements to test the costs of wars, considering them to also be determinants of the decision to negotiate.

Walter's (2002) prominent study on determining the indicators of negotiation delineates some conditions needed for opening or continuing talks, such as the cost of conflict, balance of power, domestic political institutions, and divisibility of issues in the conflict. However, she puts a great emphasis on the importance of third party involvement as a mediator in particular. Many later studies have been constructed on Walter's insight. Recent studies, however, have been taking different approaches and providing new conditions to consider such as the number of potential claimants, the intensity of the conflict, the relationship between the disputants, and services provided by the insurgent groups (Findley, 2013; Ghosn, 2010; Heger & Jung, 2015).

On the other hand, there might be varied cost motives such as the emphasis on regime or dynastic survival. Mesquita and Siverson (1995) assert that political leaders want to maintain their hold on to power; therefore, while they decide on going to wars or backing down, they assess their ability to keep the power by calculation to what extent the decision would put them in opposition to their rivals (both within and outside their political system) and the ability of these rivals to take over the power.

Walter (2002) measures the cost of war by looking at the duration of the conflict in relation to the number of battle-related deaths. This is consistent with the “war weariness” hypothesis which posits that parties in a long-lasting conflict come to realize that there is a low probability of victory and therefore decide to settle by negotiation without necessarily achieving their goals in full (Dukalskis, 2015). Similarly, Collier and his colleagues (2004) find that the probability of peace increases every year after a seven year conflict period. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) have supported this argument by mentioning that long wars are more likely to be settled by negotiation because of the increasing perception that the likelihood of the victory is low.

Similarly, Mason and Fett (1996) adapted Wittman’s (1979) model of how interstate war ends for their own model of how civil war concludes, arguing that the probability of both parties agreeing to a negotiated settlement depends on each side’s estimate of its own probability of victory. Their main argument relies on Zartman’s mutually hurting stalemate, and the authors put forward that if the probability of victory for one side is high, then the probability of a negotiation is low. While assessing the probability of victory for one side, they rely on the capacity of the government’s army. Moreover, they are concerned about the expected utility of a victory for the government. In that sense, they assess the cost of war only in light of the government expecting a victory. The argument is that if the cost of war is high, then the government will prefer a negotiated settlement rather than ongoing fighting. While

primarily assessing the cost of war, the authors rely on various other factors as well, such as the casualty rate and duration of the war.

The Type of Conflict

It is important to note that not all civil conflicts are the same. While some are fought over territorial disputes, others are primarily for the control of governance. Moreover, it is possible to suggest further categorizations of civil conflicts, such as internationalized civil conflicts, minor conflicts, and major wars. These types of categories may vary based on the definition of a civil conflict and the ultimate aim of the study. However, since the goal of this dissertation requires such a typology, what previous literature has suggested for the occurrence of negotiation across these cases will be discussed.

First, the UCDP dataset defines internationalized internal conflicts as “armed conflict [which] occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups, with intervention from other states in the form of troops” (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015). Also, the data shows that in 2014, 33% of intrastate conflicts were internationalized in that at least one foreign state contributed troops to one or both sides in the conflict. Based on the definition and statistics, the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, Nigeria, and Syria among others may be considered internationalized civil wars. However, there seems to have been no attempt to differentiate internationalized civil wars from other civil wars in terms of the probability of a negotiation.

Second, the UCDP makes a distinction among civil wars based on the casualty rate in a given year. Accordingly, while internal conflicts with less than 1000 battle-related deaths during a year are coded as “minor conflicts,” others with more than 1000 deaths are considered as being major wars. In addition to the general lack of knowledge about negotiation in internationalized civil wars, the existing literature has not been concerned with what differences the level of violence in a civil conflict would have when it comes to negotiation.

Therefore, this distinction (as well as internationalized civil conflicts) is included in this dissertation.

Lastly, some scholars have suggested that the indivisibility of the issues at stake in a civil conflict make it difficult to resolve (Iklé, 1971; Pillar, 1983; Mason, 1996; Walter, 2002; Fearon, 2005; Licklider, 1995). Accordingly, Iklé (1971) argues that in civil wars, since the sides are not geographically separable a partition is difficult; therefore, "...one side has to get all, or nearly so..." (p.95). Similarly, Pillar (1983) sees negotiation during civil conflicts as less practical than in interstate conflicts due to the indivisibility of the issues. According to Pillar, "neither side can get most of what it wants without depriving the other of most of what it wants...as a result, few civil wars end through negotiations unless they become highly internationalized" (p.24).

Walter (2002) argues that civil conflicts generally are fought over either the control of territory and/or governance. The divisibility of both issues seems to be quite difficult. On one hand, it could be argued that the insurgency fought over a territory which might be easier to resolve with a negotiation because while the political elite make concessions of the territory they can still hold on to power (Stedman, 1997). On the other hand, Walter (2002) has found that insurgent groups fighting over territory are not more likely to initiate negotiations, which has a negative effect on the insurgent's willingness to sign a treaty. Moreover, Walter has found that territorial goals, compared to those of gaining a share of governing power, have a negative effect on the willingness of insurgents to come to an agreement. Similarly, Dukalskis (2015) concludes that the insurgent groups which administer a territory in Burma are unlikely to sign a cease-fire agreement with the government. According to the author, the reason is that insurgent groups controlling an area are more likely to be long-lived and it is likely they have invested more human and financial resources in the given area; therefore, they would be less willing to sign a cease-fire. This is especially true if the insurgency relies on natural resources

or contraband for their support, and therefore the insurgent group will be less likely to negotiate (Dukalskis, 2015).

Some scholars have paid attention to the role of ethnicity during a civil conflict (Licklider, 1995; Sambanis, 2001; Fearon, 2005). Sambanis (2001), relying on Horowitz's (1985) theoretical perspectives on ethnic violence, thus categorizes civil conflicts into two major categories: identity wars (ethnic and religious wars) and non-identity wars. Licklider considers this distinction as well, and argues that ethnically motivated conflicts are more difficult to resolve. Mason (1996) stresses that territorial issues are easier to divide than identity issues (such as ethnicity), therefore, separatist wars are more likely to be settled through a negotiation than ethnic wars.

2.4. Seeing the Indicators under a New Theory: Costs and Benefits of Negotiation

Up until the study by Kaplow (2015), many have treated negotiation as a costless choice where parties to civil conflict decide to negotiate based on the cost of war or some other characteristic of the conflict. However, Kaplow (2015) argues that negotiation itself has costs and benefits. For instance, a government would consider negotiation with an insurgent group as costly if there were multiple insurgent groups in the country. This is partly because, if the government was to grant legitimacy to a group or make concessions for the sake of a negotiation attempt, other groups would seek the same privileges as the insurgent group with which the government is negotiating. As a result, the government would be seen as concession-prone.

Among existing studies, the most pronounced indicators of negotiation occurring during civil conflicts are the cost of war and the type of the conflict. However, recent work has called scholars' attention to the costs and benefits of negotiation as well (Kaplow, 2015). Although some of the measurements of the costs and benefits of negotiation suggested by Kaplow (such as the number of actors, third party assistance, and/or their involvement) have

been studied by others as indicators of negotiation under the cost of war theory, placing them under the costs/benefits of negotiation umbrella will provide researchers a different perspective on the underlying reasons behind negotiations during civil conflicts. Accordingly, the following section will address what the extant literature has proposed about the indicators of negotiation (suggested by this research as the costs/benefits of negotiation). The literature review is designed from the following variables, following the same order the hypotheses have been proposed in order to give a clearer understanding of where the theoretical point of this dissertation was derived. As such, the literature will be reviewed for every independent variable of the study separately.

Reputation

Walter (2006) argues that governments do not make concessions to self-determination movements when there are multiple potential claimants occupying lands. According to Walter, governments are heavily concerned with being perceived as concession-prone. Kaplow (2015) applies this same logic to negotiation and shows that governments are less likely to negotiate if there is a greater number of potential future claimants (i.e., there might be more than one insurgent group in a country), and if the government makes a concession to one of the insurgent groups, the others may want the same privileges. Therefore, negotiating with an insurgent group becomes more costly for the government due to the possibility of sending weak signals to other insurgent groups. The number and type of insurgent groups involved may therefore be key indicators of negotiation decisions. Findley (2012) has also included the number of insurgent groups in a country as a factor for determining its effect on his three stage negotiation model, but he does not consider multiple actors as a cost to reputation but rather argues that multiple actors will cause information problems.

Legitimacy

The most pronounced factor in civil wars and intrastate disputes, which is not usually seen in international wars, is the non-recognition of opponents (the unwillingness to admit that the adversary is legitimate) and that negotiation itself is a potential loss that will entail a significant political price (Walter, 2002; Zartman, 1993).

Unlike interstate wars in which both sides are internationally recognized as legitimate governments, intrastate wars are generally fought between a government and an insurgent group. Most of the time, governments do not recognize these insurgent groups as legitimate actors to be negotiated with and often label them as terrorists and/or criminals (Bapat, 2005). This tends to limit the potential for negotiations or certain types of negotiation (e.g., over substantive issues vs. ceasefires and prisoner exchanges). Furthermore, such negotiations may require face saving mechanisms, such as employment of “shuttle diplomacy” by third parties, thus avoiding direct meetings. It may be more likely, therefore, that substantive negotiations begin and are more fruitful in interstate than in civil conflicts since the parties recognize each other as legitimate actors (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2002). Indeed, Zartman (1995) argues that recognition is both the top and bottom line for insurgency.

Even though governments insist on not recognizing insurgent groups, these groups can gain legitimacy through other means such as their durability in fighting over time or through international recognition (Kaplow, 2015). Accordingly, longer-lived groups have a tendency to prove their de facto legitimacy by demonstrating staying power. Moreover, some insurgent groups have political links, and these parties or outside mediators can be better interlocutors for opening negotiations with governments. Therefore, for governments, negotiating with political parties seems less costly than negotiating with insurgent groups directly. While other studies have suggested various factors which serve to overcome the problem of legitimacy for insurgent groups (such as being longer-lived, internationally recognized, or having a third party

available for mediation), this study is the first to suggest the effects of a political extension for the insurgent groups (Kaplow, 2015; Walter, 2002).

Valid Spokesman

In civil conflicts, governments must decide who speaks for the insurgent group, and thus whom to contact, before starting any negotiation attempts. It is a precondition for negotiation (Zartman, 1995). Zartman argues that “the presence of strong leadership recognized as representative of each party and that can deliver that party’s compliance to the agreement is a necessary (while alone insufficient) condition for productive negotiations to begin, or indeed to end successfully” (2011, p.11).

Cunningham (2013) indicates that in most civil conflicts, governments purportedly cannot identify a spokesperson with which the government can initiate talks. This problem must be overcome prior to being able to hold any form of negotiations. Kaplow (2015) states that government wants a spokesperson who has control over the insurgency and can follow through with the commitment(s) that have been made. Moreover, it is safe to assume that a representative spokesperson reduces the transaction cost of the negotiation between parties.

External Pressure

In order to break the asymmetrical disadvantage in civil conflicts, insurgents often seek to link with an external host state and neighbor (Zartman, 1995). This leads to internationalization or trans-nationalization of conflicts as well as potential broadening of the negotiation potential so as to involve cross pressures by outsiders. Zartman argues that few internal wars are purely internal. For example, many diaspora groups support combatants in civil conflicts financially (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Kaplow (2015) argues that outside actors exert pressure on parties involved in civil conflict in order to influence their negotiation decision. As such, when the parties involved start talks which go against the interests or wishes of these outside actors who provide either

party with finance or military equipment, there is a risk that the party in question will lose the external ally. Therefore, in case the talks fail, there is a risk that the party might not win a military victory or a favorable settlement. As a result, the author argues that parties to civil war refuse negotiation attempts if they threaten their external support.

Cunningham (2006), on the other hand, talks about “veto players” who have divergent interests in a conflict. According to him, when there are more actors at play, it is more difficult to come to an agreement since there are conflicting interests and information asymmetry is more accurate. As a result, he argues that civil wars with veto players are more likely to last longer than others with two actors.

Terrorism

When it comes to negotiating with “terrorists”², things get increasingly complicated. This is because governments do not want to grant legitimacy to, or encourage, terrorist tactics by negotiating with those practicing them, and they therefore frequently label insurgent groups as terrorists initially (Bapat, 2005). Further, it may not only be the government side that does not want to negotiate, the terrorist group maintaining little or no interest in talks also. From the government’s point of view, negotiating with terrorists could be against the inherent principles of the state and serve to make terrorists stronger and terror tactics more popular. Neumann (2007) argues that although democratic countries often state that they never give in to violent acts or negotiate with their perpetrators, they often do so on issues ranging from ceasefires to prisoner releases. Thus, the more valid statement would be that negotiations are possible in all

² Since governments in civil conflicts tend to label all oppositions as “terrorists” or “criminals,” this typology might be confusing at some times. Thus, for the definition of “terrorism” and “terrorists,” this research relies on the guidance of Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Accordingly, the groups that are listed in the data are treated as “terrorists” and “terrorist organizations,” not based on how the respective government labeled them.

situations, and what focus needs to be placed on is the decision when, with whom, for what agenda(s), and how to negotiate.

In civil conflicts, the insurgent group may resort to terrorist activities such as wanton attacks on civilians or even develop into an internationally designated terrorist organization. At this point, it is important to clarify how terrorism is defined. Global Terrorism Database (GTD) defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). However, it is important to examine how terrorism is differentiated from civil wars and other political violence in order to have a better understanding of the negotiable situations in civil conflicts. Terrorism does not necessarily mean insurgency or civil war, and while terrorism sometimes can grow out of civil wars, not all terrorism evolves into civil wars (Sambanis, 2008).

Terrorist activities rely heavily on public support, and terrorist groups may build either a positive or negative reputation in the eyes of the public by various means over time (Findley & Young, 2012; Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016). Terrorist groups which conduct extreme attacks on civilians or kidnap children (such as Boko Haram in Nigeria) build a negative reputation and may lose public support. In the meantime, a terrorist might provide somewhat positive services alongside their violent activities in order to gain the support of specific groups (as is the case of Hezbollah that has invested in schools and health facilities in order to generate support from Lebanon's Shia community) (Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016). Although the media sometimes use the terms insurgents, rebels, and terrorists interchangeably, it is crucial to mark the distinction between them when it comes to civil wars and negotiation. Given that terrorist groups develop various strategies, some of which help to build a negative reputation and some of which bring a positive reputation and eventually lead to support for their group, negotiating with a terrorist group that has a negative reputation may damage the reputation of

a state thus causing the government to consider opening less costly talks only with terrorist groups that hold a somewhat positive reputation.

Fortna (2015) argues that the use of terrorism does not help insurgent groups at the negotiation table. Further, Fortna finds that rebels using terrorism are less likely to experience a negotiated settlement than those who avoid terrorism. Also, they assert that terrorism only causes the conflict to last longer and is not useful for rebels to achieve their political goals. Fortna adds that terrorism is a more effective tool, however, against democracies than non-democratic countries. On the other hand, Thomas (2014) through examining civil wars in African countries argued that governments are more likely to offer concessions to rebels who execute large scale terrorism during civil wars than those who eschew terrorism. Thomas's logic behind this argument is that use of terror displays the insurgent's "power to hurt," showing how governments are disadvantaged while they are merely responding to terrorism. Thomas argues that "governments' violent response to terrorism drives political moderates and civilians to extremists, whereas their inability to prevent violence prompts civilians to seek protection from non-state actors" (2014, p.816). Further, the author argues that governments are disadvantaged when they are responding to terrorism because they seldom are able to target those who are responsible for terrorist attacks. Therefore, the author puts forward that terror attacks during civil wars increase the probability of possible concession offers by the government during negotiations. Thomas's findings are contrary to Fortna's study, and names this pattern as "rewarding bad behavior." As a result, the extant literature presents mixed results and arguments as to how the act of terrorism during civil war influences the probability of negotiation.

Human Rights

The extant literature has not argued anything about the effect a government's respect for human rights has on the probability of negotiation. However, this dissertation takes this

matter into consideration based on the following logic. To look at the negotiation calculus from the insurgent groups` perspective, this study includes a measure of the human rights index for governments. The logic behind this is that just as governments do not consider insurgent groups to be legitimate actors for negotiation, there are cases where insurgent groups do not recognize governments as legitimate actors. Also, there is good reason to believe this may be the case when the government has no respect for human rights, tortures detainees or imprisoned individuals, or conducts large scale political imprisonments. In these cases, the insurgent group may see negotiating as being costlier than fighting since they cannot rely on the government and thus do not recognize its legitimacy due to the government`s disregard for the rights of its citizens.

Third Party Interventions

There are often third party interventions in civil conflicts, and these take various forms such as military, economic, and diplomatic interventions. Conventional wisdom holds that outside interventions increase the duration of civil wars (Regan 2000; 2002). However, there is contrary evidence in the literature. More importantly, scholars have agreed that the type of intervention plays a major role in determining the direction of civil wars, at least in terms of the duration of the conflict. Therefore, the influence of military intervention (often referred to as foreign military intervention) and diplomatic interventions (also called mediations) should be examined separately.

Scholars assert that the direction of military intervention may be of three kinds: supportive, hostile, and neutral (Pearson & Baumann, 1988; Pickering & Kisangani, 2006). Supportive and hostile interventions are those which either support the government and oppose the rebels, or support the rebels and oppose the government. Neutral (also called unbiased or in some cases humanitarian, e.g., evacuation) interventions, however, do not oppose or support either side (Lounsbury, 2016). While Mason, et al. (1999) argues that military intervention on

behalf of one side favors negotiated settlement since it increases the cost of the conflict, other scholars find that interventions supporting governments provide necessary assistance for repressing the rebels and interventions favoring the rebels increase their chances of victory (Peksen & Lounsbury, 2012; Gent, 2008). On the other hand, neutral interventions aim to bring stability and peace (Peksen & Lounsbury, 2012; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).

Scholars also pointed to the difference between multilateral and unilateral military interventions (Lounsbury, Pearson, & Talentino, 2011; Regan, Frank, & Aydin, 2009). The conventional wisdom holds that multilateral interventions taken under the auspices of the United Nations or some other supranational organizations are more influential in endorsing the stability and reforms in post-conflict era than are unilateral interventions, due to their “humanitarian” nature. Accordingly, Finnemore (1996) argues that multilateral interventions are respected as more legitimate than unilateral intervention, especially with the end of Cold War. On the other hand, Regan (1998) argues that in this era, most states are reluctant to take unilateral actions against civil uprisings, as in the example of Rwandan upheaval in 1994. As for the comparison of effectiveness of multilateral and unilateral interventions on improving the conditions in the target country, Lounsbury et al. (2011) present mixed results. Accordingly, the authors find a negative effect of all military interventions, including both multilateral and unilateral actions, on democratization, while they point slightly positive effects on economic growth and quality of life. Also, the scholars argue that multilateral interventions or neutral interventions have slight superiority over unilateral intervention in endorsing peace and stability in the post-conflict era.

In addition to military intervention, there is extensive emphasis on diplomatic interventions or aid to parties in intrastate wars. As such, the extant literature on conflict resolution has placed great emphasis on the role of mediation as a conflict management strategy (Walter, 2002; Regan & Aydin, 2006; Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Hamdan & Pearson, 2014).

It is seen as a common form of conflict management by many (Bercovitch & Regan 1999; Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997). Also, Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) defines mediation as “a variation on negotiation in which one or more outsiders (“third parties”) assist the parties in their discussion” (p.532). In that sense, the literature seems to argue that mediations and negotiations during civil conflicts are highly associated.

Regan and Aydin (2006) argues that just the outbreak of a civil war is a sign of disagreement between the government and the opposition. Therefore, it is difficult for them to settle the dispute without the help of an outside party. In the literature, mediators play two major roles in settling the dispute: first, to break information asymmetry and second, to rule out the commitment problem (Regan & Aydin, 2006; Walter, 2002). Accordingly, Regan and Aydin (2006) asserts that mediation reduces the asymmetry of information about the capabilities and incentives of parties involved in civil conflict. The authors find that even though diplomatic interventions (mediations) are effective and strategic tools in conflict management, they alter the sequence of events in a civil conflict. Moreover, Walter (2002) claims that mediation, by offering guarantees, can overcome the commitment problem which is seen as a major predicament to negotiation during civil wars by many scholars (Walter 1997; Walter, 2002; Powell, 2006; Mattes & Savun, 2009). On the other hand, other works not only focus on mediation attempts, but also the mediator`s neutral and honest role for the success of the mediation (Kydd, 2003; Svensson, 2009). Accordingly, Svensson (2009) argues that mediators whose primary interest is to end the war are more likely to lead to a peaceful agreement than biased mediators whose interests are to protect their protégés.

2.5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has presented the knowledge of the extant literature on negotiation in civil conflicts. The analysis above suggests that scholars have treated negotiation differently: either as a conflict termination or as a process. It also indicates that the most pronounced theories in

the literature, such as *Bargaining Theory* and *Ripeness Theory*, focuses on the cost of conflict to explain the occurrence of negotiation. The chapter has attempted to collect the suggested indicators of negotiation in the literature under three main groups. The first group consists of the indicators which are believed to measure “the cost of conflict”. The second group which includes the variables concerning the characteristic of conflict is suggested to account for ‘the type of conflict’ dimension. Last, the chapter has attempted to gather the literature’s knowledge on the dissertation’s suggested indicators as a new theoretical framework: *costs and benefits of negotiation*. Next chapter explains the methods and methodology of this research.

CHAPTER 3: METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

"If I can't picture it, I can't understand it."

Albert Einstein

This study both quantitatively and qualitatively assesses the occurrence of negotiations during civil conflicts under given conditions. As indicated in Chapter 2, the extant literature lacks insight on how negotiations may carry some costs and benefits to the sides involved. Moreover, Chapter 1 highlighted both the critical need for understanding the conditions leading to negotiations and the current lack of accurate measurements for the costs and benefits of negotiating during civil conflicts.

To address the goals of this study, this dissertation has developed a mixed approach that supports the descriptive nature of the research. This chapter discusses the overall research design, data analysis activities, the population studied, and data collection. Further, the chapter highlights methodological issues and limitations the data and methods may encompass.

3.1. Research Design

This dissertation uses a mixed approach, combining both qualitative and quantitative methods in order to grasp a thorough understanding of the conditions that prepare the foundations for negotiations to occur during civil conflicts. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. However, quantitative research has been the most commonly used assessment method in peace and conflict research for several reasons. First, the available datasets on armed conflicts allow researchers to conduct quantitative research more conveniently than qualitative research. Second, quantitative research enables researchers to generalize results from a larger sample, which is a common goal of peace and conflict researchers due to the general lack of understanding in the literature on the causes of peace and war. Further, to answer the research questions in this study regarding the conditions needed for negotiations, the calculation of the costs and benefits of negotiation (and the differences in the

decision to negotiate by warring dyads) calls for a quantitative research design utilizing a large collection of data. This is partially due to these questions needing a standard measurement for different calculations, behaviors, and characteristics of various governments and insurgent groups to be applied in a generalizable way in order to put forward practical political agendas and implementable actions for peace and resolution.

However, acknowledging that there is no single pathway toward negotiation, it is believed that generalization of the negotiation process for all civil conflicts would result in an oversimplification of the issue. Therefore, it has been found necessary to conduct four case studies as qualitative research in order to gain an understanding of the individual cases while comparing them with each other in the hope of explaining the motivations and underlying reasons behind negotiations in light of the country's internal dynamics and critical junctures that have occurred along the way.

Logistic Analysis

For quantitative analysis this study conducted a logistic regression on secondary aggregate data. Relying upon the Armed Conflict Database UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al, 2002) as the main data source, it combines several datasets as well in order to account for all independent variables (Gleditsch, et al., 2002). Detailed information on the datasets is provided in the Data Collection section.

Since the study has a dichotomous dependent variable, the occurrence of negotiation in a given dyad-year, logistic regression is a well-suited method for such analysis. In the logistic regression, a set of indicators derived from the literature regarding the negotiation outcome was tested. In conflict and peace research, regression is one of the most commonly used methods for predicting the outcome since most studies take war and peace as dichotomous dependent variables. In this case, however, the presence of negotiation stands for "one," and no negotiation accounts for "zero." Other scholarship handling similar dependent variables

have also made use of the various forms of logistic regression. Accordingly, Heger and Jung (2015) rely on logistic regression with their binary dependent variable which shows whether the dyad in question has held “talks” in a given year. Similarly, Hultquist (2013) uses multinomial logistic regression for his three unordered outcomes: ceasefire, government victory, and insurgent victory. On the other hand, Findley (2013) makes use of a nested logit regression since the author has an ordered and sequential outcome: “0,” negotiation not started; “1,” negotiations held; “2,” agreement reached; and “3,” successful implementation.

As seen from the extant literature, studies of conflict resolution which have binary or sequential dependent variables rely heavily on logistic analysis and its various forms based on the research. In the logistic analysis, after the regression is estimated, the results are used to predict the probability of the dependent variable’s occurrences. This study used logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of the occurrence of negotiation. However, Beck, et al. (2000), have questioned the quality of predictions made by a logistic regression, criticizing the studies for attempting to test the risk of conflict on a set of indicators. The authors argue that most studies using logistic regression limit their focus to the effect of independent variables and do not take the prediction seriously. On the other hand, later studies of significance on the causes of civil wars did not consider this issue significant (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2005). Nevertheless, being aware of the possible limitations of logistic regression, this dissertation has supplemented the analysis with additional chi-square tests and case studies for a more thorough understanding of the phenomena.

Cross Sectional Analysis

For the logistic regression, a cross-sectional study was selected over longitudinal or time series analyses. This is because cross-sectional study serves best for this study’s interest in explaining the conditions needed for negotiation during civil conflicts for a number of reasons. First, most of the independent variables (especially regarding the characteristics of

governments and insurgent groups) do not show significant variance over time. For instance, a longitudinal study which observes the same subject over a period of time would not explain the occurrence of a negotiation any more than the cross-sectional study did since most of the variables stay the same in a given dyad over time. Second, the nature of the research question calls for explanations of the relationship between the occurrence of negotiation and the suggested conditions (the hypotheses). As such, the study is not interested in understanding the change in conditions over time, or how it has affected the outcome. Therefore, it takes every dyad-year as an independent case without concerning the factor of time. Moreover, this approach is in line with most of the other studies which have focused on similar research questions (Walter, 1997; Walter, 2001; Findley, 2013; Kaplow, 2015).

Case Study

Regarding qualitative research, this study has made use of four individual case studies. The way cases were selected for the study serves the research's interest perfectly since it allows for comparison among the conditions of negotiation and the dyad groups. With the chosen cases studies, this assessment sought to mitigate the pitfalls that the logistic regression had failed to explain. In a case study, one of the most crucial elements is to decide how to select the cases while also ruling out the risk of a biased analysis. Therefore, in this dissertation, how the cases were selected is of utmost importance and is thus explained in detail within the Data Analysis section later in the chapter.

George and Bennett (2005) placed great emphasis on the many advantages of case studies over other methods. First, they are beneficial for conceptual validity, which enables researchers to measure the indicators in a way that best presents the theoretical concepts. Second, since researchers are not limited to a well-defined dataset in case studies they can identify additional variables and formulate new hypotheses. Third, case studies are helpful for exploring complex causal relations, intricate interaction effects, and path dependencies

(Stardman, 2013). Lastly, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that case studies help researchers to understand the cases which do not act in ways suggested they would by the rules established by theory.

Based on the aforementioned advantages of a case study, it seems to be a great fit for this dissertation's interest. Accordingly, although the indicators of negotiations are measured in the dataset, most of them are still conceptual variables. Therefore, it is to the researcher's advantage to give more flexibility to the measurement of the concepts with the assistance of in-depth cultural and historical analysis provided by case studies. Moreover, it is difficult to explain why some cases did not behave in the way that the study expected. Therefore, case studies have been a great assistance for deriving alternative variables and hypotheses. Also, while the logistic regression does not promise any explanation about the causal relationship between variables, the causality of the relationship between variables was still able to be claimed.

However, some limitations of case studies have been suggested (Flyvbjerg, 2006). First, it is not possible to extract a generalization based on a single case study. Second, the study may present bias verification since researchers have a tendency to confirm their predetermined ideas. Nonetheless, these limitations offer limited to no threat to this dissertation. This is because it is not the goal of this dissertation to generalize the idea of a specific case study or other cases. The goal is simply to understand why the case itself did go in that specific way. Selection of the cases has further ruled out any bias verification because this dissertation utilizes four distinctly different cases, only one of which provides verification to the theory. It should also be noted that the case studies in this dissertation have played only a supplementary role to the main analysis derived through logistic regression. While during some cases the role of some of the indicators was able to be verified, in others it was concluded

that they were not as effective as suggested and thus alternative explanations were able to be presented for the outcome.

Overall, this study has attempted to avoid the conception in social sciences that a single research method should be chosen over the others. Accordingly, it approaches quantitative and qualitative research as being complementary as opposed to rivals. Todd Jick (1979) encourages social scientists to use multiple methods, so long as they can justify the need and effectiveness of the particular combination of methods. Moreover, the prominent work of Walter (2002) on the subject argues similarly about the necessity of multiple research methods. Accordingly, Walter puts forward that, with the help of statistical analysis, researches can compare many cases at once and thus examine patterns that would not be revealed by the mere observation of a small number of cases. This, in return, helps researchers make meaningful generalizations. However, Walter (2002) also draws attention to the limitations of statistical analysis. As such, statistical analysis is not helpful for explaining the causality of the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Further, it cannot explain why some cases act in an unpredicted way in comparison to that suggested by the theory. In this dissertation, this is where case studies contribute and assist in understanding how historical events and cultural issues have affected the decision to negotiate or fight.

3.2. Population and Sample

In this study, the unit of analysis is the “dyad-year,” which stands for a government group and an insurgent group being in conflict with one another in a given year. Dyadic forms carry some advantages over alternatives such as country-year. First of all, while country-year analysis is solely focused on the country and state characteristics (such as the level of development, regime type, and ethnic constellation), they tend to ignore the attributes of various insurgent groups as if they are out there ready to negotiate when the other conditions are present. However, this dissertation derives from the notion put forward by Cunningham, et

al. (2009), that “it takes two” to negotiate. Similarly, Salehyan, et al. (2008), argue that “cross-national empirical studies of civil war generally ignore the identity of the actors involved in a conflict” (Salehyan, et al, 2008, p.2). Accordingly, to understand the negotiation calculation from the perspective of both warring parties and to take their characteristics into the consideration, the research has been structured as dyad-years.

To determine what might be considered an armed conflict, this study has relied on the definition established by the Armed Conflict Database UCPD/PRIO, being “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (Gleditsch, et al, 2002). Since the study was designed in dyadic form, then, the UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset has been relied upon to determine all dyads in intrastate armed conflicts during the same time period. A dyad consists of a contested incompatibility over governance and/or territory between a government and a non-state actor, resulting in 25 battle-related deaths during a year (Harbom, et al., 2008). This dataset includes all dyads in civil conflicts that fell under the given definition.

It is important to note that the 25 battle-related death threshold is more encompassing than other datasets on armed conflicts, such as the Correlates of War Project (COW) which has a 1000 battle-related death threshold for a case to be considered civil war. The 25 battle-related death threshold not only allows more cases to be included in the study, but also enables analysis of the differences between the conflicts with more than 1000 battle-related deaths (coded as major conflicts in the data) and the ones with less than 1000 battle-related deaths (coded as low level conflicts in the data). In the end, 991 dyad-years were observed, which included low level and major internal armed conflicts between 1989 and 2008 and taking place around the world. Time restriction of the data is due to the unavailability of data about all variables outside this period.

Data Collection

While this research relies on the Armed Conflict Database UCDP/PRIO as the main data source, it combines a variety of datasets in order to accommodate for all the variables (Gleditsch, et al., 2002). These datasets are the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA) introduced by Cunningham and his colleagues (2013), the Reputation of Terror Groups dataset (RTG) by Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016), International Military Intervention dataset (IMI) of Pearson and Baumann (1988) and updated by Pickering and Kisangani (2009), and the CIRI Human Rights Data Project designed by Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay (2014).

The choice of combining these datasets in this study lies in the theoretical and methodological choice of the research. These datasets are well suited for the dissertation in comparison to the alternatives covering this subject matter. In the next section their limitations and strengths will be explained as well as why they have been preferred over other datasets.

The UCDP Dataset.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is one of the main data sources on organized violence, having been started at Uppsala University in Sweden during the 1980s (Sousa, 2014). Since 1993, data on armed conflicts produced by the UCDP has been published in the *Journal of Peace Research*. Although there other data sources on armed conflicts are available, this data program carries some advantages over others such as the Correlates of War Project (COW) and the Minority at Risk Research (MAR). First, the main difference between the COW and UCDP datasets is their inclusion of cases; while the COW has a 1000 battle-related death threshold for a conflict to be categorized as civil war, the UCDP lowers this threshold to 25 and allows researchers to analyze low intensity conflicts (less than 1000 deaths) and civil wars (more than 1000 deaths). Since one of the interests of this study is to explain the difference between low-level conflicts and major conflicts when it comes to the decision to engage in negotiations, the choice was made to use the UCDP data. This distinction was

included in the analysis by coding conflicts which do not reach the 1000 battle-related death threshold as *minor conflicts* and conflict with more than 1000 battle-related deaths as *wars*. Second, while the MAR provides detailed information about ethnic groups, its scope of area is limited to Middle Eastern and African countries. Therefore, the UCDP data allowed broader coverage of conflicts around the world. Another aspect of the dataset that made itself suitable for the research was its compatibility with the other datasets that were combined.

The collection of the UCDP data is performed in four stages. Searching words related to organized violence in the online Factiva Global News Database, which has a global coverage monitoring newspapers, newswires, and other sources (including Reuters, AFP, Xinhua, EFE, and the BBC) initiates the first stage. Then, the gathered information is coded according to the criterion of the UCDP coding system and categorization. In the second stage, the coders continue their search of online databases for organized violence published in books, case studies, articles, journals (i.e. Africa Research Bulletin and Africa Confidential), and NGO publications (such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). This information is also coded manually according to the UCDP coding system, and if there is a change identified since the previous information it is updated according to the new information. In the third stage the coders turn to the UCDP's broad network of regional experts to assist in clarifying the information if anything is missing such as why an actor is fighting, the number of deaths, or other factors regarding the conflict. The data collected is then checked by the UCDP's project managers and directors in the last stage.

The Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA).

The Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset was developed by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013). This dataset contains information about the non-state organizations included in the UCDP Dyadic dataset. Therefore, The UCDP and NSA datasets

are compatible with each other because the NSA provides detailed information about state-rebel group dyads included in the UCDP and relies on the same definitions and coding system.

Data provided in this dissertation from the NSA offered a significant ability to understand the insurgent groups. While the literature's extreme focus on the country-level characteristics of the conflicts typically ignores the roles of non-state actors, this dissertation was able to grasp the negotiation calculation while taking the characteristics of the insurgent groups into account as well. Accordingly, the data offered information on the conflict such as rebel strengths, territorial control of insurgent groups, organizational structures, and external supports, as well as other attributes of non-state actors (Cunningham, et al., 2013).

In the data collection process, the authors relied mostly on the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, which is a reliable and invaluable source of information on the number of troops which governments and insurgents have and the presence of external support to both sides (Cunningham, 2013). Since the UCDP data is limited to the time period after 1975, the authors relied on other sources in order to expand the data back to 1945, their main sources being "Keesing's Record of World Events, news reports found through searches in Lexis-Nexis academic and secondary academic sources about individual conflicts and countries" (Cunningham, et al., 2013, p.521).

It is crucial to note that the NSA data played a major role in this research. One of its contributions was to allow dyadic research to be conducted because it provided information about insurgent groups. This was its primary contribution to the study. Based on this data, this dissertation argues that a thorough understanding of a negotiation can be acquired through the understanding of every single actor involved, a simple premise that somehow has yet been missing in peace research. Another advantage of the database is that it uses an ordinal scale to measure its variables, which gives the researcher more variance to observe. For instance, the variable which shows whether the insurgent group has control over the country's territory is

coded as being either low, medium, or high. On the other hand, one disadvantage of the data for this research may be that it is not structured as annual observations like the data used by the UCDP. However, its conversion to annual forms was possible, and shows the changes in insurgent group characteristics over time.

The Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset (RTG).

The Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset (RTG) introduced by Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016) measures the reputation terror groups hold with their constituency and target audience based on their activities. Built on the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD), this dataset covers all terrorist activities around the world from 1970 through 2016 (START, 2017). It has an extensive sample size covering all terrorist groups in the years between 1980 and 2011, making up 443 terror groups and a total of 2641 observations. RTG data excludes terrorist groups which have less than five terrorist activities between 1980 and 2011 in order to narrow its focus to the reputation of groups that have been able to survive over some time (Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016).

One of the major advantages of RTG is that this has been the first attempt to measure the popularity of terrorist groups. While most studies on terrorism assume all terrorist activities cause similar ends, this data shows how different activities of terrorists may build positive or negative reputations for them. Therefore, the data allows the researcher to compare different terrorist groups. In this study, the reputation of a terrorist group was used to understand its effect on the negotiation calculus of the government.

The data provided an ordinal measure of the positive and negative reputations of terrorist groups, ranging between 0 and 3. When it comes to the validity of indicators of reputation in the data, the authors used factor analysis with the principal components factor method so as to make sure they used the appropriate variable for each index (Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016). However, one limitation of the data may be how it treats the missing data.

Accordingly, when there was missing information in a year, it was filled based on the information about the last data point. For instance, if the information about a terrorist group's media outlet was present in 2003, 2004, and 2006, while 2005 was missing, RTG filled 2005 with the same information in 2006 on the assumption that the media continued in that year as well (Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016).

International Military Intervention Dataset (IMI).

International Military Intervention Dataset was first introduced by Pearson and Baumann (1993), and covers military intervention from 1946 through 1989. Then, Pickering and Kisangani (2009) updated the data through 2005.

While collecting the data used in the updating process, the authors used eight main sources, six of which were news wire sources while another two were major newspapers. Namely, these sources were the AP, UPI, Reuters, Agence France Press, Interfax (a Russian NGO news service), Xinhua (official press agency of China), *the New York Times*, and *Le Monde*. The Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe was used to conduct a search through these sources. To secure the reliability of the data, a team consisting of five advanced undergraduate and four graduate students was assembled and each student and principle investigator independently compiled information on interventions through these eight sources. The PIs then analyzed all the information gathered by the students and had the final determination about inclusion of the data. To rule out any possible biases which may harm the reliability of the data-collection, the authors developed a standardized data-collection procedure for the students monitor. Further, they conducted a set of tests for inter-coder reliability. As for the concern over validity, the authors asked a number of outside scholars to independently examine their materials and codebook (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009).

For this dissertation, the IMI data has some advantages over its alternatives. First, while the other datasets commonly used in the literature [such as the Militarized Interstate Disputes

(MID), Military Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS), and Tillema's (1989) military intervention data] solely focus on hostile military intervention against state actors, the IMI data covers every intervention regardless of its purpose. Moreover, while the IMI data is more inclusive, it codes the interventions as opposing the government, supporting the government, or neutral (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009). On the other hand, MIPS data provides information only about major-scale power interventions by five permanent members of the UN. However, the IMI data contains information about both minor and major intervention actions of the five members as well as interventions launched by non-major powers. With these advantages of the data, it fit perfectly with the dyadic nature of this dissertation allowing an understanding of how the presence and purpose of interventions played a role in the negotiation calculation of parties involved in civil conflict.

The CIRI Human Rights Data Project.

The CIRI Human Rights Data project provides information about the extent governments respect human rights for almost every country around the world. In addition it includes fifteen internationally recognized human right activities [including *Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings (or defined as Arbitrary or Unlawful - Deprivation of Life), Disappearance, Torture, Political Imprisonment, Freedom of Speech and Press, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Domestic Movement, Freedom of Foreign Movement and Travel, Freedom of Assembly and Association, Electoral Self-Determination, Worker Rights, Women's Political Rights, Women's Economic Rights, Independent Judiciary, and Women's Social Rights*] to measure each government's respect for human rights across 195 countries between 1981 and 2011 (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014).

The CIRI project argues it is a non-governmental organization which is independent of the influence of any governments, not accepting funds from government institutions or formulating contracts between them, therefore, it does not serve as an extension of any

government (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010). The data, for all of its variables, rely on the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International's Annual Reports. When there is a contradiction between these two sources, coders use the latter for rendering their final decision. Moreover, coders turn to other reliable news sources (such as the *New York Times*, *BBC*, *Washington Post*, *LA Times*, *Reuters*, *AP*, and *Agence France-Presse*) to confirm the collected information (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014).

In the data, units are coded in the country-year format. CIRI data code only government violations of human rights against its own citizens and within their own country's borders. Therefore, government violations of human rights for non-citizens and outside the country's borders are not included in the data. Further, the data are not concerned about the geographic concentration of the violations within the country, focusing only on the overall number of occurrences in each country. In addition the CIRI data set codes only human rights practices of governments without concerning the overall human rights condition in the country or its human rights policies. This means that the data codes only human rights practices of governments and its agencies. However, the condition of human rights in a country may be influenced by other factors such as the presence of foreign companies and non-state actors. Therefore, the overall human rights condition in the country is not taken into consideration. Similarly, human rights policies (such as legislation and incorporation in the constitution of a country) may be different from their actual practice. For this reason, the data is not concerned about the human rights policies of a country (Cingranelli & Richards, 2014).

Wood and Gibney (2010) criticized the CIRI data from three main perspectives. First, the authors argued that the CIRI data set uses an arbitrary threshold to create ordinal scales. As such, the CIRI codes zero violations as "2" (full respect); 1-49 violations as "1" (moderate respect); and more than 50 violations as "0" (no respect). The authors continue to argue that this, in turn, causes a country with 3001 violations and a country with 51 violations to receive

the same score in respect to human rights violations. Lastly, the authors criticized the data for not giving countries like Canada and New Zealand, which are known for their respect of human rights, perfect CIRI index scores.

On the other hand, Cingranelli and Richards (2010) explain the quality of the coding procedure and reliability of the CIRI data by responding to all of these criticisms. The authors acknowledge that the threshold they placed to measure their ordinal scales are arbitrary numbers; however, they are based on the years of reading reports available to them. They also gave the example of the 1000 battle-related deaths threshold used in the Correlates of War project data, which has shaped war and peace research for use and was also derived arbitrarily yet based on expertise in the field. Moreover, when it comes to the second criticism of the data, they accept this limitation yet continued to argue that this issue does not pertain to the CIRI data per se, but the problem of all datasets. Lastly, about not giving a perfect score to the countries known as “best,” the authors argued that they do not consider relative respect of countries but rather they rank countries according to an absolute standard of behaviors. For instance, Cingranelli and Richards (2010) state that due to Amnesty International’s report of police and guard brutality in the United States, such as “prison rapes (torture); the imprisonment of suspected terrorists without access to lawyers or the right to a trial (political imprisonment); and the continued use of tasers by police....,” (p.409), the US receives a low score on these human rights practices. What is more, the authors report that they found a 0.94 Krippendorff’s \bar{r} intercoder reliability test score in the data in 2004, which is considered very high given the fact that 0 represents “no reliability” and 1 represents “perfect reliability” (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010).

3.3. Data Analysis

The central goal of this study is to provide a better understanding of negotiations during civil conflicts and the conditions leading to the warring parties’ willingness to negotiate. In

addition to testing the proposed hypotheses by using overall aggregate data analysis, supplementary comparative case studies have also been included to illustrate pitfalls that the logistic regression analysis has failed to explain. Further, to explain the relationship between mediation and negotiation, a subset analysis has been conducted by relying on mediation and negotiation events in internal armed conflicts data which is built on the UCDP dataset (Svensson, 2007).

Logistic Analysis Research Design

In order to explain the relationship between the costs and benefits of negotiation and the occurrences of negotiation, all civil conflicts occurring from 1989 to 2008 have been identified by using the Armed Conflict Database UCDP/PRIO. These years have been chosen since the dependent variable (negotiation) acquired from the UCDP Database Categorical Variables is only available for the conflicts occurring in this time period (Gleditsch, et al, 2002). Then, for the dyadic form, the UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset was relied upon (Harbom, et al, 2008). Also, the data were combined with the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict (NSA), Reputation of Terror Groups dataset (RTG), and International Military Intervention (IMI) datasets to accommodate for, respectively, the characteristics of the insurgent groups, terrorist events, and foreign military intervention variables. In addition, the CIRI Human Rights Data Project was utilized to account for the government`s respect for human rights.

To test the hypotheses in this dissertation, the overall aggregate data consisting of 991 units of dyad-years in a time period from 1989 through 2008 is relied upon, and a logistic regression analysis of various models where all indicators are tested separately and in combinations, and one final model including all indicators, is included in the study.

In addition to these models, a subset Chi-square analysis was conducted in order to see the relationship between third party mediation efforts and a negotiation outcome. For this subset analysis, the dataset on mediation and negotiation events presented by Svensson (2007),

which is also built on the UCDP dataset, was utilized. There were several reasons for conducting a subset analysis. First, this study's main dataset is not suited to testing the effect of mediation properly. Second, Svenssons's data provide detailed information about mediation and third parties. However, one downside of the MIC data is that they are limited to the years between 1989 and 2003.

Case Study Research Design

For a better understanding of the negotiation process during civil conflicts, it is important to support the identified conditions needed for negotiation with as many cases as possible in order to provide soundness to the proposed theory. As Pearson and Lounsbury (2009) noted, "no matter how compelling a theory may seem, if we, as a field of conflict resolution researchers, have not provided evidence to support theory, we run the risk of misleading practitioners, students, and scholars alike" (p.71). In the end, every conflict has its own cultural and psychological dynamics. Findings should be confirmed with case studies. Stedman (1991) stresses that more case studies are needed to give additional insights into conflict resolution so that applicable theories can be developed.

To respond to the call of scholars for this necessity of integrating applicable case studies, this dissertation has examined four conflict dyads in detail. Moreover, how this dissertation has structured the case study analyses presents two major advantages. First, four cases were divided into two pairs of cases in which dyads were considered similar between them in terms of negotiation probability (high and low). Second, the selection of cases was chosen dependent on the results of the logistic regression analysis. To avoid a biased interpretation of cases, particular attention was paid to the warning of Most and Starr (1982) that scholars should focus on all possibilities of both independent and dependent variables, which means including cases with the occurrence (X) and nonoccurrence (-X) of some

independent variables and the occurrence (Y) and nonoccurrence (-Y) of some dependent variables. Therefore, representative cases in an analysis should include “X, -X, Y, -Y”.

Accordingly, since logistic regression provides researchers with the probabilities of an outcome, based on the logistic results, the decision was made to select: (1) one case with the highest probability of negotiation which has experienced negotiation in fact; (2) one case with the highest probability of negotiation which has not experienced negotiation; (3) one case with the lowest probability of negotiation which has experienced negotiation; (4) one case with the lowest probability of negotiation which has not experienced negotiation. According to Flyvbjerg's (2006) categorization of the strategies for selecting cases, this system may be considered information-oriented selection, which aims to maximize the utility of information from small samples. Accordingly, “cases are selected on the basis of expectations about their information content” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.230). Moreover, it is necessary to note that not all negotiations discuss the same matters. While some may lead to peace agreements, others discuss prisoner exchanges, ceasefires, or similar agreements. Therefore, this study has paid attention to the negotiation matter in cases while simultaneously comparing them. By doing so, the dissertation provides a comprehensive explanation across both similar and different dyads and is able to explain what kinds of unpredicted conditions have played a role in favor of or against negotiation. Moreover, case studies provided a better understanding of the cultural, historical, and group dynamics supporting the discovered explanations.

Operationalization of Variables for the Logistic Regression

Table 1 below summarizes the operationalization of the variables in logistic regression. Accordingly, the table includes the description of variables, their roles in the research (i.e. dependent variable, independent variable, and control variable), how they are measured, and from what dataset they were derived.

Table 3.1. Variables, Descriptions, Level of Measurement, Sources of Data: Logistic Regression

Variables	Description	Level of Measurement	Data Source
Dependent Variable			
Negotiation	The Presence of any talks involving both parties to the conflict and concerning conflict-related issues	Dummy (0=no negotiation, 1=negotiation)	UCDP
Control Variables (Representing the Cost of War Theory)			
Battle-related Deaths	The number of battle-related deaths in the conflict in a given year	Logged	UCDP
Duration	Measure of how many years have passed since the first start date of the conflict, measured in years	Integral	UCDP
Stalemate	Measure of whether the government and insurgent`s military capacity is at parity	Dummy (0=no stalemate, 1=stalemate)	NSA
Territory Control	Measure of insurgent group`s territorial control in the country	Dummy (0=no control, 1=control)	NSA
Independent Variables - Hypotheses (Representing the Costs/Benefits of Negotiation)			

Variables	Description	Level of Measurement	Data Source
<i>Reputation Hypothesis</i>	The number of insurgent groups fighting with the government in a given year	Integral	UCDP
<i>Legitimacy Hypothesis</i>	The presence of the insurgent`s link to a political party	Dummy (0=no link, 1=link)	NSA
<i>Valid Spokesman Hypothesis</i>	Measure of whether there is a central leadership	Nominal (1=low, 2=moderate, 3=high)	NSA
<i>External Pressure Hypotheses</i>			
<i>a-Transnational Constituency</i>	1 -whether the insurgent group has a transnational link	1 -Dummy (0=no transnational link, 1=transnational link)	NSA
<i>b-Outside Pressure</i>	2 -whether the insurgent group receives military support from an external state and/or a non-state actor	2-a. Dummy (0=no external state support, 1=external state support) b. Dummy (0=no non-state actor support, 1=non-state actor support)	NSA

Variables	Description	Level of Measurement	Data Source
<i>Terrorism</i>	<p>1-Positive Constituency Reputation of the Terrorist Organizations</p> <p>2-Negative Constituency Reputation of the Terrorist Organization</p> <p>3-Target Audience Reputation of the Terrorist Organization</p>	<p>1-ordinal scale (ranges from 0 to 3)</p> <p>2-ordinal scale (ranges from 0 to 3)</p> <p>3-ordinal scale (ranges from 0 to 2)</p>	RTG
<i>Third Party Intervention</i>	Measure of whether there is a biased foreign military intervention to the conflict by another state	Dummy (0=unbiased intervention, 1=biased intervention)	IMI
<i>Human Rights Hypothesis</i>			
<i>1-Physical Integrity Rights</i>	1-measure of indicators of human right violations including torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance	1- Physical Right Index - ordinal (ranges from 0 (being no respect four these four rights) to 8 (being full	CIRI

Variables	Description	Level of Measurement	Data Source
<i>2-Empowerment Rights</i>	2- measure of indicators of human rights violations including the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers' Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators	respect for these four rights). 2-Empowerment Rights Index – ordinal (ranges from 0 (being no respect for these four rights) to 14 (being full respect for these four rights).	CIRI
Control Variables (Representing Types of the Conflict)			
Incompatibility	Describes the issue that the conflict is fought over	Dummy (0=governance, 1=territory)	UCDP
The intensity of Conflict	Describes the magnitude of the conflict in terms of number of deaths	Dummy (0=minor conflict, 1=major conflict)	UCDP
The actors involved	Describes whether there is other states involved in the conflict.	Dummy (0=internationalized, 1=internal)	UCDP

Data Sources: UCDP (the Uppsala Conflict Dataset Project), NSA (Non-State Actor Dataset), IMI (International Military Intervention Dataset), RTG (Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset), CIRI (The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Project)

Dependent Variable.

The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of negotiation, which takes values of one if there were any negotiations in the dyad during year and zero otherwise. In the analysis, any talks involving both parties to the conflict and concerning conflict-related issues such as ceasefires, exchanges of prisoners, or the creation of humanitarian zones, are considered to be negotiations.

Independent Variables.

The costs and benefits of negotiation were measured by several indicators. To test the reputation hypothesis, a simple measure of the number of insurgent groups fighting with the government was created, simply counting the number of insurgent groups fighting with the same government in a given year.

To test the legitimacy hypothesis, a measure adopted from the NSA dataset was utilized. Accordingly, a dichotomous measure which takes a value of one if the insurgent group has a political link but otherwise zero was included.

To test the valid spokesman hypothesis, an ordinal measure was constructed by relying on the NSA dataset, which indicates the strength of central leadership in the insurgent group as low, moderate, and high. This hypothesis assumes that if the insurgent has a high level of centralized leadership, the government would know whom to speak with and the occurrence of negotiation thus becomes more likely.

As for the effect of outside actors on talks between governments and insurgent groups, two hypotheses have been proposed: transnational constituency and outside support. To test outside support, two dichotomous variables have been included which indicate whether the insurgent group receives military support from an external state and/or non-state actor. By doing so, the study helps to differentiate between the effects of different source of support for insurgent groups on the occurrence of negotiation. A value of one is given to the non-state actor

support variable if the insurgent group is supported by at least one non-state actor in a different country, otherwise remaining zero. The external state support variable takes the value of one if the insurgent group receives military support from at least one external state. To test the transnational constituency hypothesis, a dichotomous variable created by the NSA dataset has been adopted. The measure of transnational constituency of an insurgent group takes the value of one if the insurgent group has a transnational link to and/or is supported in a non-military manner by another non-state actor in other states, otherwise remaining zero.

To test the terrorism hypothesis, positive and negative constituency reputation as well as target audience reputation scales used for the Reputation of Terrorist Groups datasets (RTG) introduced by Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu (2016) have been adopted. The dataset includes all terrorist organizations listed in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD Advisory Board, 2017). These scales of positive and negative constituency reputation are ordinal variables, taking a value between 0 and 3. To measure the positive constituency of terrorist groups, the dataset uses an additive index that includes public good provision, media power, and political existence. To account for the negative reputation of terrorist groups, the dataset uses an additive index that includes forced recruitment, child recruitment, and forced funding. Moreover, the dataset incorporates another additive index, taking value from 0 to 2, which indicates whether the terrorist group conducts extreme violence against civilians and targeting children.

For the third-party intervention variable, use was made of the International Military Intervention dataset (IMI) in order to code third party military intervention(s) for the given year. IMI dataset codes all foreign military intervention in civil conflicts from 1989 to 2005 and provides information about the directions (intentions) of these interventions labeling them as neutral, supporting government, supporting rebels, opposing government, and opposing rebels. Accordingly, two dichotomous variable were created. One dichotomous measure which takes the value of one if there was a foreign military intervention in the country regardless of

the intervener's intention, otherwise remaining zero, was included. Also, another dichotomous variable was created to indicate whether the intervention was biased or unbiased. Accordingly, the interventions opposing governments or insurgents and the ones supporting either parties were coded as biased intervention while neutral interventions (not supporting either parties) were coded as unbiased interventions.

As for the human rights hypothesis, Physical Integrity Rights and Empowerment Rights indexes from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project index have been adopted (Cingranelli, et al., 2014). The Physical Integrity Right index includes four indicators (torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance) and ranges from 0 (being no respect for these four rights) to 8 (mainting full respect for these four rights). The latter index consists of the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (being no respect for these rights) to 14 (being full respect for these rights).

Control Variables.

Since the literature places a heavy emphasis on the cost of conflict, this study uses it as a control variable. Relying on the extant literature, four indicators have been used to measure the cost of the conflict. Accordingly, the first indicator is the number of battle-related deaths in a given year. The number of deaths shows much variance across the dyad-years; therefore, it is better measured of in terms of ratios than difference. Accordingly, the effect of number of deaths on negotiation outcome by one unit increase in death would be meaningless. Therefore, a logarithmic value of this variable was included in the analysis. Second, the duration of conflict, measured by how many years have passed since the first start of the conflict, was included. Third, the most pronounced stalemate hypothesis was controlled for. To measure stalemate, a ordinal variable drawn from the NSA dataset (which measures the relative strength

of insurgent group against the government as “much weaker”, “weaker”, “at parity”, “stronger”, and “much stronger”) was recoded into a dummy which takes the values of one if the military strength of the insurgent group is at parity with the government, otherwise remaining zero. The NSA dataset is a reliable one for measuring military stalemate since the authors use not only the UCDP encyclopedia but also *Keesing`s Record of World Events* and additional secondary academic sources for collecting information on the military capacity of the insurgent group and the government (Cunningham, et al., 2013). Lastly, the NSA dataset`s measure of whether the insurgent group controls a territory within the country was adopted.

Due to the focus in previous scholarship on the types of conflicts, another series of control variables was included in order to rule out any biased assessment of negotiations during civil conflicts. To decide what issue was at the root of the conflict, one-dummy variables (called Territorial Conflicts) were created. While this variable takes a value of one if the conflict is fought over a territory, the territorial conflict variable takes a value of zero if the conflict is over government control. In addition, another dummy variable was integrated to differentiate internal conflicts from internationalized conflicts. Accordingly, the variable takes a value of one if the conflict is internal yet takes a value of zero if the conflict is internationalized.

3.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has presented the methods and methodology of this research by explaining how it relates to the current literature. For the logistic analysis, the necessity and strength of the method as well as its weaknesses have been presented. The chapter has explained that the case study research strengthens the soundness of this study. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of a case study have been discussed. The chapter, also, has introduced the aggregate data, population and sample. Moreover, how the dependent, independent and control variables have been operationalized for the sake of this dissertation have been explained in details to set the stage for interpretation of the results in the next chapter. Accordingly, the

following chapter discusses the results of logistic analysis and discuss them in relation to the hypotheses.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS

This chapter reports the results of logistic regression and interpretations. In addition to the results of logistic regression, the chapter also provides descriptive statistics for the indicators of costs and benefits of negotiation as well as chi-square analyses for nominal control variables. Accordingly, before discussing the main finding of the regression analysis, it starts with a number of chi-square analyses. Later, a chi-square analysis, as a subset analysis, was conducted to show the association between mediation and negotiation. The chapter continues with the summary statistics for the independent variable. Then, it reveals the results of logistic regression and offers interpretations accordingly.

4.1. Descriptive Analysis

Before discussing further the analyses and results, it is important to give a general picture about the units in the study and the dependent variable (negotiation). The collected aggregate data includes 991 dyad-years (see Appendix A, for the list of warring dyads). As seen from the pie chart below, of those observed dyad-years, negotiation is present at only about 28 percent, which is the part painted in blue.




Figure 4.1. The Frequencies of Negotiation across 991 Observations

Chi-Square Analyses

In this study, relying on the extant literature, two sets of control variables were used. These are namely the cost of war (conflict) and the type of war (conflict) variables. Before using these variables in the logistic regression, they were separately put into chi-square tests to see their association with the dependent variable (negotiation). This is important because these variables reflect the characteristics of conflicts, and they do not show much variation across time. Especially, the type of conflicts variables are considered valid indicators of characteristics of conflicts. Therefore, it is crucial to determine whether there is a significant association various characteristics of conflicts and negotiation outcome. Accordingly, the following tables describes the significance of suggested associations and percentages of each outcome.

First, the association between the variables of type of conflicts (issues of incompatibility, type of conflict, and intensity of conflict) and the occurrence of negotiation is considered. Accordingly, Table 4.1 shows the association between the issues of incompatibility and negotiation. As seen from the table, territorial issues somewhat dominated over governmental issues in the occurrence of negotiation. These numbers suggest, though it does not prove, that it may be easier for parties to negotiate when the issue at stake is territorial instead of negotiating the control of governance or sharing governance. This preliminary finding seems to be in line with previous studies (Stedman, 1997; Walter, 2002). Accordingly, the numbers show that while about one-third of territorial conflicts-years have observed negotiations, one-fifth of governmental conflicts-years have experienced negotiations. From another point of view, almost two thirds of total observed negotiation (66 percent, 185/280) across dyad-years have occurred in the disputes which are fought over territory, while about one third (34 percent, 95/280) of those have emerged from the conflicts over the control over governance.

Table 4.1. Issues of Incompatibility and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	Government	Territory	Total
No (negotiation=0)	338 (78.1%)	373 (66.8%)	711 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	95 (21.9%)	185 (33.2%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	433 (100%)	558 (100%)	991 (100%)

$$\chi^2 (1) = 15.125, P = .000$$

Table 4.2 illustrates the association between type of conflict and occurrence of negotiation. The study categorizes civil conflicts into two types in terms of actors involved, namely internationalized and internal conflicts. The table suggests that the association between type of conflict and negotiation is significant. This is to say that the type of conflict may involve some factors which influence parties' perception of negotiation. It is easily noticed that the number of internationalized conflicts is much lower than internal ones. However, it seems that while almost 39 percent (44/113) of internationalized conflicts have experienced negotiations, about 27 percent (236/642) of internal conflicts have had negotiations. Although this illustration suggests that internationalized conflicts may be keener on negotiation comparing to internal conflicts, the argument cannot be proved unless other factors are not controlled. However, since there is a lack of understanding on what internationalized conflicts hold for negotiation, this could be a significant starting point.

Table 4.2. Type of Conflict and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	Internal	Internationalized	Total
No (negotiation=0)	642 (73.1%)	69 (61.1%)	711 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	236 (26.9%)	44 (38.9%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	878 (100%)	113 (100%)	991 (100%)

$$\chi^2 (1) = 7.182, P = .007$$

Table 4.3 demonstrates the association between the intensity of conflicts and negotiation. In literature, though arbitrary, there are some suggested thresholds to distinguish the intensity of conflict. In this study, 25 battle-related deaths threshold was selected to decide whether there is a civil conflict and 1000 battle-related deaths threshold was used to decide whether the scale of conflict reached a high level, or namely major conflict. The below table suggests that the association between the intensity of conflict and negotiation is significant. Looking at the table, it seems that the negotiation talks are slightly easier to initiate for dyads in major conflicts than those in minor conflicts. This suggestion is in line with the cost of war argument that as the costs of fighting increase, the parties will prefer to negotiate. Presumably, the cost of war would be higher in major conflicts comparing to minors given the time, money and people invested.

Table 4.3. Intensity of Conflict and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	Minor	Major	Total
No (negotiation=0)	601 (73.7%)	110 (62.5%)	711 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	214 (26.3%)	66 (37.5%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	815 (100%)	176 (100%)	991 (100%)

$$\chi^2 (1) = 9.025, P = .003$$

Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, below, show the further association between cost of war variables and the occurrence of negotiation. Accordingly, Table 4.4 illustrates that there is a statistically significant association between insurgents' territorial control and negotiation outcome. On the face of it, of the total 384 conflict-years where the insurgent group hold a territory within the country, a full 43 percent (165/384) seems to have encompassed some sorts of negotiations. On the other hand, of the total 605 conflict-years in which the insurgent group does not occupy a territory, a full 81 percent (490/605) have not held any negotiations. As another illustration, in about 59 percent (165/280) of negotiation observed in dyad-years, the

insurgent group has a control over a territory within the country. Overall, the table below suggests that negotiation outcome is more likely if the insurgent group controls a territory in the given country.

Table 4.4. Insurgents` Territorial Control and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	No Control	Control	Total
No (negotiation=0)	490 (81.0%)	219 (57.0%)	709 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	115 (19.0%)	165 (43.0%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	605 (100%)	384 (100%)	989 (100%)

$$\chi^2 (1) = 66.446, P = .000$$

Lastly, as seen from the Table 4.5, as predicted by Zartman, the association between parties` stalemate situation and negotiation is also significant. The suggestion here would be that negotiation might be easier to form in dyads whose military power is at parity than in those in which one side is stronger than the other. Also, it is obvious from the table that stalemate situations are very rare events. Indeed, only 7.2 percent of 991 dyad-years (71/991) includes observations where insurgent groups and governments have equal military power. However, parties to civil conflicts have initiated talks with each other in a full 50.7 percent (36/71) pf such stalemate situations, whereas only 26.6 percent (244/920) of non-stalemate situations experienced negotiations. Apparently, these results, by far, verify the much pronounced hurting stalemate argument in the literature, though only “military stalemate” aspect of the concept was tested. This indicates that when parties to civil conflicts basically cannot escalate the conflict further, they somewhat prefer to step outside of it, although the data indicate that this is still roughly 50-50 proposition.

Table 4.5. Insurgents` Relative Strength to Governments and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	No Stalemate	Stalemate	Total
No (negotiation=0)	676 (73.5%)	35 (49.3%)	711 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	244 (26.5%)	36 (50.7%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	920 (100%)	71 (100%)	991 (100%)

$$\chi^2 (1) = 19.015, P = .000$$

The suggestions above deriving from the results of chi-square analyses provided insight into the association between various characteristics of conflicts and the occurrence of negotiation. All of the tables present statistically significant association between the suggested variables and negotiation. Although the suggestions are valuable to examine, it is early to reach to some conclusions before conducting more comprehensive analysis and without controlling for various factors and other variables.

A Subset Analysis for the Association between Mediation and Negotiation

Due to the literature`s high emphasis on the relationship between negotiation and mediation, it is important to take mediation into consideration when studying negotiation. Since the data in this study is not suited to test mediation, a subset analysis was conducted to see the association between mediation and negotiation, by relying on Swensson`s (2007) mediation dataset.

The table below shows the results of a chi-square analysis on the association between mediation and negotiation. Expectedly, the association is statistically significant. It is clear from the table that although relatively small number of cases (21.5 percent - 308/1431) are assisted by a mediator, 64.6 percent (199/308) of these mediation attempts result in negotiation, whereas only 10 percent of non-mediated dyads experience talks. Table 4.6 fits well to the general expectation of the literature on the association between negotiation and mediation.

Table 4.6. Mediation and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	No Mediation	Mediation	Total
No (negotiation=0)	1009 (89.8%)	109 (35.4%)	1118 (78.1%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	114 (10.2%)	199 (64.6%)	313 (27.9%)
Total	1123 (100%)	308 (100%)	1431 (100%)

$$\chi^2 (1) = 419.492, P = .000$$

Summary Descriptive

Table 4.7 provides a summary of descriptive statistics for the independent variables by the dependent variable. While the percentages by dependent variable are reported for categorical variables, the mean values and the standard deviations are included for continuous variables. The table provides a bigger picture for the data analysis by enabling a quick comparison of mean values and percentages. First thing to look at is that 280 out of 991 cases have experienced some sorts of negotiation. It is also crucial to examine how the suggested indicators of negotiations vary across the negotiation outcome.

The reputation hypothesis, as explained earlier, is measured by the number of insurgent groups who are fighting with the same government at the same time. It can be inferred from the table that across civil conflict observations there is an average of 3 insurgent groups per government in a given year. On the face of it, the mean value of number of actors variable for “no negotiation” (3.31) and mean value for “negotiation” (2.26) merely suggest that there are more observed negotiations when there are fewer insurgent actors at stake, which is what is implied by the reputation hypothesis.

The legitimacy hypothesis is measured by whether the insurgent has an alleged or acknowledged link to a political party. Therefore, it is seen from the table that about 37 percent of insurgent groups had a political link, while the rest (63 percent) were not affiliated with a political party. Around 30 percent of negotiated cases included insurgents groups with a

political wing. Although it is hard to tell whether the assumption is statistically significant by comparing the mean values when the numbers are close to each other, it seems that having a political wing does not lend much of an advantage to insurgent groups for initiating negotiation.

The valid spokesman hypothesis indicates the strength of leadership in the insurgent group. The data categorize the levels into three categories: low, moderate, and high. High level structure leadership is suggested as a significant indicator of a valid spokesman with whom the government might negotiate. Therefore, high level dummy is used for control group and not shown in the table. According to the table, of all insurgent groups, about 18 percent had a low-level leadership; 54 percent had moderate; and 28 percent had a high level of hierarchy (leadership). On the other hand, when the cases which have experienced negotiations are observed, it is seen that in 30 percent of them, insurgent groups have a high structural leadership whereas 53 percent moderate and 17 percent low. This may suggest that highly centralized leadership might slightly be better indicator of Valid Spokesman success, as suggested by the dissertation.

The external pressure hypothesis has two propositions. First proposition looks at whether the insurgent group has a transnational link. Second proposition examines whether the insurgent group any military support from an external actor, and this is measured with two variables which show whether it receives any military support from an external state and/or from an external non-state actor. It is shown in the table that 36 percent of insurgent groups had a transnational constituency while 55 percent of them received military support from a state, and 33 percent from a non-state actor. Moreover, about 39 percent of all negotiation cases included the insurgent groups with a transnational link; 63 percent of the cases involved the insurgent groups receiving military support from an external state, and 27 percent of them involved the insurgents who are militarily supported by a non-state actor in another country.

Just eyeballing the numbers gives a preliminary idea that military support from both external non-state and state actors may influence the negotiation calculation.

The table also indicates that around 40 percent of insurgent groups in civil conflicts are terrorism-oriented; involving the use of terror-oriented tactics. It is seen that the percentage (40.51) for the cases where there is no negotiation and the percentage (38.93) for the cases where negotiation takes place is very close to the total percentage (40.06) of terrorist-oriented insurgents in all insurgents. This may suggest, though does not prove, that it is not much of an importance whether the group is terrorism-oriented or not when it comes to negotiating in civil conflicts.

As for the number of foreign military interventions in civil conflicts, the table illustrates that while only about 30 percent of all cases included an intervention by foreign states, around 43 percent of all negotiation cases were assisted by these foreign military interventions. It seems that foreign military intervention may play an important role to encourage parties to negotiate or provide them with a safer ground for talks to begin.

Lastly, two indexes are suggested to test the human rights hypothesis. While the first index (physical integrity) ranges from 0 to 8, its mean value is 1.55 for “no negotiation” and 1.60 for “negotiation”. Indeed, this does not go against the conventional wisdom that civil conflicts are more likely to take place in the countries where the government’s respect for human rights is lower. On the other hand, the other index (empowerment) ranges from 0 to 14, and the mean value is 6.44 for “no negotiation” and 6.45 for “negotiation. It seems that variation in the scales does not provide much explanation in the occurrence of negotiation.

Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables by Negotiation

Variable	Total		(negotiation=0)		(negotiation=1)	
	Mean/%	Std	Mean/%	Std	Mean/%	Std
Reputation	3.02	2.477	3.31	2.656	2.28	1.748
Legitimacy	37.24	-	39.94	-	30.36	-
Valid Spokesman						
-Low Central Leadership	18.26	-	18.71	-	17.14	-
-Moderate (Leadership)	53.99	-	54.57	-	52.50	-
External Pressure						
-Transnational Link	36.63	-	35.58	-	39.29	-
-State Support	55.40	-	52.18	-	63.57	-
-Non-State Support	33.10	-	35.30	-	27.50	-
Terrorism	40.06	-	40.51	-	38.93	-
Military Intervention	29.87	-	24.75	-	42.86	-
Human Rights						
-Physical Integrity Index	1.56	1.52	1.55	1.56	1.60	1.43
-Empowerment Index	6.44	3.687	6.44	3.613	6.45	3.893
N	991		711		280	

Note: Due to missing information, N is 899 for Empowerment Index and 895 for Physical Integrity index.

4.2. Results of Logistic Regression

Table 4.8 shows the results of logistic analyses examining the each hypothesis separately and together in the last model. Overall, the tables demonstrate that the negotiation calculation applies to civil conflicts. Specifically, they demonstrate that parties to civil conflicts are more likely to negotiate when they perceive negotiation as less costly, or more strategically

beneficial. It should be noted that given that the observations are clustered by dyads, we use bootstrap corrected standard errors to obtain unbiased inferential tests.

In Table 4.8, each row stands for a variable, and each column represents a model. Total of 10 models are presented in the tables separately in the columns. Each model tests one hypothesis, and in the last model (10), all variables are tested. The variables for cost of war and type of conflict arguments are treated as control variables, and they are placed in the first four rows and last three rows, respectively.

Table 4.8. Logistic Analysis of the Negotiation Calculation in Civil Conflicts

Hypothesis	Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Cost of War	Logged – Number of Deaths	1.097	1.102	1.115**	1.125^
	Duration of Conflict	.992	.998	.994	.997
	Stalemate	1.638^	1.660^	1.603*	1.437
	Territorial Control	3.027***	3.461***	3.385***	3.252***
Reputation	Number of Actors	.869***			
Legitimacy	Political Link		.585**		
Valid Spokesman	Low Level Leadership			.681^	
	Moderate Level Leadership			.909	
External Pressure	Transnational Link				1.950***
	State Military Support				1.430*
	Non-State Military Support				.469***
Terrorism	Terrorist Organization				
	Terror x Negative Rep.				
	Terror x Target Rep.				
Military Interven.	Intervention				
	Unbiased Intervention				
Human Rights	Physical Integrity Index				
	Empowerment Index				
Type of Conflict	Territorial	.655*	.572***	.551***	.508***
	Minor Conflict	1.048	1.085	1.068	1.122
	Internationalized	1.204	1.288	1.259	1.421

Exp (B) – odd ratio – values are reported in the table. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10.

Table 4.8. Logistic Analysis of the Negotiation Calculation in Civil Conflicts (Continued)

Hypothesis	Variable	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Cost of War	Logged – Number of Deaths	1.123 [^]	1.117 [^]	1.132 [^]	1.139 [*]
	Duration of Conflict	.994	.991	.994	.993
	Stalemate	1.684 [^]	1.705 [*]	1.380	1.475
	Territorial Control	3.266 ^{***}	3.198 ^{***}	3.196 ^{***}	3.205 ^{***}
Reputation	Number of Actors				
Legitimacy	Political Link				
Valid Spokesman	Low Level Leadership				
	Moderate Level Leadership				
External Pressure	Transnational Link				
	State Military Support				
	Non-State Military Support				
Terrorism	Terrorist Organization	.943	.465		
	Terror x Negative Rep.		1.350 [*]		
	Terror x Target Rep.		.864		
Military Interven.	Intervention			1.968 ^{***}	1.583 [*]
	Unbiased Intervention				1.953 [*]
Human Rights	Physical Integrity Index				
	Empowerment Index				
Type of Conflict	Territorial	.581 ^{***}	.593 ^{***}	.600 ^{**}	.621 ^{**}
	Minor Conflict	1.045	1.040	1.039	1.029
	Internationalized	1.239	1.220	1.043	1.105

Exp (B) – odd ratio – values are reported in the table. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10.

Table 4.8. Logistic Analysis of the Negotiation Calculation in Civil Conflicts (Continued)

Hypothesis	Variable	Model 9	Model 10	Yes/No
Cost of War	Logged – Number of Deaths	1.151 [^]	1.077	Yes
	Duration of Conflict	.994	.992	No
	Stalemate	2.035 [^]	1.129	Yes
	Territorial Control	3.347***	3.321***	Yes
Reputation	Number of Actors		.858**	Yes
Legitimacy	Political Link		.976	No
Valid Spokesman	Low Level Leadership		.595 [^]	Yes
	Moderate Level Leadership		.926	Yes
External Pressure	Transnational Link		2.168***	Yes
	State Military Support		1.931***	No
	Non-State Military Support		.387***	Yes
Terrorism	Terrorist Organization		.371 [^]	Yes
	Terror x Negative Rep.		1.550**	No
	Terror x Target Rep.		.843	Yes
Military Interven.	Intervention		1.567*	Yes
	Unbiased Intervention		2.378**	Yes
Human Rights	Physical Integrity Index	1.054	1.000	Yes
	Empowerment Index	1.033	1.087**	Yes
Type of Conflict	Territorial	.539***	.501***	Yes
	Minor Conflict	1.016	.967	Yes
	Internationalized	1.116	1.172	Yes

Exp (B) – odd ratio – values are reported in the table. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, $\wedge p < .10$. Note that Exp (B) values are based on bootstrap corrected standard errors, clustered by dyads. “Yes” indicates that the result is in the expected direction; “No” means that the result is not in the expected direction. The coefficients, standard errors and model summaries are included in Appendix B.

The odds ratio – Exp (B) – values are presented in the table above for readers to interpret the results easily. Accordingly, the interpretation of these values is as following: the values less than 1 indicates that the odds of negotiation decreases as the independent variables increase; an odds ratio equal to 1 means that the odd of negotiation does not change as the independent variables change, meaning no relationship; and the values greater than 1 tell that the odds of negotiation increases as the independent variables increase. However, one should be more careful interpreting the dichotomous variables. With these variables, the interpretation should be made by referencing to the control group, rather than considering the unit of increase or decrease in the independent variables since it would cause meaningless interpretations. Also, the percentage change in odds can be calculated easily by the equation $[Exp(B)-1]*100$.

Throughout all the models, two control variables (Insurgent`s territorial control and territorial wars) are statistically significant at the .001 and .01 level, and they are in the expected direction. This is to say that the odds of negotiation are higher with insurgent groups who control a territory within the country comparing to with those who do not. The tables show that the number of deaths variable is significant at .05 and .10 level across the models, except in Model 1, 2, and 10, and it is in the suggested direction by cost of war argument that as the cost (the number of death, in this case) increases, the likelihood of negotiation goes up. It is important to note that logged form of this variable is utilized to get more meaningful findings. This is because the number of deaths varies much across the observations; therefore, considering the variable in terms of ratio rather than difference provides a better understanding

of its effect on negotiation. Moreover, the stalemate argument shows a slightly significant trend across the models. Although this is not one of the strongest results of the analysis, this finding, in most models, supports the well-known stalemate argument that when parties are stuck in the conflict and see no victory in sight, they seek a way out.

On the other hand, other control variables seem to be not significant across the models. However, it may be still valuable to look at the direction of their effects in the regression. Specifically, as seen from the tables, the odds of negotiation – $Exp(B)$ values are around .99 in all models – decrease every additional year of conflicts by around 1 percent. Also, the models, though not statistically significant, suggest that internationalized conflicts are more likely to experience negotiation comparing to other internal conflicts. As for the comparison between minor and major conflicts, the models seem to suggest that minor conflicts could be slightly keener on negotiating as opposed to major conflicts.

Model 1 illustrates that the likelihood of negotiation decreases by 13 percent for every additional increase in the number of insurgent groups that the government is fighting. The finding is significant at the .001 level and supports the reputation hypothesis that negotiation is less likely to happen as the government perceives potential fights with additional insurgent groups.

In the Model 2, the legitimacy hypothesis is tested. The model's result runs counter to the suggested legitimacy hypothesis that the likelihood of negotiation is higher if the insurgent has political link. In contrary to the hypothesis, the model suggests that the odds of negotiation is more likely with insurgent groups who are not linked to a political party. Indeed, the result reveals that the odds of negotiation is less by 50 percent with insurgent with political connection comparing to the others.

Model 3 shows that insurgent groups which have low level of leadership are 10 percent less likely to experience negotiation than those with highly structured leadership, and this

finding is significant at the .10 level. Also, the models does not point to a significant effect of moderate level leadership on negotiation compared to high level leadership. However, although the significance is weak, the direction of variables is in the expected way. Accordingly, comparing the three levels of strength of leadership in insurgent groups, the results suggest that negotiations are more likely in the presence of highly structured insurgent leadership.

Model 4 tests the effects of external pressure on the occurrence of negotiation. The first variable, transnational link, confirms the suggested hypothesis that negotiation is more likely if the insurgent group has a transnational link. This dissertation argued that an existing transnational link would bring pressure on the government, and that the government would want to respond seeing negotiation as beneficial rather than costly. As for the effect of external support to insurgents, the model suggests conflicting results to the external pressure hypothesis. Accordingly, the hypothesis put forwarded that the insurgent would see negotiation as costly and be unwilling to negotiate if there is a potential risk that it can lose the existing support. However, the model makes two suggestions. First, the model indicates that the odds of negotiation increases by 43 percent when there is an external state support for the insurgents comparing to the cases with no support. Second, the odds of negotiation seem to decreases by 47 percent in the presence of a non-state support for insurgents as opposed to the cases where no support exists. Accordingly, while the former is not in the opposite direction of suggested hypothesis, the latter confirms it. Moreover, regardless of what directions variables go, they all are statistically significant at the .001 level.

Model 5 does not lend as much significant support to the dissertation`s expectation that negotiation is less likely if the insurgent group is terrorism-oriented. However, when the odds of negotiation is considered, it still seems that the likelihood of negotiation is slightly lower for the terrorism-oriented insurgents comparing to the others. Moreover, Model 6 contributes to this discussion by considering the effect of reputation of terrorism-oriented groups on

negotiation. The results suggests that the terrorist groups who score higher in the negative constituency reputation scale are more likely to hold talks with their respective government than those who score higher in the positive scale. Also, the model suggests, though not significant, that the odd of negotiation are less likely for the terrorist group who target children and civilians, comparing to the groups who have a somewhat more positive reputation.

The finding of Model 7 is consistent with the foreign military intervention hypothesis with significance level at the .001. This suggests that the odds of negotiation are higher if there is a military intervention in the conflict, comparing to the conflicts without foreign interventions. The dissertation argued that foreign military intervention, especially neutral interventions, would decrease the cost of negotiating for parties to civil conflicts, and in turn, the likelihood of negotiation would increase. Accordingly, Model 8 confirms that when the intervention is unbiased (neutral) instead of biased one, the likelihood of negotiation is much higher.

Model 9 indicates that the government`s respect for human rights, alone, has no significant effect on the negotiation prospect. Although, at first glance, the finding seems to be the contrary to the human right hypothesis, it would be naïve to expect a significant effect of human right variables on negotiation without controlling for more variables.

Model 10 presents the results of the combination of all variables. The model lends strong support for the reputation, external pressure, and foreign military intervention hypotheses. Also, the model finds somewhat partial support for the valid spokesman and terrorism hypotheses, while it calls into question the some parts of hypotheses. It is also important to take a closer look at human right hypothesis because in the Model 10, one variable of the hypothesis (empowerment index) become significant at the .01 level and was in the expected direction. Similarly, in model 10, the effects of suggested indicators on negotiation become more significant, and all variables except two (negative reputation of terrorist

organizations and external state support to insurgents) are in the expected direction. Therefore, the model confirm the costs and benefits of negotiation argument. Accordingly, the odds of having negotiation gets higher as the existing conditions or characteristics of parties or the conflict itself are cost cutting rather than cost increasing.

4.3. Selection of Case Studies

The case studies for qualitative analysis was selected based on the predictions of the logistic regression. Accordingly, the logistic regression predicts the probability of occurrence of negotiation for each dyad-year in the data. First, with the help of SPSS, the predicted values for negotiation was saved for each dyad-year while conducting the last model which includes all the independent variable. Later, the residual values, which gives the difference between the observed and the predicted values, were found. By the help of these values, the probability of negotiation for each dyad-year was reported. While selecting the cases, the probability of negotiation was one of the factors taking into consideration. Accordingly, the cases which yielded different negotiation outcomes with different probability of negotiation suggested by the logistic regression.

However, it should be noted that since the quantitative analysis is structured in dyad-year format, the predicted values of negotiation stand for a specific year in the given conflict. Therefore, the regression's prediction for negotiation in a conflict varies across the conflict years. This is to say that while the regression may predict a high probability of negotiation in a given year in the conflict, it may predict a higher or lower probability for the preceding or following year since the independent variables can change yearly base. While this makes it relatively more difficult to select one conflict (dyad) meeting the pre-determined conditions, it enables the study to analyze *within* the conflict setting as well. On the other hand, to overcome the difficulty to select the case, several additional considerations were made. First, the conflicts which provided more numbers of observation (dyad-years) in the desired direction were given

the priority. Second, other factors, such as the issue of incompatibility, the geographic region of conflict, and the type of terminations, were selected diversely.

After all the above mentioned factors considered, four dyads were selected: the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People`s Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM/A), the Government of India and the Kashmir Insurgents, the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

It is important to highlight that the probability of negotiation not just varies *across* the conflicts but also *within* the conflict years. The regression`s prediction of negotiation varies over every year of conflict. Every conflict (dyad) has relatively low and high probability of negotiation for different years based on the changing conditions (grasped by the independent variables). On the other hand, a prediction for negotiation outcome can be made for the entire conflict by examining the expectation of regression over years, and this enables to the comparison *across* the conflict settings. Accordingly, the regression`s overall prediction for the years of Sudanese civil conflict is high probability of negotiation, and the conflict indeed ends with a peace agreement between two sides. As for the Indian and Kashmiri insurgency conflict, the regression predicts a low probability of negotiation for most years of the conflict, and the conflict still remains disputed. Although the conflict experienced some sorts of negotiation at some points, the years in which negotiation took place and did not happen are not well predicted by the logistic regression prediction; they stand for anomalies in the data and call for further analysis to explain the causes. Indeed, for the civil conflicts in which the government of India is involved, the logistic regression predicts relatively low probability of negotiation. This might be due to the high number of insurgent groups in the country, which reaches to the number of ten and eleven dyads within India in 1990s. Among these conflicts which yields to similar

predicted value of negotiation, the Kashmiri conflict was chosen due to its unique characteristic as a long-lasting internationally disputed and unresolved conflict.

The Sri Lankan conflict, on the other hand, stands for an anomaly where negotiation mostly occurred in the opposite direction of the regression's prediction, meaning that negotiation happened in the years for which the logistic regression predicts low probability of negotiation, while negotiation did not take place in the years for which the logistic regression predicts relatively high probability of negotiation. Also, the Sri Lankan was selected over alternative cases, which yield to similar predicted value of negotiation, since the conflict ended with a one side's military victory. Among the selected cases, only Sri Lankan civil conflict ended with one side's victory. Lastly, although the regression is powerful to predict negotiations in the Colombian civil conflict for some years, in other years it fails to forecast negotiations. This case does not stand in the very extreme cases of the regression analysis. However, since the predictions of dyad-years for this conflict cluster better comparing to the similar cases, it was selected. Also, the Colombian conflict with ELN was another alternative for the last case. However, since the government of Colombia and the FARC recently signed a peace agreement in 2016, the selection was made toward the conflict with FARC. Moreover, this case stands for a unique example for a peaceful resolution to the long-lasting and heavy civil war.

Overall, the selected cases (the Sudanese, Indian, Sri Lankan, and Colombian civil conflict dyads) not only show different probability of negotiation for the years of conflict based on the logistic regression prediction, but also they yield to different conflict termination, if any, (respectively, peace agreement, remained disputed, one side's victory, and peace agreement); they are fought over different issues (the control over territory and/or governance); and they take place in different regions (respectively, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, South Asia, and South America).

4.4. Concluding Remarks

The chapter has presented the results of the logistic analysis of negotiation calculation in civil conflicts. Overall, the models suggest that perceived costs and benefits of negotiation by the actors significantly influence the probability of negotiation occurrence in the dyad. However, three independent variables need to be further analyzed in the future study because they were not in the suggested direction. First, the insurgent's link to a political party was suggested as an indicator for the legitimacy of insurgent group with whom to initiate talks; therefore, the expectation was that it would increase the probability of negotiation. However, the regression suggests that the insurgent's political wing decreases the chances of holding a negotiation. Conceivably more voices are heard on the question of negotiations with party input, or the government may fear for its future with a contending party. Also, it should be noted that this variables lost its significance in the last model where all variables are included. The further studies might need to look at whether the political group is legal or not as well as the strength of the link between the political party and the group. In this way, it can be better analyzed what it means for the insurgent group to be linked to a political party so far as the probability of negotiation is concerned.

Second, in the external pressure hypotheses, two measures were included to represent the pressure on the insurgent group. It means that when the insurgent group is supported by an external actor, it will fear the risk of losing the support if it negotiates with the government. The regression shows that while the suggested hypothesis holds true for when the group receives military support from a non-state actor, and accordingly it decreases the probability of negotiation, it has a different effect on the probability of negotiation if the support comes from a state actor. One possible explanation might be that a state's sponsorship increases the insurgent's military capacity more comparing to the non-state actor support. Accordingly, it

might increase the military capacity to a stalemate situation where the parties no longer see a military victory as possible.

Third, the regression suggests that negotiation is more likely to happen with terrorist groups who score more on the negative constituency reputation scale comparing to those scoring more on the positive constituency reputation scale. This is also in the unexpected direction. However, the reason for this result might be explained with the cost of conflict argument. On the other hand, future research might aim to categorize negotiation into levels. By the same token, negotiation with terrorist groups who have a negative constituency reputation might concern a prisoner exchange, ransom, or temporary ceasefire in the face of a terrorist act. However, the aggregate data in this study do not allow for such a classification. On the other hand, the last model suggests that negotiation is, though slightly, less likely to happen with the terrorism-oriented groups comparing to the others.

Other hypotheses are confirmed by the logistic analysis. Accordingly, the results show that governments are concerned about their reputation as concession prone, and negotiation seems to become less likely as the number of insurgent group increase within the country. The cases studies in the next chapter provides more insight into the reputation hypothesis with the specific examples.

Moreover, the logistic analysis verifies the valid spokesman hypothesis and suggests that negotiation is more likely to happen with insurgent group who have a highly structured leadership comparing to the ones who have a low level of leadership structure. A highly structured perhaps centralized leadership is important for both the government and the insurgent in term of cost of negotiation calculation. For insurgent, the leader would feel more confidence in a potential talks with the government since the leader can be sure of the internal cohesion of the group. By the same token, a high-level of leadership means a valid spokesman with whom the government might initiate the talks. On the other hand, the government also

perceives that a highly organized insurgent group can follow the commitment of a negotiation better than a less organized group; therefore, the negotiation in this case seems to come off as less costly for both sides.

External pressure seems to be the most important factor which brings parties to negotiation. This hypothesis suggest two arguments with three measurements. Accordingly, the first measure is the transnational constituency of the insurgent group. It is believed that if transnational constituency might increase the international community`s awareness on the conflict and present the insurgents as “freedom fighters” instead of “terrorists”. This in turn might bring the international pressure to the government to listen to the demands of insurgency. In that case, the government might want more recognition in the international arena by meeting the demand, and consequently, it can perceive a initiating a talk with the insurgent group as less costly, even beneficiary. On the other hand, the dissertation suggested that external pressure might work in the opposite way, as well. This potential opposite effect was only suggested for the insurgent group, though the same argument could be suggested for the government, too. Accordingly, the regression illustrates that negotiation is less likely to happen when the insurgent group is supported by an external non-state actor, another insurgent group. The fear of losing the external support seems to matter for the insurgent group. Although further research is need, it could be argued that the insurgent group does not risk losing the external support for the negotiation attempts or chances in which the insurgent does not expect a gain in prospect.

The logistic analysis shows that foreign military intervention, especially neutral ones comparing to the biased interventions, increase the likelihood of negotiation during civil conflicts. This finding supports that the parties to civil conflicts need a third party to overcome their security concerns. It can be argued that the parties more confidently negotiate under the supervision of a third party. Moreover, they prefer a neutral foreign intervention which does

not support either of the parties in conflict. Otherwise, negotiation becomes less likely to happen when the third party intervention is perceived as biased by one the warring parties.

As far as the awareness allows, the human right measurement has been included in the literature for the first time in such a study. As seen from the model, while the first suggested measure for human rights, physical integrity index, does not have any effect on the occurrence of negotiation, the second measure, empowerment index, has a significant effect on negotiation. Accordingly, it can be argued that the human rights indicators included in the index, such as *freedom of movement, freedom of speech, workers' rights, political participation, and freedom of religion*, influence the perception of insurgent group on the government. This, in turn, shapes the group's prospective gains and losses from a potential negotiation with the government. As a result, negotiation becomes more likely as the government's respect for these rights increases.

Overall, the finding of the regression asserts that the parties' perception of the conflict and negotiation can be explained by some variables, and the suggested indicators, in this sense, well grasp their assessment of negotiation during civil conflict. The chapter also mentions the need of future research for a better understanding of several variables. Next chapter discusses the four case studies which were selected based on the results of logistic analysis. With the help of cases, the dissertation provides more insight into the understanding of negotiation in civil conflicts and what shapes the actors' perception of cost and benefits of a potential talk.

CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES

This chapter gives in-depth analysis for four selected cases, relying on secondary data sources and scholarly works. Basically, the cases were selected based on the variation of occurrence of negotiation expectation from the results of logistic regression. This chapter compare the actors` perception on negotiation in relation to the occurrence of talks *within* the same conflict setting and *across* different conflict settings. The actors` perceptions on and willingness to negotiate changes throughout the conflicts along with changing conditions within the country. In addition to the suggested and tested measures of costs and benefits of negotiation, this chapter aims to give more insight into the unexplained and hidden cost of negotiation which might be specific to the conflict or the parties to the conflict. Moreover, since the aggregate quantitative analysis was formed in dyad-years structure, the regression`s prediction for negotiation for specific years in the dyad, within-conflict lends the dissertation an ability to grasp the conflict as a whole and the negotiation as a process which involves the interaction of fighting, talks, and terminations or outcomes..

On the other hand, the purpose of comparisons *across* the conflict settings is to provide a thorough knowledge of the cost and benefit perception of negotiation, how the actors perceive those in different settings and why they occur and do not occur. Overall, the chapter aims to analyze how costs and benefits of negotiation theoretical framework can be applied to specific cases and in what cases it fails or helps to explain the presence or absence of a negotiation. This knowledge will improve the common understanding of negotiation in relation to the parties` assessment of specific situations in the protracted civil conflicts, and will be of value to scholarly analysts and policy-makers alike in anticipating, setting the stage, or fostering productive occasions for talks.

In the following sections of the chapter, four selected civil conflicts are presented. These conflicts are: the dyads of the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People`s Liberation

Movement/Army (SPLM/A); the Government of India and the Kashmir Insurgents; the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Each conflict setting is analyzed under four sub-sections. First, the background of conflict is introduced to explain the causes of the conflict and the actors involved. Next, the characteristics of the parties and the conflict are presented to understand the costs and benefits of a potential negotiation. Later, the negotiation period, if any, as well as missed negotiation opportunities throughout the conflict are highlighted and analyzed. Lastly, the analysis of each conflict is completed with concluding remarks which point to alternative explanations of why negotiation occurred or not, what has been the obstacle for the benefit of negotiation, and what might be ahead for the conflict in future.

5.1. The Government of Sudan – Sudan People`s Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM/A)

Background of the Conflict

Sudan can be considered as a good example of a protracted civil conflict with its over five decades long duration which claimed over two million lives and caused millions of refugees to the neighboring states and internally displaced people (Deng, 2001). The beginning of the conflict dates back to the independence of Sudan from British colonialism in 1956. Since then, except for a peace period from the implementation of Addis Ababa agreement in 1972 through the resumption of grievance and conflict in 1983, the country has experienced on and off conflicts (Grawert, 2013). Accordingly, the first Sudanese civil war (1955-1972) was the result of grievance against the Khartoum government`s policy, which was seen to favor the Muslim-dominated region in the North, and impose Arabic and Islamic culture to the South. The clash between the South and North started one year before the independence and lasted in the first phase until the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972 which granted regional autonomy to

the South. After a decade long silent period, the old conflict flared up again in 1983 when the President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri issued a decree to impose Shari`a laws on the public and to divide the South into three regions, and it continued until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. In this conflict with the North, the South was gathered under the umbrella of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). SPLM and SPLA were controlled by the same leadership, and therefore they are often referred by many as one unit, Sudan People`s Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM/A) (Deng, 2001).

At the heart of the conflict between the North and South were many reasons, including internal disunity, economic and social cleavages, accessing the resources (especially oil), economic development, inter-ethnic rivalry and insecurity, including the interests of marginalized groups (Grawert, 2013). The main manifestation of these factors revolved around the religion. Both in the South and North, religion along with Arab or African culture and tribal or clan allegiances were taken to define the identity of people. Accordingly, while the North was composed of mainly Muslim groups, Christians and traditional African groups and those against the imposition of Islam made up the majority in the South³ (Grawert, 2013).

From the perspective of the North, Islamization and “Arabization” were necessary for the unity of the country, and beginning from the independence, the government repeatedly attempted to nationalize the norms of Islam and Arabic culture across the country. On the other hand, the Southerners struggled for years against the imposition of Arabic language, religion

³ The South is believed to compose of 60 major ethnic groups, each has distinct sense of identity. Among these groups, Dinka (36%) and Nuer (16%) ethnic groups are the largest, making up more than the half of population. The rest of South`s population belongs to smaller ethnic groups, including Bari, Zande, Acholi, Madi, Moru, Kuku and others (Branch & Mampilly, 2005; *The World Factbook*, 2017).

and culture, and struggled to resist the imposition of Northern norms (English was adopted in part as a resistance to Arabic language dominance as well) (Deng, 2001).

It would, of course, be naïve to think conflict in Sudan only entailed the clash between Islam and Christianity. This is partially because Sudan is the largest country in Africa and it hosts many divergent ethnic groups, religions, races, and languages. Indeed, there are over 400 local languages spoken in Sudan (Waba, 1997). Despite the divergence in issues of ethnicity, religious, races and languages, what brings the Southerners together against the North is their struggle against the imposition of Arab and Islamic culture as well as the often harsh and divisive policies of the North. In that sense, SPLM/A served as a glue bringing together oppositions to the North regardless of their background (Jok, 2011); indeed after the country's partition into Sudan and South Sudan, many of these simmering rivalries and contention over control of resources (oil) broke out within South Sudan itself, while Khartoum's heavy hand could also be seen in the subsequent carnage in Darfur (Grawert, 2013). Therefore, on the face of it, the divided civil society due to the divisive policies of the government constituted the main reason for civil conflict.

The SPLA was formed in 1983 by John Garang, who had been an officer in the Sudanese Military. SPLM/A brought the scattered rebel groups across the Southern regions under one roof. Its 1983 manifesto began by addressing the failure of the government in Khartoum on the Addis Ababa Agreement and criticizing the North's policy on oil resources (Grewart, 2013). John Garang aimed to create a "New Sudan" where all excluded and marginalized groups could live in equality. In that sense, the SPLM/A has always referred to its struggle in secular and democratic lines. Its main goal was iterated as the secession from the North. Consequently, the struggle between the government of Sudan and SPLM/A first led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, and after an interim period, the South

held a referendum in 2011 in which the vast majority of population (99 percent) voted for independence (Grewart, 2013).

Costs and Benefits of Negotiation Framework Applied

The logistic regression model in this study based on the costs and benefits of negotiations predicts a high probability of negotiation for the period of conflict between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. This is because the characteristic of the parties and the conflict itself present a relatively low negotiation cost. Accordingly, although the conflict has been extremely bloody and violent, it has experienced numerous negotiations talks and attempts, including cease-fire agreements, talks about talks and terms, and the final agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in 2005, which set the stage for the independence referendum in 2011 (Grawert, 2013).

The reasons the conflict, though it was very violent, is associated with low cost of negotiation are multifaceted. First, the number of warring parties were relatively limited in Sudan although there were several splits and small groups. Most of the opposition gathered under the banner of the SPLM/A against the government. While this gave the SPLM/A a strong hand for negotiation, since it represented a large segment of the Southern population, it was also beneficial for the government to deal with one counterpart – one voice if you will – as compared to multiple voices, which would have required more complications, concessions and squabbling for both the government and the SPLM/A. Second, the SPLM/A had a moderate level structured leadership, according to this dissertation`s data. This is to say that there was a spokesman or a leader of the group with whom government could confidently maintain contact to direct its intentions and offers.

Moreover, external pressure and assistance played a major role in the conflict. SPLM/A received military support from neighboring states such as Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda especially in the 1990s. These supports were due to these states' fears that the aggressive and

expansionist Political Islam policy of the Sudanese government would spill over their borders (Young, 2005). This assistance tended to solidify and give more military power to the SPLM/A, bringing it to a military stalemate with the government, and putting pressure on the government to be open to discussing the concerns of SPLM/A. Moreover, Ethiopia allowed the SPLM/A supporters to open a radio station to report the updates about military campaigns and announce their philosophical and ideological views (Wama, 1997).

On the other hand, Muammar Qadhafi, the leader of Libya was also willing to give support to SPLM/A at the beginning due to his opposition to the Numayri government in Sudan. Consequently, Garang (the leader of SPLM/A) visited Tripoli in 1984 and secured significant military support. However, due to the SPLM/A's rejection to Qadhafi's pan-Arab political agenda and the overthrow of Numayri government in 1986, the cooperation between Qadhafi and SPLM/A broke down. Then, Qadhafi started to support the new coalition government on the fight against the SPLM/A (Wama, 1997).

Egypt, also, consistently sought to bring the SPLM/A and the government to negotiation. The SPLM/A urged to establish relations with Egypt due to its significant role in both African and Arab world. President Mubarak assisted to arrange a meeting between Garang and Sadiq al-Mahdi (Prime Minister of Sudan) at the summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1986 and encouraged further negotiation talks between the SPLM/A and the DUP in 1988. Moreover, Egypt kept its insistence on negotiation between two warring parties in the subsequent years and attempted to arrange meetings between the military government and the SPLM/A (Wama, 1997).

In this way, the SPLM/A's political and ideological stance transcended the borders of Sudan and reached abroad. That, in turn, helped the struggle of SPLM/A to gain and sustain international attention, and it, in a way, tended to legitimize the struggle. Overall, these factors above served to lower the parties' perception of the cost of negotiation, somewhat raised the

government's cost in fighting, and prepared the ground for potential talks. The costs and benefits of negotiation measures do not stand for sufficient conditions for a negotiation, but appear to have been necessary conditions in this case. Other factors, however, also influenced the decision to talk. What the factors above provide is that they settled the question of legitimacy of insurgent group actor for potential peace talks and the presence of the aforementioned conditions shaped the parties' perception of a potential negotiation in a more positive way.

Negotiation Periods/Chances throughout the Conflict

As in the expectation of the logistic model, the conflict between Sudan and the SPLM/A has embodied various negotiations over the courses of conflict. Although most of them failed to bring a peaceful resolution, the conditions at the time, when the talks were held, are important to understand and lend great support to our theoretical argument. Accordingly, between 1989 and 2005, the parties to civil conflict initiated or held some sort of negotiations every year, at least conflict related talks, except in the years 1990, 1991, and 1996, according to this dissertation's data. Accordingly, the government of Sudan started peace feelers and informal talks consisting with the SPLM/A beginning in 1986, when a coalition government consisting of the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the National Islamic Front (NIF), under the leadership of Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi (affiliated with the Umma Party) came to power. The informal peace talks and negotiation attempts started from that year. It should be noted that the new coalition government replaced the Numayri Government which declared Shari'a law in 1983 causing, in turn, many protests and uprisings both in the South and North in the subsequent years. By 1988, the SPLM/A took control of almost 90 percent of territory in the South, and large-scale killings on both sides reached a peak (Waba, 1997). Consequently, in 1988, the SPLM/A and the DUP came to an agreement on a preliminary plan calling freezing Sharia Law, ending the state of emergency and setting a cease-fire. As some

sort of negotiation was underway with the government, the intensity of civil conflict did not end; however, battle-related deaths increased and the economy deteriorated (Waba, 1997). The National Islamic Front, which is known as an Islamist party affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and took part in the coalition government by securing the third largest number of seats in the parliamentary elections of 1986, opposed negotiation attempts with SPLM/A from the very beginning (Deng, 2001). At first, the Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi refused the peace plan agreed by the SPLM/A and the DUP in 1988, but after an ultimatum from the Army to the Prime Minister that he should find a peaceful resolution or be removed, Sadiq Al-Mahdi had to approve the peace plan. However, before the peace plan came into existence, a military junta, operated by General Umar Hasan al-Bashir, ousted Sadiq Al-Mahdi and took over the government control (Grawert, 2013). Although, Bashir initially claimed to be independent from the NIF, it was clear that he shared its Islamic agenda. Moreover, it was later revealed that the *coup d'état* was encouraged by Hasan at-Turabi, the leader of NIF (Deng, 2001). It can be argued that increasing cost of the conflict led the political parties (the Umma Party, DUP, and NIF) in the coalition government of Sudan to find a solution to end the conflict. While the DUP sought a negotiated solution with the SPLM/A, the NIF, due to its Islamic agenda, refused negotiation and went further to spoil it by using its presence in the Army and eventually conducted a coup to take control of the government in 1989.

Although they neither led to an immediate peace nor stopped the fight, the peace talks between the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan started in the relatively early stages of the conflict and continued throughout its phases. Accordingly, the SPLM/A held eight sessions of peace talks with the government during the conflict, in Addis Ababa and Nairobi (1989), Abuja (1992 and 1993), and Nairobi again (1989 to 1995). These talks were mediated by neighboring states including Ethiopia, Kenya and Nige (Wama, 1997), and appeared to ease the way toward the final agreement about a decade later.

Since 1990s, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya have attempted to start a peace initiative in Sudan under the sponsorship of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is an inter-governmental trading bloc. It finally led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This peace can best be described as the fruit of repeated negotiation attempts starting from 1990s. Also, before reaching the final agreement in 2005, there were separately negotiated agreements: the Machakos Protocol in 2002; the Covenant on Security Arrangements in 2003; the Covenant on Power Sharing and Wealth-Sharing in 2004; Protocols on resolutions of the conflicts in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile States, and Abyei (Adeleke, 2015).

Concluding Remarks

Although it is one of the oldest and bloodiest civil conflicts in Africa, the case of Sudan presents a unique example of negotiation because the first negotiation attempts began relatively early. Moreover, the conflict ended with a peace agreement which holds an example showing that old enemies can come to a settlement. The informal peace plan between the SPLM/A and DUP can be seen as a missed opportunity that might have resolved the issue between the North and South years earlier. The obstacles standing in the way of a peaceful resolution were the country's weak political institutions and unstable domestic and coalition politics. In the case of Sudan, it is readily seen that leadership change in the government changed the negotiating stance and further delayed settlement even though negotiations were relatively cost tolerable. Moreover, years-long division between Islam – Christianity, and the North – South divide turned the conflict into “identity war” and increased the individuals' willingness to fight further despite periodic talks.

This case also illustrates that not every negotiation leads to a peaceful solution. However, the case lends support to the argument that when certain conditions which lower the parties' estimated cost of negotiation negotiations are more likely. These conditions shape the

parties' perception of negotiation as well as of each other. Accordingly, it can be argued that the government of Sudan had considered the SPLM/A a legitimate and powerful actor, but a treacherous and rebellious one. It is, also, important to reiterate that occurrence and the success of negotiation are two different matters, and that repeated attempts may be necessary.

It can easily be noticed that the SPLM/A had been very insistent on talks with the government during the conflict periods. To the dissertation's expectation, the case of Sudan seems to support the notion that territorial conflicts are more likely to have negotiations. This persistence in favoring and holding talks can be explained with the group's determination to secede from the Sudan and build an independent state for the Southerners, which they finally gained in 2011 through a referendum but also having benefited from foreign pressure. Moreover, this determination becomes stronger since the SPLM/A spoke for a diverse population as the representative of the South, East, the West and Nuba mountains, collecting all opposing parties against the government under its leadership. Unfortunately that unity could not be sustained post-independence. Accordingly, soon after the South Sudan gained its independence, another civil unrest unleashed within the South in 2013 due to a political struggle between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar who are from different ethnic groups: the Dinka and Nuer (which are the two largest ethnic groups in the country) (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).

Lastly, the conflict was ended through a negotiation between internal actors under international mediation which could be considered as reasonably unbiased. Although the parties to civil conflict were often unwilling meet directly with each other, which could be perceived as the cost of negotiation, mediators (i.e. IGAD) served to decrease this initial cost perceived by the parties and pressed them to resolve their issues through negotiations and offered workable agendas including power-sharing, protocols about security issues, economic development and so forth. Third parties, when they are neutral, are helpful to overcome the

untruthful and war-torn relationship between the parties, although cultural affinity between conflict parties and mediators can also build trust (Yassine-Hamdan & Pearson, 2014). This calls into question the durability of peace and peacebuilding processes. As supported by the dissertation, external factors played a major role in Sudanese negotiations. However, the success of the peace initiated by IGAD has been questioned by many because of its top-down and elitist approach while ignoring economic conditions, human rights and women status (Young, 2005). Indeed the issue of cohesion for South Sudan has come under threat since the independence, the border conflicts between Sudan and South Sudan still continues, as well as its internal power struggle.

5.2. The Government of India – The Kashmiri Insurgents

Background of the Conflict

The Kashmir conflict is an example of protracted territorial dispute in which interstate and intrastate rivalries are entangled (Ganguly & Bajpai, 1994). There are both internal and external factors at stake. For the external factors, the long-standing India – Pakistan hostility plays the major role (Bose, 1999). Accordingly, the Kashmir region, officially referred as Kashmir and Jammu, has been a disputed issue between Pakistan and India since their partition from British rule in 1947. However, the civil uprising in Kashmir region for the independence did not outbreak until 1989, although Kashmiris` discontent about Indian presence and governance was there. One might ask the question of why the civil conflict in Kashmir occurred as well as why it did occur after forty-two years of Indian rule and not, for the most part, before 1989. Ganguly (1996), by citing Samuel Huntington`s (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies*, points to political mobilization and institutional decay as the major factors which prepare the ground for civil unrest. This is to say that political mobilization at the time increased with the young generation who became more conscious about their rights, and the government`s policy to block any discontent and to respond harshly.

To better understand the origin and underlying reasons of the Kashmir insurgency, it needs to be traced back to the 1947 partition. Accordingly, India and Pakistan existed as a British crown colony in the Indian Union. There were also semi-independent “princely states” under the Union, with Kashmir among them. At the partition, while India and Pakistan emerged as independent states, the princely states joined either India or Pakistan based on their demographic structure and the decision of the ruling prince. Kashmir was given a right to accede to either India or Pakistan, although at the time it was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, who was a Hindu, despite its majority Muslim population. Therefore, Hari Singh decided to remain neutral and did not accede to either country. This, however, was not accepted by Pakistani government and it attacked the western part of Kashmir to force the state join Pakistan. Hari Singh demanded Indian’s assistance to thwart the Pakistani troops. The Indian government agreed to help only if the Kashmir acceded to India. Hari Singh later accepted India’s offer; India sent its troops to Kashmir Valley to halt the invasion of Pakistan. However, Muslim majority did not welcome the Indian presence in the region, and Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of a large Muslim community in the Kashmir region, signed an instrument of accession to Pakistan and the first war between India and Pakistan erupted in the very same year with the partition (Ganguly & Bajpai, 1994).

In 1948, India requested the involvement of the United Nations in the dispute. The UN immediately brokered a ceasefire, demanding Pakistan withdraw its troop and India keep its military presence in the region minimal. Also, the UN offered a plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir. However, India refused the plebiscite and Pakistan continued its troop presence. Although the violence abated in the region, the UN involvement unleashed further unrest in the region (Peace Insight, 2010).

In 1962, China and India came face to face over a territorial dispute near and within the Kashmir region. China objected to the British drawn McMahon border, and occupied territory

and claimed the area under its administration, naming it “Aksai Chin” (Hoffmann, 1990). In 1965 and 1971, there were two other confrontations between India and Pakistan due to the increasing tension and unrest in the region. At the end of the third war, the sides signed the Simla Agreement and promising to resolve their issues within the UN framework. Also, the agreement defined the Line of Control, suggested by the UN in 1949, which demarcates a line dividing the region into Indian-administered and Pakistani-administered Kashmir (Mathur, 2014). However, the unrest in the region never disappeared. On the contrary, the increasing unrest brought the sides to the brink of a nuclear war in the Kargil crisis in 1999 (Tellis, Fair, & Medby, 2002). Therefore, the Kashmir region can be defined as a very critical and highly militarized area with three contesting nuclear powers (China, India and Pakistan) (Ganguly & Bajpai, 1994).

Thus, to an even greater extent than Sudan, the Kashmir insurgency has both internal and international aspects. International aspects can be summarized in the interest of India and Pakistan in the territory as well as the role of China. To put it simply, for the Indians, it is unacceptable to give land which they consider as integral to India. For Pakistan, Kashmir, with its majority Muslim population cannot live under the control of India and should be belong to Pakistan. Furthermore, when India aided the breakaway Bangladesh insurgency in the early 1970s it left more bitterness in Islamabad, which has perhaps spawned the use of terror tactics against Indian targets in the aftermath.

As for the internal Kashmiri aspects, already the increasing discontent of the Muslim population against the Indian government deteriorated after 1965 due to the Indian government's heavy-handed measures to repress dissidents, thus paving the way for the Muslim Kashmiri uprising in 1989 against Indian control. The insurgency has caused more than fifty thousand deaths and many more injured civilians, militants and security personnel (Yusuf & Najam, 2009).

Although there was another ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan in 2003, claiming both sides would be respected to the line of control, the conflict in the region has never come to a resolution. It is still a critical region which is regarded as a safe haven for religious terrorists and human rights are under constant attack.

Costs and Benefits of Negotiation Framework Applied

Based on the estimate of the logistic regression, the cost of negotiation is found high for the conflict between the Kashmiri insurgency and the government of India. For India, even the granting of legitimacy to talks with the insurgents would imply that the status of the Indian portion of Kashmir might be questionable or negotiable. This finding comes up against the Indian “bottom line,” and therefore the conflict has seen a bare minimum of direct or mediated government-insurgent negotiation, except for one ceasefire agreement and sporadic talks between the governments of India and Pakistan.

There are several other factors which increase the negotiation cost for the parties. First, although the Kashmiri insurgency demands a secession from India, it is not united as one voice within itself. There are people who want an independent state for Kashmiri and those who seek to accede to Pakistan, as well as a small group who prefer to stay within India (Tavares, 2008). The Kashmiri insurgency itself is much fractionalized, as there are different militant outfits in the region (Cunningham et al, 2013). While JKLM was the dominant group in 1990s, multiple groups presented a low level of leadership coherence in the model. This multiplies the costs and burdens of negotiation for both the insurgency and the government. As such, neither the government nor the insurgency find a valid spokesman for the insurgent side to give voice to the grievance of Kashmiri people. Once the government negotiates with one group, the others may act as spoilers or demand the same privileges.

In view of the fractionalized insurgency, it is not very fruitful for one group to initiate talks with the government because there is a good chance negotiations will be fruitless unless

other groups join in; thus inter-group understandings, and conceivably consultation with Pakistan must precede outreach to the Indian government. The Kashmiri insurgency began in 1989 with a single dominant insurgent group, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), but by 1990, there were about 40 different militant outfits (Cunningham et al, 2013). Among these groups, while many were determined to gain a secession from India, there were also religious foreign militants who sought to wage a *jihad* to create a theocratic state, which further complicates the already complex war situation (Tavares, 2008). Additionally, the Kashmiri insurgent groups do not have a unified political wing to raise their concerns and demands in the political forums.

Pakistan's role adds to these complications, as for New Delhi the Kashmiri insurgency is seen as more of an international dispute with Pakistan than an internal uprising. India may believe that it could put down this rebellion quite easily were it not for outside interference. Pakistan's involvement is well known, though Pakistan generally denies it (Cunningham et al, 2013). Accordingly, as Pakistan uses the Kashmiri dispute as a way to fight India, the long term value of negotiation with insurgents is rather doubtful for the Indians.

Overall, with the high influence of Pakistan, Kashmir is seen as a proxy war between India and Pakistan rather than an internal dispute. This, along with their multiplicity and military dependence on Pakistan, harms the legitimacy of insurgent groups as reliable partners since it seems obvious to India that the Kashmiri insurgency cannot speak without Pakistan's consent. Moreover, any concessions on the disputed region, Kashmir, may be perceived as a damage to the reputation of India in the South Asia. These reputational and legitimacy factors thus raise India's perceived cost of negotiation, while the insurgency itself, despite its generations long duration, is nowhere near "hurting stalemate."

Negotiation Periods/Chances Considered throughout the Conflict

Since 1989 the Kashmiri insurgency has claimed more than 70,000 lives, with 8,000 missing (Peace Insight, 2010), and it reached at its peak in 1990s which is considered full-scale civil conflict with more than 1000 battle related deaths over the years, according to the UCDP data (Allansson, Marie, Melander & Wallenstein, 2017). In 2000, it was believed that there was some sort of covert negotiations among the Kashmiri insurgent groups, resulting in the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire against the Indian forces by the Hizb`ul – Mujahedeen, the largest insurgent group. The insurgents aimed to bring India to three-party negotiations for the disputed territory involving India, Pakistan and the insurgents. However, this overture was not met by India, and the ceasefire collapsed immediately (Peace Insight, 2010).

Later, in 2003, the Indian and Pakistani governments signed a ceasefire agreement concerning the de facto “Line of Control.” The ceasefire, along with an exchange of hundreds of prisoners between the two countries, came after the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee`s visit to Srinagar in 2003 where he announced a “healing touch” (Taraves, 2008). Moreover, the leaders of India and Pakistan pledged to seek negotiated terms for the long-lasting international dispute in 2007 at the Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in New Delhi. With the ceasefire in 2003, the level of conflict between two countries gradually had scaled down, though it never ended completely. These two events can be considered as the gestures of good-will from the sides to build confidence in their much-damaged relationship and to proceed to negotiation (Taraves, 2008). However, the progress made between 2003 and 2008 proved void after the Mumbai attacks in 2008, which Pakistan admitted were launched and partly planned from Pakistan (Peace Insight, 2010). Therefore, retrospectively speaking, India and Pakistan missed somewhat ripe moments in the period between 2003 and 2008 where a negotiated settlement might have been a case with the inclusion of Kashmiri people in the process as well.

On the other hand, the rhetoric of the newly elected Prime Minister of India, in 2014, pledged a hard-line policy toward Pakistan (BBC News, 2016). Moreover, from 2010 till to present, there have been on and off clashes between the Kashmiri insurgents and the Indian Army as well as exchanges of border fire between Pakistan and India. In the summer of 2016, India imposed a curfew for two months upon a violent street protest by the Kashmiri militants. During this period, it is believed that 68 civilians and two Indian army personnel died and more than 9,000 people were injured. In 2017, the Kashmiri militants conducted their most aggressive move since 2000 by attacking Hindu pilgrims and killing at least 7 while injuring 16 (BBC, 2017) The situation, today, still remains unresolved and is regarded as one of the longest international disputes in the world.

Concluding Remarks

The Kashmir issue can only be understood as a multidimensional conflict wherein India and Pakistan fight proxy wars and the Kashmiri Insurgents campaign for self-determination. Also, within the Kashmir region, there is no single insurgent voice; while some want to accede to Pakistan, a substantial portion of Kashmiri view favor the idea of independent state (Ganguly & Bajpai, 1994). What makes the situation even more complicated is that the region has become the backstage of foreign extremist fighters who aim to conduct a war of jihad (Clark, 2001). Therefore, without resolving the Kashmir issue, it is naïve to expect a political stability in South Asia, or a Kashmir region free from transnational terrorism.

Although the level of conflict is lower compared to the 1990s, there is a risk of falling back in the same violent cycle. In addition to Pakistan`s policy to support the insurgency which it perceives an easy and effective way of balancing the power asymmetry in the region, India`s repressive, hardline policies and use of violence against the insurgency leaves the younger generations with little perceived choice but to take arms. While territorial disputes, even if more complicated to resolve than governmental power sharing, were found in the Chapter 4 to

result in significantly more negotiations, it seems that due to the complications noted in this case, there is no end in sight and little prospect for government-insurgent talks unless India and Pakistan themselves give up on their existing policies and turn to negotiation. Moreover, any talks concerning the region should also include Kashmiri people. Last but not the least, based on the relationship between the two countries in the last six decades, the importance of international mediation may have to be recognized particularly as for the human rights are concerned in Kashmir (Mathur, 2014; Yusuf & Najam, 2009; Habibullah, 2009; Tavares, 2008), and the splintered opposition groups must themselves come to terms.

5.3. The Government of Colombia - the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Background of the Conflict

Colombia has experienced a half-century long conflict between the government of Colombia and the leftist guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which is the country's largest insurgent group. To date, the conflict is estimated to have claimed more than 220,000 lives and caused more than six million people displaced (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). However, it has also recently reached a stage of negotiated settlement, albeit with some setbacks in Colombian politics.

Unlike many other civil conflicts, there is little religious or ethnic divergence in the country, although the rights of indigenous groups have been reflected in the FARC campaigns. Moreover, the country is regarded as one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, and despite severe narco-trafficking threats over time, has remained one of the most stable political systems in the region (Holmes, Gutiérrez De Piñeres & Curtin, 2007).

However, the conflict has been risen along the lines of class division, and it is depicted as a contest for political power rather than secession (Restrepo, Spagat & Vargas, 2004). Colombia has evolved as a highly segregated society which presents a large gap between rich

and poor. While rich families, mostly Spanish descent, make up a small portion of the society, poor Colombians are the vast majority (Leech, 2011). The distinction has led to the long periods of political polarization and violence between Liberals and Conservatives, as well as to political exclusions (Restrepo et al., 2004).

The origin of the conflict between the FARC and the government dates back 1960s which came after the period of “La Violencia” (1948-1958) (Restrepo et al., 2004). The La Violencia was a period of civil war between Liberals and Conservatives after the assassination of popular charismatic leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala in 1948, which is believed to have cost more than 200,000 lives (Peace Insight, 2009). In 1964, in line with world-wide rebel and “national liberation” struggles, a group of 50 guerrillas, which mostly consisted of communist self-defense peasant groups, under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda, took up arms against the government and began the FARC insurgency. By the 1980s, FARC had become more prominent with its increasing military power and the association with the control of major drug trafficking (Leech, 2011).

In 1965, another leftist insurgent group, called the National Liberation Army (known by its Spanish acronym, ELN), also emerged in opposition to the government. The Cuban Revolution served as a model for other uprisings in various countries, including El Salvador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Colombia. Accordingly, the ELN was formed to replicate the Cuban revolution, and its constituency was largely composed of leftist students and intellectuals. Both insurgent groups, which are known as two largest rebel groups in Colombia, have kept up the conflict with the Colombian government to date. However, the ELN is believed to be more ideological than the FARC. Unlike the ELN which, like many other revolutionary insurgent groups, was formed by middle-class intellectuals to attract the masses, FARC was founded by peasants and its leaders have come from peasantry. With this feature, the FARC “is unique among contemporary guerrilla organizations in Latin America” (Leech, 2011, p.22). Moreover,

although the insurgent groups fought with the same enemy, they cooperated in some regions and conflicted in other parts. Both groups have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the US State Department (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

As opposition to FARC and ELN, a right-wing group, called United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), emerged in the 1980s to protect landowners and local businessmen from kidnappings and attacks by insurgent groups (Peace Insight, 2009). AUC also has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the US State Department until it was removed from the list in 2014 after formally declaring that it had disbanded in 2006 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

The FARC adopted violence, kidnappings and extortions to gain recognition and financial support. The FARC's high-profile activities include the abduction of presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt in 2002, the assassination of a former culture minister in 2001 and the hijacking of a domestic flight in 2002 by which they held a senator hostage (Leech, 2011). The FARC is believed to have kidnapped more than 25,000 people during the insurgency (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

FARC's revenue largely relied on drug trafficking, which included production and distribution of cocaine. Colombia reportedly has supplied up to 90 percent of the total cocaine in the world (Peceny & Durnan, 2006). According to a US government report in 2009, FARC controlled 60 percent of cocaine exported to the US (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

The United States launched a program, called Plan Colombia, in 2000 to halt this trafficking. Following the initiation of the Plan, the US sent financial, military and intelligence support to Colombia to fight the FARC (Peceny & Durnan, 2006). Also, Alvaro Uribe, elected as the president of Colombia in 2002, adopted a harsh policy toward the insurgency. Nevertheless, in 2012, Uribe's successor, Juan Manuel Santos, initiated peace talks with the FARC with the bilateral declaration of ceasefire (Zuleta et al, 2013). In 2016, the sides signed

a peace deal which put an end to the five decades long conflict, although Uribe came out strongly critical of its terms (particularly regarding FARC's criminal record, legitimation and reintegration into Colombian politics), and influenced the peace referendum to reject the initial agreement and force its revision (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

Costs and Benefits of Negotiation Framework Applied

While the logistic regression calculates relatively low cost of negotiation in the case of Sudanese conflict and high cost of negotiation in the Kashmiri insurgency, the calculation shows a moderate level of negotiation cost in the Colombian conflict compared to the other cases. The occurrence of negotiations during the conflict periods were not always in the same line with the logit model prediction. The parties' perception of negotiation cost can be understood through the critical junctures and political events unfolding in the country that have shaped the parties' perception of the conflict process.

Throughout the five decade-long conflict, the factors associated with both low and high cost of negotiation appear and vary across time. First, there were four leading insurgent groups formed in 1960s, namely the FARC, the Popular Liberation Army (EPN), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Movement of April 19 (M-19). After 1992, and following many years of US assisted anti-insurgency efforts, only the FARC and ELN remained active in the conflict (Cunningham et al, 2013). Therefore, short of actually eliminating all insurgent groups, negotiating with the FARC after 1992, in the presence of two active insurgent groups, posed only moderate cost on the government's side.

Second, the FARC did not form a political movement for a long time after its founding. However, ultimately it did form a political wing, the Patriotic Union, in 1984, and the members of the party competed in elections (Cunningham et al, 2013). This dissertation asserts that having a political wing lends the group more legitimacy and makes the initiation of talks, at

least back-channel talks, easier. Thus, the government may perceive less political cost in talking with the leader of a political party than the leader of insurgents.

However, what increased the cost of negotiation in the eye of the Colombian government was the FARC's reliance on terrorist, criminal and violent acts including extortion, kidnapping, assassinations and the association with drug trafficking. FARC has conducted high profile assassinations and kidnappings targeting ministers, politicians and foreign diplomats. While the group might have utilized these acts to display their power, the government and segments of the population saw them as wanton acts of terror and unacceptable. Consequently, negotiations were retarded as government leaders characterized the FARC as unreliable negotiating partners; under these conditions negotiation attempts may seem to entail a cost harming the government's reputation by giving in to terrorism. (Leech, 2011).

Negotiation Periods/Chances Considered throughout the Conflict

The Colombian government and FARC have gone through several negotiation processes with varying results while the last negotiation peace process initiated in 2012 ended with a comprehensive peace agreement in 2016 seemingly putting a peaceful end to the long-lasting hostilities. Until 2012, however, two sides had missed various opportunities for peaceful resolution due to the lack of trust between the parties as well as perceived negotiation costs and continued violence from both sides.

First negotiation attempts between the Colombian government and the FARC date back to the early 1980s. These attempts ended in amnesty and ceasefire. Although the ceasefires were initially respected by both sides, the members of the Patriotic Union (UP) party were subject to constant attacks and assassinations conducted by paramilitary groups and Army officers. In addition, guerrilla conflict remained active in rural areas. All these violent activities, regardless of whether initiated by FARC or its counterparts, caused the collapse of ceasefires and damaged the trust between the parties (Zuleta, Villaveces & Andonova, 2013).

With the end of Cold War, the government of Colombia attempted to take advantage of the peace environment unfolding in El Salvador and Guatemala and negotiate with the rebel groups. While several groups such as M-19 and EPL ended the armed struggle and came to the terms with the government, the FARC did not take part in negotiations (Cunningham, 2013). Accordingly, the Colombian government offered unilateral peace proposal to the M-19 by demanding the demobilization of group. In exchange, M-19 demanded amnesty and political inclusion. As a result, the M-19 disbanded and established a political party, the Democratic Alliance M-19, in 1989 (Zuleta et al, 2013). The successful agreement between M-19 and the government, and M-19`s newly established political party running in elections with a reasonable popular support brought about new perspectives for insurgents, with the possibilities of amnesty and reincorporation into society. Consequently, other small groups such as EPL and PRT accepted to demobilize when offered similar peace proposals, as offered to M-19, by the government (Zuleta et al, 2013). On the other hand, the unwillingness of the FARC to negotiate might have come from the lack of trust due to the failed negotiation process in the previous years.

Further peace talks commenced in 1998 and resulted in creation of a demilitarized zone in the FARC controlled territories with the withdrawal of the Colombian forces until 2002, when the peace talks collapsed again (Saab & Taylor, 2009). During this period, FARC appeared as unwilling to bargain and asserted “its demands in such a strong way that the government had to fulfill them if it wanted to negotiate” (Zuleta et al, 2013, p.112). Also, FARC did not trust the international mediators. The US Plan Colombia was considered as international participation in the talks. However, the FARC was skeptical about the neutrality of the international community and believed that the foreign elements, particularly from or influenced by North America, were on the side of the Colombian government. Therefore, the FARC decided to stay out of negotiations. Yet, in 2001, they accepted the offer that

international participation in negotiation talks would be under the leadership of a “Facilitating Group” whose main goal was to maintain the security of the negotiating zone and guarantee that there would be no military intervention in the zone. However, FARC’s kidnapping of the head of Colombian Senate’s Peace Commission by hijacking an airplane spoiled the peace process (Zuleta et al, 2013). On the other hand, the Plan Colombia might also be considered another obstacle to peace talks during these periods because the US’s involvement, though considered as international participation, was perceived by the FARC as biased and aimed not at a negotiated settlement but rather toward the Colombian government’s military victory (Zuleta et al, 2013). It appears that international involvement in Colombia did not complicate talks as much as in Kashmir, but more than in Sudan.

Another round of peace talks between the government and FARC in Norway and Cuba began in 2012, with the attendance of Norwegian representatives, Venezuela, Chile and Cuba (Zuleta et al, 2013). This constituted a two-year pre-negotiation phase, with one and half years of discreet interactions to build confidence between the parties and six months of secret talks, preceding the formal negotiation process (Haspeslagh, 2015). This process led to the declaration of bilateral ceasefire in mid-2016 and the signing of a peace treaty by the Prime Minister Santos and the FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño in September 2016. However, Colombians rejected the peace deal a week later in a national referendum. The public’s main concern was that the justice process would treat the rebel too softly, based on the agreement. Santos and FARC leaders announced that the ceasefire would remain active while they resumed and revised the talks. In December 2016, Colombia’s Congress approved the revised peace agreement, and it was not brought into another referendum. The revised agreement better defined the punishments of the former FARC members. After the congressional approval on the agreement, the Constitutional Court ruled that the government can plan to implement the agreement (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

Concluding Remarks

The peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government is a unique example of a negotiated solution to an intractable conflict. Although the guarantors (Cuba and Norway) in the peace process have played a major role in keeping the parties on track during the critical moments in the talks, the biggest credit should be given to the country itself with the determination in the process on both sides.

The decision toward negotiated settlement in the conflict can best be explained by the parties' changing perceptions about negotiation along the lines of the increasing cost of conflict. Accordingly, as the cost of conflict increased, the parties, especially the FARC, perceived negotiating as relatively beneficial. There are various factors which have shaped the actors' perception of actor from resistance toward negotiation. First, between 2002 and 2010, the Colombian government tightened its hard policies against the insurgency. With the support of Plan Colombia, the government increased its military spending from 3.6% in 1999 to 6.1% in 2007 (Zuleta et al, 2013). Moreover, the US's policy "war on drugs" turned into "war on terror" in Colombia which put the FARC on the front lines, and this tipped the balance of power in the conflict toward the Colombian government (Peceny & Durnan, 2006). Although US support ultimately strengthened the Colombian government's hand in the fight, the government did not see a military victory in sight because the FARC still controlled a large territory within the country and continued using guerrilla tactics. That brought the conflict to a perceived stalemate neither side could win. That, coupled with FARC's relatively well- developed leadership and political wing, along with the removal of two rival insurgent groups from the field, provided a reasonably coherent partner for talks.

On the other hand, the law passed by the parliament in 2012 aiming to bring a transitional justice mechanism to the agents of State, called "Legal Framework for Peace", could have been seen as a sign of "good will" on the part of the government (Zuleta et al, 2013).

With the law, the government aimed to prioritize the prosecution of “most responsible” actors who planned and conducted for the most serious crimes and to forgive others with minimal punishments or without prosecution if they cooperates with the peace process. Also, the law asserted that even the “most responsible” actors, when they cooperated, would be given reduced sentences and alternative punishments (Human Rights Watch, 2012). This would make the benefits of negotiation more salient for the insurgent group because they would know that once they ended the conflict, their rights would conceivably be secured by the government. This move as a sign of good will changes the insurgents` perception of negotiation in positive way.

Lastly, Venezuela played an important balancing (countering the US) role in the negotiation process as a facilitator and guarantor for both the government and the FARC (Zuleta et al, 2013). For the government of Colombia, Venezuela was a key trade partner in Latin America. From the FARC`s perspective, Venezuela under Hugo Chavez refused to label FARC as a terrorist organization. Therefore, Venezuela had some level of influence on both parties; until her own post-Chavez economic demise, she could aid the Colombian economy or support the insurgents; she could condemn the government or label FARC as a terrorist group (Yilmaz, 2001). As argued in the dissertation, when the parties perceive the facilitator as a neutral party, the cost of negotiation for them gradually diminishes.

All in all, there are important conclusions that can be drawn from the historical peace agreement in Colombia. As often highlighted, there is a trust issue between the parties to civil conflict. However, this issue can be overcome by the sign of good will from the parties or the active participation of neutral third parties. Accordingly, as seen in the case of Colombia, declaring a unilateral ceasefire or the laws passed by the parliament can be seen as the sign of good will and change the parties` perception of negotiation. Moreover, the international community can play a major role in dealing with the trust and commitment issue because

outside actors make the parties more aware of the costs associated with conflict while making more salient the gains the negotiation might provide to them (Rettberg, 2007). As such, while the FARC refused to negotiate in 1999 when it perceived international community as favoring the government, the group accepted negotiations in 2012 when it perceived the facilitators as neutral actors and its own resources as perhaps waning. Last but not the least, the dissertation mentioned the importance of back-channel and covert talks to test the waters without making it public. However, in most cases, it is not possible to analyze these moments due to unavailable data. The reason these talks are known for the Colombian case is that the Colombian government, after the discreet contacts, announced that they had held secret talks with the FARC. It is known that these talks paved the way for legitimation and a formal agreement, helping the parties overcome trust issue and making sure of each other's intention toward a negotiated solution, with the help of neutral or balancing mediators.

5.4. The Government of Sri Lanka – the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Background of the Conflict

The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was a three-decade long fight which caused about 84,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands displaced people (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2012). The main reason of the conflict resided in the demand of the LTTE for an independent state for the Tamil ethnic group (Lindberg & Orjuela, 2011).

The origin of the conflict dates back to Sri Lanka's independence (formerly known as Ceylon) from the British rule in 1948. After independence, ethnic tension between the majority Buddhist Sinhalese and the minority Hindu Tamils rose due to the government's policies favoring the Sinhalese while excluding the Tamils (Lindberg & Orjuela, 2011; Lounsbery, 2003). Among these policies, the major ones included changing the name of country from

Ceylon to Sri Lanka, making Buddhism the state's religion, and the Sinhala language, which is spoken by the majority of Sri Lankans, the official language (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). These policies increasingly disenfranchised and marginalized the Tamils. Moreover, the Tamils became the targets of various terrible violence in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1979 and 1981 which is believed to have been initiated by the Sinhalese authorities (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2016)

In 1976, Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the LTTE to mobilize and encourage the Tamils to seek an independent state, called Tamil Eelam, for them in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, where they predominantly lived. The LTTE was formed as a political party with military wings including the Tigers (armed infantry), Sea Tigers (navy), Air Tigers (air force) and Black Tigers (terrorism-oriented) (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2016).

In 1983, the LTTE conducted its first attack to the Sri Lankan Army by ambushing an army convoy and killed thirteen soldiers. The attack started an uprising in the country, where three thousand Tamils were killed and more than 150,000 became homeless. This uprising, known as "Black July" marked the beginning of three decades of civil conflict (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2016).

In the subsequent years, the LTTE continued its attacks by escalating the level of violence, recruiting children and women, becoming known for its suicide bombings among other terrorist organizations around the world, and gaining the control of the Jaffna Peninsula in the Northeast side of the Island. Women played a major role in the military wing of the LTTE. Accordingly, four thousand women, with over one hundred engaged in suicide attacks, are believed to have been killed in the fight with the government between 1987 and 2002. Moreover, following Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's ill-fated attempted peacemaking military intervention, in 1991, LTTE women were believed to have been responsible for his assassination (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2016). The assassination of political leaders and suicide

bombings became a common strategy of the LTTE as it raised its voice about the discrimination against the Tamils and the government's abuse of human rights through the diaspora in Europe and the United States, and funding its campaign largely through their remittances. (Vijayasin, 1999).

Although there were several peace talks and ceasefire agreements between two sides, especially brokered by Norway, they did not last long and broke down sometimes due to changes of government in Colombo. Starting from 2007, the Sri Lankan government launched a large-scale military campaign against the LTTE to permanently wipe out the insurgency, causing large numbers of civilian deaths. During this time, LTTE also continued to carry out deadly suicidal attacks compounding the civilian deaths. Although the international community and the United Nations called on the sides to deescalate the conflict, the tension continued to rise (Braithwaite & D'Costa, 2016). In 2009, the Sri Lankan government officially declared that it had defeated the LTTE and liberated the occupied region (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). There are credible allegations showing that war crimes against humanity were committed by both the government and the LTTE in the final stage of the conflict, leaving 40,000 civilian deaths and 6,000 disappeared people (UN Report, 2011).

Costs and Benefits of Negotiation Framework Applied

Although there were some ripe moments, where the cost of negotiation was predicted relatively low based on the logistic regression, there were only two main periods of comprehensive talks and ceasefires. Conditions which raised the actors' cost perception regarding negotiation and factors which rendered negotiation less costly for the parties have existed side-by-side in this case.

First, in the early 1980s, several insurgent groups emerged to challenge the government of Sri Lanka. However, by the late 1980s, while many insurgent groups dissolved, the LTTE became the single insurgent group and the main representative of Tamil struggle (Cunningham

et al, 2013). Also, under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE had a very hierarchical and centralized structure. Although it did not have a political party which represented the group in national elections, it functioned as a government in the area it controlled. Moreover, the LTTE established strong and directive relations with Tamil diaspora groups around the world. Through the large diaspora activity, the LTTE gained both financial support and international public attention over years (Weiberg-Salzman, 2015). These factors strengthened its hand as a legitimate and powerful actor in a potential negotiation, but these talks did not always materialize or persist.

On the other hand, despite having considerable territorial control, the group's high reliance on terrorism activities damaged its reputation within its constituency and in the eye of international community and the Sri Lankan government. The LTTE used assassinations, forced funding and recruitment, and suicide bombing as the means of fighting with the government. It conducted high-profile assassinations, including the assassination of Indian prime minister in 1991, the president of Sri Lanka in 1993, and the foreign minister of Sri Lanka in 2005 (*The Guardian News*, 2009). Also, after the 9/11 terrorist event, the international funding and recognition of the group gradually declined, and it was no longer seen as "freedom fighter" by the outsiders (Weiberg-Salzman, 2015). This weakens the legitimacy of the group and, though perhaps raising its own willingness to negotiate, as with FARC in Colombia, raised the perceived cost of negotiating with them.

Negotiation Periods/Chances Considered throughout the Conflict

Throughout the conflict, different external actors tried to bring the parties to negotiation, but none of them were very successful. First, Indian military intervention between 1987 and 1989 did not go in the expected direction. Since there are linguistic, cultural and religious links between the Sri Lankan Tamils and Tamils in India, the Indian government perceived the conflict as a regional issue and aimed to settle it without its getting out of control.

In 1985, the Indian government attempted to initiate some talks with both the Sri Lankan government and various Tamil insurgent groups. However, the talks did not proceed further. Then, in 1987, the Indian and Sri Lankan governments signed the Indo-Sri Lanka accord which concerned the devolution of power by providing a system of provincial councils as a central structure of administration in Sri Lanka (Loganathan, 1996). The accord also required the disarmament of insurgent groups. Upon signing the accord, India sent about 75,000 to 100,000 soldiers to Sri Lanka under the name of Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) to monitor the implementation of the accord (De Silva, 1998). The Sri Lankan government perceived the Indian intervention as a threat to its sovereignty, but the government believed the insurgent groups would disarm to the IPKF. However, conflict between the LTTE and the IPKF broke due to the LTTE's unwillingness to disarm. Because of the increasing tension in the country, the Sri Lankan government demanded to negotiate with the LTTE on the issue of how to get rid of Indian intervention. After the talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, the IPKF had to end its intervention in 1990 (Åkebo, 2016). It can be considered as a missed opportunity for a comprehensive potential peace accord. However, the parties to civil conflict, even while recognizing each other as negotiating partners, often become less willing to sustain or build agreements because they perceive improved prospects of or more benefits in military victory, or they think they can achieve more through struggle.

After a period of deadly warfare between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, a new opportunity for peace initiatives emerged in the mid-1990s. The People's Alliance (PA), an opposition party to the ruling party, came into the power in 1994, with the promise to end the long-lasting conflict. By 1994, the LTTE had gained a significant military power and territorial gains in the northern areas. After taking office, the newly elected Prime Minister Kumaratunga sent a message to the LTTE which showed the government's readiness to negotiate. Later, it was announced that the talks would be held in October. However, weeks

before the start of talks, the LTTE attacked a Sri Lankan Navy patrol vessel. Although this raised opposition voices in the Sri Lankan government against the upcoming talks with the LTTE, the prime minister insisted on the continuation of the planned talks (Höglund, 2004).

Starting from the dialogues in 1994, the government and the LTTE exchanged forty letters and held four bilateral talks. Although there were disagreements along the way, it led to the mutually agreed ceasefire in 1995. The main goal of the agreement was to deescalate the conflict and prevent the parties from carrying out hostile actions including attacks, assassinations, abductions, and intimidations. Although the violence abated in the following period, incidents continued to occur across the country (Åkebo, 2016).

With increasing violation of the ceasefire by both sides, the parties started losing their faith in the process, and developed different opinions on how it should proceed. From the LTTE's perspective, the government was preparing for war under the ceasefire. In the meantime, the government thought that the LTTE's goal was to weaken the presence of the military in Jaffna. As a result, the ceasefire agreement did not proceed to a more comprehensible negotiation concerning the conflict related issue and collapsed in a short time; the parties turned back to the armed conflict (Balasingham, 2004).

After the earlier talks in 1994 and 1995 failed, the cost of conflict had become a heavy burden on both sides where neither side could apparently achieve a military victory. In 2001, a new prime minister, Wickremasinghe, was elected on the promise once more to initiate negotiations with the LTTE. In 2002, a ceasefire agreement, brokered by Norway, was signed, and the parties accepted further negotiations. This was considered internationally as a breakthrough move for peace. In the beginning of the talks in 2002, Norway played a major role as facilitator and increased the hopes of peace negotiation on both sides. However, by 2003, the lack of trust in each other's commitment and mutual disappointments in the process eroded the momentum for peace, although third parties constantly pressured the parties to be

committed to the talks. (Schiff, 2014). As the talks proceeded, the LTTE felt that the international community and the Sri Lankan government were working together and ignoring its demands. Accordingly, while a federal system was being offered in the talks by international mediators and the government, seeking to preserve the country's unity, the LTTE insisted on an independent state for Tamils, a goal similar to the developments in Sudan. The LTTE's perception was that international mediators were siding with the government on many issues, and therefore, the group declared an end to the negotiation process in 2003 (Weiberg-Salzman, 2015).

Then, the conflict escalated again. In 2006, the LTTE launched several heavy attacks on the Sri Lankan Army. Although under the auspices of Norway, there were several back and forth informal negotiation offers between the parties, each time they failed to meet the other side's concern and demand and the negotiations did not occur. In late 2006, and after an elected change of government, the Sri Lankan leadership determined to root out the LTTE completely and closed all negotiation channels (Weiberg-Salzman, 2015). Although the LTTE later sent informal messages to restart the ceasefire process, the government response was: "it is useless talking to them now", the cabinet spokesman and media minister, Anura Yapa (*The Guardian News*, 2008). After a long period of military operations against the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government officially declared the defeat of the insurgent group and fully reoccupied their territory in 2009.

Concluding Remarks

In the case of Sri Lankan civil war, both parties sought at various times to negotiate or to reach a military victory and ultimately were unwilling to give meaningful concessions. Although federal status was briefly discussed it is remarkable how little attention was paid to the issues such as language, cultural and economic rights that divided the parties as the conflict devolved into a fully secessionist movement. Ultimately they were also unable to take the steps

for partition that were taken in Sudan, despite a coherent insurgent leadership and international pressure for settlement. Even the periods of ceasefire were taken as opportunities for them to prepare for war, at least as they perceived the other side`s intention in that way. The lack of trust was a main obstacle in the way of negotiation.

The two periods of talks in the mid-1990s and 2002 were opportunities for potential breakthrough negotiations. However, as highlighted in this study, not all opportunities are grasped by the parties, and not all ceasefires are in the intention of peace talks; some are for gaining time to recover or gain legitimacy. Accordingly, what brought the parties to ceasefire agreement in 2002 was appeared to be the external pressure, not their readiness for a negotiation. Due to the international pressure, not negotiating was an additional cost to their already existing cost of conflict. As such, although the LTTE had gained military victories against the Sri Lankan Army in 2000 and 2001, after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US, the group had difficulty in receiving international support and recognition. The LTTE`s expectation from the ceasefire was to gain legitimacy and recognition. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan government`s economy had been devastated by the conflict, and it had been pressured by international community to end the conflict. Therefore, the government also aimed to meet the international community`s expectation and gained legitimacy in the international area (Weiberg-Salzman, 2015). As in Colombia, however, political infighting in the regime added to the inconsistency in backing away from previous ceasefire agreements.

The end of the Sri Lankan civil war has come at cost of thousands of civilians` lives, human rights violations and refugees. In last two years of the conflict, the government strengthened its military operation and did not hear the calls of the UN and other states to end the conflict. Also, any opposition and media had been silenced (Weiberg-Salzman, 2015). As Galtung (1969) asserts, the end of conflict does not mean a total peace and harmony for people affected by the conflict unless it deals with the grassroots and structural issues of the conflict.

Therefore, many unresolved issues including political, economic, cultural, and psychological aspects of the society affected by the conflict and violations of human rights lie ahead if the Sri Lankan government is to build the peace. Otherwise, the end of one conflict might be the beginning of another.

5.5. Conclusion

The chapter analyzed four protracted civil conflict from different parts of the world and showed negotiation periods. While two conflicts (the Colombian and Sudanese) ended with a peace agreement, one conflict (the Sri Lankan) ended with the government's military victory, and one conflict, Kashmir, remained unresolved. Within-conflict analysis showed that some conditions prepared the ground for negotiation, while others led to the escalation of conflict. It is seen that suggested indicators for costs and benefits of negotiation can be applicable to specific cases, and they indeed do matter in the actors' assessment of the conflict.

Within-case comparison showed that the parties' willingness to negotiate might change over years based on the conditions. Accordingly, all four cases suggest that negotiation is more likely to happen in the presence of a neutral third party. This can be understood from the Colombian case where the FARC did not perceive the international mediators as neutral during the talks they refused to attend in 2000, but later in 2001, with the emergence of Venezuela and when they believed the mediators were not biased, they accepted talks. Similarly, the LTTE is believed to have ended the peace talks in 2003 since they believed that the facilitators were favoring the government and ignoring its demands.

On the other hand, even if negotiation is predicted well with suggested indicators such as coherent insurgent leadership (Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sudan) and territorial control (Colombia, Sudan, Sri Lanka), the actual initiation, durability and success of a negotiation can vary due to extenuating circumstances. Accordingly, even when parties hold talks, they often fail. While the cases lent support the dissertation's reputation, legitimacy, valid spokesman,

third party intervention, external pressure, and terrorism hypotheses, in many aspects, these cases carried the arguments further and gave a better understanding of the variables which were not included or suggested in the quantitative analysis. Comparison across conflicts, settings, and circumstances reveals many important nuances accounting for the approach or refusal of negotiation.

One of the common implication of all four cases seems to be the need of good-will signs from at least one actor to initiate the talks. As often suggested, there is a trust issue between the parties in civil conflict, and while they may afford a modicum of legitimacy to each other, they may remain unsure of each other's sincerity or intentions, at least initially. However, some actions or signals might be sent as signs of good-will. The Colombian government's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire and the laws concerning post-conflict situation passed by the parliament can be given as examples of good-will gestures by the government which pronounce its willingness and readiness to negotiate, despite later reneging which could negate such gestures in subsequent phases. Similarly, in the Sri Lankan case, the newly elected Prime Minister Kumaratunga made clear her intention for potential talks with the LTTE during her campaign, just as her opponents later reversed these positions. In both cases, the good-will gestures were reciprocated by the other side and at least led to the initiation of talks between the parties.

Another way to overcome the trust issue seems to be through third party participation as mediators, or perhaps more importantly, guarantors. In all four cases, most of the talks between the parties to civil conflict happened in the presence of a third party. Moreover, it seems to be that more neutral the third party comes off and more influential it is over the parties, the more likely negotiation is to happen between the parties. In the Colombian case, Venezuela emerged as both a neutral and influential party and source of major assistance to the parties in

the negotiation process. On the other hand in Sri Lanka, India's involvement was seen as insufficiently non-partisan.

Political changes, on the other hand, seem to affect in what the direction the conflict or the talks will go because newly elected or influential parties come with their own agenda, and often they are elected or selected because of their rhetoric on the conflict. Accordingly, the newly elected Prime Minister of India in 2014 pledged a hard stand against Pakistan and the dispute region of Kashmir although clashes between Indian Army and Pakistan-backed Kashmiri insurgency had been relatively low since 2003 when India and Pakistan signed a ceasefire along the Line of Control. Similarly, when the Uribe administration came to power in Colombia in 2002, he pledged a hardline policy on counter-insurgency operations, gaining American assistance, and the military operations were on rise until 2010 when a new administration was elected. However, it should be mentioned that the rhetoric of the parties is not independent of the public opinion toward the conflict and the actions of the insurgent groups. Accordingly, Uribe's administration's rhetoric came after the FARC's terrorist action in hijacking a plane and scuttled the talks initiated in 1999 between the government of Colombia and the FARC. Similarly, in Kashmir, there had been on and off clashes between the insurgent groups and Indian Army until 2014 when the Prime Minister announced a hard stand on the issue. Such rhetorical or military reversals also have been seen in many other countries, and may be interpreted as strategies to manipulate or gain public support.

Although it is expected and known that the parties to civil conflict may hold secret talks preceding formal talks or during negotiation processes, it is often difficult to assess the impact of these events due to unavailable data. However, the government of Colombia announced that they held secret talks with the FARC members for two years before they sat down for formal negotiations in 2012. In the Colombian case, it was to test the water for negotiations before they formally began. There can be various reasons for covert talks. First, the parties are not

sure of other side`s tendency toward a negotiation. Since the leaders are concerned about their reputation, they may find secret talks safer in case the talks are to fail. Second, whenever a peace process starts, there are, most of the times, spoilers who oppose them. The spoilers may come from within the insurgent group or the government and threaten the cohesion or survival of the leadership. This was the case in Sri Lanka in 1994 when the newly elected Prime Minister Kumaratunga made public her intention for peaceful resolution to the long-lasting conflict. Accordingly, many critical voices were raised both within the military and the opposition political parties.

On the other hand, while focusing too much on the perceived costs and benefits of negotiation, the cost of conflict cannot be ignored. This is because in civil conflicts it mostly takes years, if not decades, before the parties take a break from the conflict and initiate or agree to talks with the opposition. In that sense, as Zartman predicts, military stalemate seems to be an important factor preceding negotiation. This is because when the parties are overwhelmed by the conflict and have no victory in sight, they seek to find other means. Accordingly, in the Sri Lankan civil conflict, the parties agreed to a ceasefire agreement brokered by Norway in 2002, and at that time, the cost of conflict was too high for both parties due to economic factors, territorial losses, and armed fighting (Weiberg-Salzman, 2015). After the ceasefire collapsed, Sri Lankan government increased its military operation against the LTTE and made territorial gains. When the balance of power was tilted toward the government forces, the insurgents demanded a ceasefire through third parties; however, since the government`s expectation of a military victory increased in the meantime, it refused the offer and aimed to root out the insurgency.

It can be argued that once the one sides gains the upper hand in the conflict, they are more motivated to fight than to talk. However, the tactic that the Sri Lankan government used might not be generalized to other conflicts because the military victory came at the heavy cost

of civilian lives and human rights violations, and not all governments can ignore the call of the international community to end the conflict and secure the safety of civilians. For instance, although the Colombian government gained the upper hand in the conflict by 2010 with its increasingly hard-stand in counter insurgency policy and military operations, it decided to negotiate with the FARC for a more comprehensive and inclusive conflict resolution.

Overall, in this chapter, many conclusions have been drawn based on the sweep of years in four selected protracted civil conflicts. Some of them might be generalized to other conflicts while the others might be specific to the dyad, only. However, how the actors perceive negotiation and what they see in prospective negotiations influence their decision to hold and persist in talks. To understand the success of these talks requires another set of questions and another analysis, on the other hand. The next chapter gives a bigger picture on the conclusions drawn from both regression and case study analysis, as well as giving direction to further research.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This chapter presents an overview of the research undertaken to complete this dissertation. It also provides preliminary discussions on the theoretical, as well as applied implications of the findings. Third, the chapter outlines the most significant limitations circumventing the generalizability of results uncovered by this research. Finally, the chapter supplies stakeholders with a set of recommendations aiding their systems of decision-making with respect to negotiations.

6.1. Overview of the Study

This research investigated the magnitude of costs associated with entering negotiations in civil wars. This question is central to the conceptualization of negotiations since many models cast doubt on the significant costs of negotiations concluding that such an act is costless. On the other hand, a number of political scientists noted that negotiations carry a wide range of costs including concerns about reputation, communication, legitimacy, as well as political (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001; Ghosn, 2010; Kaplow, 2015). Further, this study empirically tested the link between actors' perceptions of various aspects related to negotiations and the likelihood of entering negotiations in civil wars, a neglected relationship in the scholarship on negotiations.

This research extends the work of Kaplow (2015) who attempted to generate the benefits and costs of negotiations in civil war. To do this, this research proposed and tested eight hypotheses concerning the potential benefits and costs of negotiations on the likelihood to negotiate in civil conflicts using new set of measurements. The dissertation did not only utilized the power of multivariate statistical techniques, but also the rich in-depth evidence based on real case studies supported by the results of the quantitative analysis. Using logistic regression, the research tested the effects of *reputation*, *legitimacy*, *valid spokesman*, *external pressure*, *terrorism*, *foreign military intervention*, and *human rights* on negotiations. The data

for the research included 991 units of intrastate dyad-years. Case-study analysis was conducted on four conflict dyads: *the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A; the Indian Government and the Kashmir Insurgency; the Colombian Government and the FARC; the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE.*

Based on the findings of the research, this dissertation proposed a new perspective on the understanding of negotiations during civil conflicts referred to as the Negotiation Calculation. The Negotiation Calculation suggested in this research grasps how the parties to civil conflict assess prospect of a potential negotiation. More specifically, the calculation, which lies in the actors' perception, reveals whether a potential negotiation comes off as a cost or benefit to them. In this sense, the main assumption here is that negotiation will become more likely to happen as the perceived cost of negotiation by the actors decreases, or as the parties find it beneficial. This view blends existing understandings of negotiations occurrence in the international relations and peace studies literatures on the subject. The basic assumption of the proposed explanation begins with asking two queries. First, what are the barriers to negotiations in civil conflicts? Second, who decides to negotiate? These two questions, though seem simple, their answers are complex and require an in-depth analysis, the work of this dissertation. The first question represents the negotiations puzzles in the Negotiation Calculation logic. The puzzle, described in Chapter 1, indicates that negotiations in civil conflicts are rare events because civil conflicts can last years without reaching a peaceful agreement (Zartman, 1993); the actors do not recognize each other as a reliable and legitimate negotiating partner (Iklé, 1971; Pillar, 1983; Zartman, 1995; Walter, 2002); the issues at stake are undividable (Pillar, 1983; Walter, 2002), the parties see victory as a better option during the early years of conflicts (Bapat, 2005); the parties perceive losses more salient than gains in a prospect of negotiation (McDermott, 2009). Therefore, reputation, legitimacy, valid spokesman, external pressure, and terrorism were suggested as potential factors explaining negotiations occurrence. One the other

hand, seeking to answer the second question turned the dissertation's perspective to a dyadic analysis since it takes two to negotiate (Cunningham et al, 2009). The decision of negotiating is a two-sided choice. Therefore, both sides' perspectives should be grasped for a better analysis. Accordingly, foreign military intervention, mediation, and human rights were suggested as potential determinants of negotiations in civil conflicts. Overall, the findings of this dissertation supports the Negotiations Calculation perspective.

6.2. Discussion

Findings of this research suggested that negotiation becomes less likely to happen as the number of insurgent groups fighting the central government simultaneously increases. In this analysis, the number of insurgent groups was used as a measure testing the reputation hypothesis. The idea here was that the government would be less likely to negotiate with an insurgent group if there were multiple groups involved in the civil conflict because it perceives any talks with a group as a concession tainting its reputation. This finding is consistent with previous research conclusions (Kaplow, 2015; Findley, 2013). Although one measure was suggested to capture the reputation variable in this study, a qualitative reading into case studies affirm this finding. As in the case of the Colombian government, there were secret talks between government of Colombian and the FARC for two years prior to the initiation of formal peace negotiation in 2012. This suggested that both sides wanted to ensure the other side's willingness and readiness for a negotiation before announcing it publicly because they were concerned about their reputation within their constituency.

Moreover, the fractionalization of leadership in insurgent groups shape the government's perception on negotiations. Conventional wisdom suggests that finding a representative of a group is a prerequisite for initiating a negotiation episode (Zartman, 1995). The findings of logistic analysis showed that negotiation is more likely to happen with the insurgent groups that have highly structured leadership compared to less structured groups. In

highly structured groups, the government would find a valid spokesman to initiate the talks with. Therefore, a spokesman who can speak for the insurgent group is believed to decrease the cost of negotiations on the government's side. In Kaplow's study (2015), this was named as transaction cost. Moreover, as seen in the Sudanese civil conflict, the SPLM/A, which has a highly hierarchical organizational structure, has emerged as a dominant insurgent group within the country who speaks for a large segment of the Southern population which encompasses various groups with different ethnic, cultural and religious background. Accordingly, this decreases the transaction cost of negotiation, although other costs of negotiation for both sides were present in the conflict.

The findings also indicated that external pressure has a significant effect on the occurrence of negotiation during civil conflicts. External pressure was considered from both governments' and insurgents' perspectives and was suggested in two different directions. First, from the insurgent's point of view, it was argued that the insurgent group would be less willing to negotiate if it received military support from an external actor (either a state or a non-state actor) since the group would perceive a potential negotiation as a risk to lose the existing support. The assumption here was that the external sponsors would encourage the insurgent group to continue to fight. However, the results showed that while negotiation is less likely to happen if the insurgent group receives military support from a non-state actor, negotiation is more likely to happen if the group receives the support from a state actor. One possible explanation to this unexpected finding is due to the increased military power of the insurgent group raising the probability of a stalemate leading to a better ground for negotiations escaping the deadly stalemate between the government and the dominant insurgent group. Another explanation suggests that there might be other unobservable factors which cannot be captured by the data. For instance, when there is an explicit military support from an external state to the insurgent group, the conflict might be carried into an interstate confrontation and might

lead to some sort of temporary negotiations, such as ceasefire agreements, even if it does not lead to a peace agreement, as in the example of Pakistan-backed Kashmiri insurgency. Although the conflict has been unresolved for decades, it has experienced some negotiations between India and Pakistan which mostly include ceasefire agreements.

Second, from the government's perspective, external pressure was suggested in a way to prompt the probability of negotiation in civil conflicts. This means that if the insurgent group has a transnational constituency, this will increase the international attention and awareness on the conflict and will bring pressure on the government to negotiate. This argument was supported by the findings of logistic analysis.

The effect of foreign military interventions on negotiation in civil conflicts emerged as one of the strongest findings of this research. The results indicated that foreign military interventions increase the likelihood of a negotiation in the conflict. Moreover, the findings showed that the effect and significance of the neutral/unbiased foreign military interventions on the occurrence of negotiation are stronger than those which are biased either against the government or the insurgent, or both. This is because the security is among the biggest concerns of the parties in civil conflict due to lack of trust and war-torn relationship. However, a foreign military intervention, especially a neutral one, might change the perception of parties by making the benefits of negotiation more salient than the costs of negotiation. In addition to foreign military intervention, findings lent support to the effect of mediation, which is one of the most-pronounced indicators in the literature (Walter, 2002; Bercovitch & DeRouen, 2005; Greig & Regan, 2008). As found in neutral military intervention, findings showed that mediations and mediators which are perceived as neutral by the parties to civil conflict are more likely to increase the probability of negotiation. Moreover, most negotiations in many conflicts are moderated by a third state or multiple states and international organizations. The four case studies show that most negotiation attempts and period in these conflicts were

mediated by a third neutral party. Indeed, as in the example of Sri Lankan conflict and Colombian conflict, the insurgent groups refused to take part in negotiations or cancelled the talks since they perceived the international mediators to be biased against them.

Human right hypothesis was suggested to capture the negotiation calculation from the insurgent`s perspective. Accordingly, two human rights indexes (physical integrity index and empowerment index) were used as a measure of this hypothesis. However, while the former was not found influential on negotiation outcome, the latter showed significant and positive effect. This could be interpreted as that the insurgent`s prospect of post-conflict situation can be partially shaped by the government`s respect for specific human rights, including *freedom of movement, freedom of speech, workers` rights, political participation, and freedom of religion*. Therefore, this hypothesis might be truer for the conflicts which are fought over the governance than those waged for territorial interests. The logic here is that as the government is perceived more respectful for these rights, the insurgent group`s cost perception of a negotiation gradually decreases in case a mutual agreement, i.e. sharing government, is reached. Since this hypothesis has not been included as an indicator of negotiation in civil conflict setting before in the literature, this marks one of the slightest contributions of the dissertation to the field and call for improvement in future studies.

The results indicated that the occurrence of negotiation does not significantly vary between terrorist-oriented groups and other insurgents. However, findings showed that negotiation is, though slightly, less likely to happen with the group who are recognized as terrorist organizations comparing to the others. However, the dissertation did not find support to the argument in relation to positive and negative reputation of terrorist organizations. In contrast, it was found that negotiation is more likely to happen with the terrorist group who has negative constituency reputation comparing to those who has positive reputation. This finding seems to support Thomas`s (2014) argument that terrorist activities in civil war increases the

likelihood of concessions and negotiation by decreasing the state's "power to hurt" since state cannot "target those directly responsible for violence" (p.816). Although an alternative explanation was raised in the conclusion of Chapter 4 to make sense of the finding, further research is needed to better understand the underlying reason. Regardless, terrorism hypothesis stands as another contribution to the literature by giving a way to compare the terrorist organizations within themselves and with other insurgent groups on the perspective of negotiation outcome.

Moreover, the dissertation did not find support for the argument that negotiation will be more likely to happen if the insurgent group has a political wing since it will grant the group somewhat more legitimacy as a negotiation partner. The results pointed that it is the other way around. As discussed in the conclusion part of Chapter 4, other factors, such as whether the political party is legal and the degree to which the party and the insurgent group are linked, should be included to argue that a political wing may grant legitimacy to the group. However, the lack of data might be an obstacle for such research.

In this analysis, the case studies did not only serve as a complimentary to the logistic analysis to understand the costs and benefits of negotiation, but also gave more insight into the understanding of the actors' perception of negotiation and negotiation periods in civil conflicts. Accordingly, several important conclusions can be drawn from the cases. First, the cases showed that gesture of good-will is a catalysis for negotiation because the intention of parties is often overshadowed by hostility and mistrust between the actors in civil conflicts. As seen from the cases, one of the most common signs of good-will seems to be the unilateral ceasefire declaration. This is often reciprocated by the other side although there are exemptions to it. Second, not all ceasefire agreements are intended to seek to negotiate the conflict related issues, but some are intended to buy time to recover or to gain legitimacy. This was the case in Sri Lankan civil conflict. Accordingly, when Norway brokered a ceasefire agreement between two

sides in 2002, the parties' interests were to gain legitimacy in the eye of international community (Weiberg-Salzman, 2015). Third, there might be secret and back-channeled talks preceding to formal negotiation in civil conflict. Last but not the least, leadership and political changes within governments and insurgent groups might stand for critical junctures in conflicts. The leader's fear to lose the constituency support leads to risk-averse decisions toward negotiation. A political leader might lose the public support in the face of failed negotiation or even initiating a negotiation with the "terrorists". On the other hand, as seen from the cases, some administrations come to power on the promise to find a peaceful resolution to the long-lasting conflict. This shows that negotiation might be a risky choice for political leaders in terms of their hold on to power. The same logic can be applied to the leaders of insurgent groups. Accordingly, they can be also concerned about the internal cohesion of the group and potential splits and critical voices. Therefore, this perception adds a cost to the perception of negotiation for the leaders of parties.

This dissertation, by no means, attempted to invalidate the cost of conflict explanation. On the contrary, it found strong support for the effect of insurgent's territorial control within the country on the occurrence of negotiation. The findings suggested that negotiation is more likely to happen in the dyad-years in which the insurgent groups controls a territory comparing to those where no land is administered or occupied by the insurgents. However, the findings did not support much the well-known stalemate argument. Although the stalemate hypothesis was in the expected direction, it lost its significance over the models of logistic analysis when the other variables were controlled. This finding might be explained by Findley's (2013) study in which the author finds mixed effects of stalemate on the different levels of negotiation process.

On the other hand, the findings showed that some conflicts are more prone to negotiation comparing to others. Accordingly, the results indicated that the probability of

having a negotiation is higher in territorial conflicts than in the conflicts over the governance. This finding adds more insight into the literature which suffers from the mixed results in which some studies find territorial conflicts are easier to resolve (Mason, 1996; Stedman, 1997), others asserts territorial goals have a negative impact on the resolution of conflicts (Walter, 2002; Dukalskis, 2015).

Last but not the least, the data created can be considered as one of the significant contributions of this dissertation. The data was collected by merging four different data sources. First, although the NSA data were not initially in annual observation format, they were converted into dyad-years format for this study. Second, although not all the sources had both dyad id (identification number for dyads) and cow id variables both the COW ID (identification for countries) at the beginning, both IDs were included in the data by using several resources and crosschecking the information. By this way, the data merged for this study allows researchers to conduct analysis at both dyadic and country levels. Moreover, the collected data provides researchers with knowledge on the characteristics of the government and insurgent group as well as the conflict itself. Moreover, it includes the reputation scales of terrorist organizations in civil conflicts as well as other variables in terrorism research such as information about the terrorism events, and human rights indexes for countries.

6.3. Research Limitations and Recommendations for Future Studies

This dissertation attempted to measure the costs and benefits of negotiation in the eyes of the parties to civil conflicts. However, negotiation was taken as a static concept rather than dynamic. This research did not differentiate between low, medium or high negotiations or any other typologies of negotiations limiting the scope of its generalizability. Therefore, future studies might consider seeking the effects of given costs and benefits on various levels of negotiation, such as talks, prisoner`s exchanges, ceasefire agreement, and peace agreements.

On the other hand, this research was designed to explain the initiations of negotiation; therefore, it does not provide any insight into the durability and success of negotiation under the costs and benefits of negotiation. This gap should be filled in future research since it can provide the policymakers and scholars with more practical implications for conflict resolutions. Future studies should utilize measures of duration, durability and success of negotiations to better aid stakeholders in their work on the international level creating better conditions for peacemaking.

Third, given the sudden nature of negotiations and its rarity, more refined analysis of the event should occur in shorter periods of time. This analysis was limited by the availability of data, which only provided annual measures of conflicts. Monthly or quarterly analyses should be conducted in future research to provide better refined results. Nevertheless, such a research might be difficult to pursue in a cross-sectional data covering all civil conflict periods around the world due the unavailability of data. This indicates a further need for in-depth case studies and comparative studies using mixed research designs rather than solely relying on the quantitative paradigm.

This dissertation relied on dichotomous variables to measure the suggested hypotheses. This loses the continuity of constructs that are hypothesized to influence negotiations limiting the ability of the research to generalize its claims. Future studies should use interval/ratio measures to see whether the effect on negotiation vary across the levels of suggested indicators. Also, more variables might be needed to grasp the hypotheses better. As such, in this study, the insurgent's political wing was a dichotomous measure, and the hypothesis was not supported by the findings. This might be due to the use of a dummy variable. Therefore, future research should include more measures to test this hypothesis, such as whether the political party is legal and the strength of link between the insurgent group and political part.

Lastly, based on the cases studies, ceasefire agreements or unilateral ceasefire declaration emerge as critical points during civil conflicts. While some of them lead to more comprehensible agreements between the parties, others collapse in a matter of time. Therefore, ceasefire agreements may hold several aspects during the conflict in terms of negotiation. As understood from the cases, not all ceasefire agreements are done in good faith, rather, some are in pursuit of taking a break from the conflict to recover or to gain legitimacy in the eye of international community. On the other hand, unilateral ceasefire declaration is often perceived as the sign of good-will by the parties to negotiate. Therefore, future studies should analyze different types of ceasefire agreements under various condition and their effects on the conflict resolution to see whether it is a pre-condition for negotiations.

The study uncovered the set of conditions under which negotiations occur during civil conflicts. Note that the success and durability of negotiations was of no concern of this study. Therefore, every contact between the parties concerning the conflict was considered as a negotiation point (let it be a ceasefire agreement, decision to exchange prisoners, bilateral talks about conflict zones, or a peace agreement). Regardless of the implementation of the mentioned issues, the study analyzed negotiations points during the period under study attempting to explain what brought the parties to negotiations table. It is also noteworthy to note that the dissertation was merely an attempt to verify previously tested hypotheses and test newly proposed relationships concerning occurrence of negotiations during civil conflicts at a theoretical level.

6.4. Summary

This chapter outlined the conclusions of this dissertation by discussing the results, pointing to the limitations of study and making suggestions for future research. The chief findings of this work lie in the fact that our understanding of contemporary civil conflicts and peace is inadequate without a thorough understanding of costs and benefits of negotiation. The

parties` perception of negotiation as a cost or benefit determines the decision to negotiate during civil conflicts. The dissertation attempted to conceptualize *the Negotiation Calculation* of insurgent groups and government in civil conflicts, aiming to provide the extant literature with a new perspective on conflict resolution. Future research should implement rigorous research designs and include additional measurements to analyze the costs and benefits of negotiation more thoroughly. The most important recommendation of this research is for international community to pay attention not only the cost of war, but also the cost of negotiation for the parties to civil conflict and aim to decrease the parties` perception of the costs while making the benefits more salient. Future researcher are encouraged to reshuffle the literature`s knowledge on what constitute a cost and what does not to the parties in civil conflicts.

APPENDIX A: THE LIST OF WARRING DYADS IN CIVIL CONFLICTS, 1989-2008

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
1	Government of Algeria - FIS (AIS)	1	615
2	Government of Algeria - Takfir wa'l Hijra / Exile and Redemption	2	615
3	Government of Algeria - GIA	3	615
4	Government of Algeria - AQIM	4	615
5	Government of Angola - UNITA	7	540
6	Government of Burundi - Palipehutu	11	516
7	Government of Burundi - CNDD	12	516
8	Government of Burundi - Frolina	13	516
9	Government of Burundi - CNDD–FDD	14	516
10	Government of Burundi - Palipehutu–FNL	15	516
11	Government of Central African Republic - Military faction (forces of André Kolingba)	17	482
12	Government of Chad - Revolutionary Forces of 1 April	18	483
13	Government of Chad - Mosanat	19	483
14	Government of Chad - Islamic Legion	20	483
15	Government of Chad - CSNPD	21	483
16	Government of Chad - CNR	22	483
17	Government of Chad - MPS	23	483
18	Government of Chad - FNT	24	483
19	Government of Chad - MDD	25	483
20	Government of Chad - FARF	26	483

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
21	Government of Chad - MDJT	27	483
22	Government of the Comoros - MPA/Republic of Anjouan	35	581
23	Government of Congo - Ninjas	36	484
24	Government of Congo - Cocoyes	37	484
25	Government of Congo - Ntsiloulous	38	484
26	Government of Democratic Republic of Congo - RCD	40	490
27	Government of Democratic Republic of Congo - MLC	41	490
28	Government of Djibouti - FRUD	43	522
29	Government of Djibouti - FRUD – AD	44	522
30	Government of Ethiopia - EPRDF	48	530
31	Government of Ethiopia - Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie)	49	530
32	Government of Ethiopia - ARDUF	52	530
33	Government of Ethiopia - EPLF	53	530
34	Government of Ethiopia - ONLF	54	530
35	Government of Ethiopia - OLF	55	530
36	Government of Guinea - RFDG	57	438
37	Government of Guinea Bissau - Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	58	404
38	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPCCI	89	437
39	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPIGO	91	437
40	Government of Lesotho - Military faction	92	570
41	Government of Liberia - NPFL	93	450

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
42	Government of Liberia - INPFL	94	450
43	Government of Liberia - LURD	95	450
44	Government of Mali - MPA	96	432
45	Government of Mali - FIAA	97	432
46	Government of Morocco - Polisario	98	600
47	Government of Mozambique - Renamo	99	541
48	Government of Niger - CRA	111	436
49	Government of Niger - FDR	113	436
50	Government of Rwanda - FPR	127	517
51	Government of Rwanda - FDLR	128	517
52	Government of Senegal - MFDC	129	433
53	Government of Sierra Leone - RUF	130	451
54	Government of Sierra Leone - AFRC	131	451
55	Government of Sierra Leone - Kamajors	132	451
56	Government of Uganda - UPA	148	500
57	Government of Uganda - LRA	151	500
58	Government of Uganda - WNBF	152	500
59	Government of Uganda - ADF	153	500
60	Government of the Comoros - Presidential Guard	158	581
61	Government of Congo - Cobras	189	484
62	Government of Angola - FLEC-FAC	190	540
63	Government of Angola - FLEC-R	191	540
64	Government of Somalia - SNM	207	520

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
65	Government of Somalia - SPM	208	520
66	Government of Somalia - USC	210	520
67	Government of Somalia - USC/SNA	211	520
68	Government of Somalia - SRRC	212	520
69	Government of United Kingdom - IRA	216	200
70	Government of Philippines - CPP	217	840
71	Government of Trinidad and Tobago - Jamaat al-Muslimeen	219	52
72	Government of Philippines - Military faction (forces of Honasan, Abenina & Zumel)	220	840
73	Government of Bangladesh - JSS/SB	223	771
74	Government of El Salvador - FMLN	225	92
75	Government of Guatemala - URNG	228	90
76	Government of Mexico - EZLN	230	70
77	Government of Nicaragua - Contras/FDN	231	93
78	Government of Peru - Sendero Luminoso	235	135
79	Government of Colombia - FARC	237	100
80	Government of Georgia - Anti-government alliance	239	372
81	Government of Egypt - al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	241	651
82	Government of Philippines - MILF	242	840
83	Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) - LTTE	243	780
84	Government of Haiti - Military faction (Forces of Himmler Rebu and Guy Francois)	244	41
85	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MJP	245	437

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
86	Government of Iran (Persia) - MEK	246	630
87	Government of Philippines - MNLF	247	840
88	Government of United Kingdom - RIRA	248	200
89	Government of Philippines - ASG	249	840
90	Government of Haiti - Military faction (Forces of Raoul Cédras)	251	41
91	Government of Philippines - MNLF – NM	252	840
92	Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) - JVP	256	780
93	Government of Georgia - Republic of Abkhazia	259	372
94	Government of Iran (Persia) - KDPI	260	630
95	Government of India - ATTF	262	750
96	Government of India - NLFT	269	750
97	Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - Republic of Croatia	272	345
98	Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - Croatian irregulars	273	345
99	Government of Iraq - KDP	279	645
100	Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - Republic of Slovenia	281	345
101	Government of Iraq - PUK	285	645
102	Government of India - NSCN – IM	286	750
103	Government of Central African Republic - Forces of Francois Bozize	287	482
104	Government of Georgia - Zviadists	289	372
105	Government of Croatia - Serbian irregulars	291	344

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
106	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	292	346
107	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	293	346
108	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia	294	346
109	Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - UCK	295	345
110	Government of India - ULFA	296	750
111	Government of Georgia - Republic of South Ossetia	297	372
112	Government of Iraq - SCIRI	298	645
113	Government of Mexico - EPR	299	70
114	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Serbian irregulars	300	346
115	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Croatian irregulars	301	346
116	Government of Croatia - Serbian Republic of Krajina	303	344
117	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KIO	304	775
118	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU	306	775
119	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - SSA/s	307	775
120	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - MTA	308	775
121	Government of India - ABSU	309	750
122	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - NMSP	310	775
123	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNPP	311	775
124	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - RSO	312	775
125	Government of India - NDFB	313	750

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
126	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - God's Army	314	775
127	Government of Peru - MRTA	319	135
128	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - UWSA	321	775
129	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - ABSDF	322	775
130	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - ARIF	323	775
131	Government of India - PLA	325	750
132	Government of Myanmar (Burma) - BMA	326	775
133	Government of Afghanistan - Taleban	327	700
134	Government of Turkey/Ottoman Empire - Devrimci Sol	330	640
135	Government of Turkey/Ottoman Empire - PKK	333	640
136	Government of India - UNLF	336	750
137	Government of Papua New Guinea - BRA	337	910
138	Government of Pakistan - MQM	340	770
139	Government of Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) - UCK	341	343
140	Government of Colombia - ELN	342	100
141	Government of Colombia - EPL	343	100
142	Government of Indonesia - FRETILIN	344	850
143	Government of Indonesia - GAM	347	850
144	Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	348	365
145	Government of Nepal - CPN-M	349	790
146	Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Parliamentary forces	350	365

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
147	Government of Liberia - MODEL	352	450
148	Government of Tajikistan - UTO	353	702
149	Government of India - Kashmir insurgents	355	750
150	Government of Romania - NSF	357	360
151	Government of United States of America - al-Qaida	360	2
152	Government of Azerbaijan - Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	361	373
153	Government of Azerbaijan - Military faction (Forces of Suret Husseinov)	362	373
154	Government of Uzbekistan - IMU	363	704
155	Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KR	364	811
156	Government of Spain - ETA	366	230
157	Government of Moldova - Dniestr Republic	367	359
158	Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district	368	365
159	Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Republic of Armenia	370	365
160	Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - APF	373	365
161	Government of Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen) - Democratic Republic of Yemen	375	678
162	Government of Lebanon - Lebanese Army (Aoun)	376	660
163	Government of Israel - Fatah	377	666
164	Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KPRLF	378	811
165	Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - FUNCINPEC	379	811

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
166	Government of Israel - Palestinian Islamic Jihad	380	666
167	Government of Israel - Hamas	381	666
168	Government of Laos - LRM	382	812
169	Government of Lebanon - Lebanese Forces	383	660
170	Government of India - Sikh insurgents	387	750
171	Government of India - PWG	405	750
172	Government of India - MCC	406	750
173	Government of Azerbaijan - OPOK forces	407	373
174	Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	411	700
175	Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan	412	700
176	Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat	413	700
177	Government of Tajikistan - Movement for Peace in Tajikistan	415	702
178	Government of Israel - PFLP	419	666
179	Government of Afghanistan - Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami	422	700
180	Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA	423	700
181	Government of Israel - AMB	426	666
182	Government of Israel - PNA	427	666
183	Government of Israel - PFLP-GC	428	666
184	Government of Uganda - UNRF II	431	500
185	Government of Sudan - SLM/A	433	625
186	Government of Sudan - JEM	434	625

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
187	Government of Eritrea - EIJM – AS	435	531
188	Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	439	437
189	Government of Haiti - FLRN	440	41
190	Government of Haiti - OP Lavalas (Chimères)	441	41
191	Government of Iraq - Al-Mahdi Army	442	645
192	Government of Iraq - Ansar al-Islam	443	645
193	Government of Uzbekistan - JIG	444	704
194	Government of Nigeria - Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa	446	475
195	Government of Iraq - ISI	448	645
196	Government of India - CPI (Maoist)	451	750
197	Government of India - NSCN – K	453	750
198	Government of Chad - FUCD	455	483
199	Government of Turkey/Ottoman Empire - MKP	457	640
200	Government of Iran (Persia) - PJAK	459	630
201	Government of Panama - Military faction (forces of Moisés Giroldi)	461	95
202	Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents	472	800
203	Government of Nigeria - NDPVF	473	475
204	Government of Paraguay - Military faction (forces of General Rodriguez)	474	150
205	Government of Venezuela - Military Faction (forces of Hugo Chávez)	475	101

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
206	Government of Afghanistan - Military faction (forces of Shahnawaz Tanay)	476	700
207	Government of Iraq - RJF	578	645
208	Government of Central African Republic - UFDR	628	482
209	Government of Israel - PRC	629	666
210	Government of Sudan - NRF	630	625
211	Government of Sudan - SLM/A (MM)	631	625
212	Government of Somalia - ARS/UIC	632	520
213	Government of Chad - RAFD	633	483
214	Government of Chad - UFDD	634	483
215	Government of Pakistan - Baluch Ittehad	638	770
216	Government of Pakistan - BLA	639	770
217	Government of Iran (Persia) - Jondollah	640	630
218	Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	641	625
219	Government of Israel - Hezbollah	643	666
220	Government of Sudan - NDA	645	625
221	Government of Democratic Republic of Congo - CNDP	646	490
222	Government of Philippines - MNLF – HM	647	840
223	Government of Sudan - SLM/A-Unity	648	625
224	Government of Mali - ATNMC	650	432
225	Government of Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire) - BDK	651	490
226	Government of Sierra Leone - WSB	714	451

No	Dyad Name	Dyad Id	COW Id
227	Government of Niger - MNJ	749	436
228	Government of Niger - FLAA	761	436
229	Government of Niger - UFRA	762	436
230	Government of India - KCP	764	750
231	Government of India - DHD-Black Widow faction	765	750
232	Government of India - PREPAK	766	750
233	Government of Chad - AN	767	483
234	Government of Pakistan - TTP	768	770
235	Government of Somalia - Al-Shabaab	770	520
236	Government of Somalia - Harakat Ras Kamboni	771	520
237	Government of India - PULF	772	750
238	Government of Russia (Soviet Union) - Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	773	365
239	Government of Pakistan - BRA	774	770
240	Government of Chad - Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas)	777	483

APPENDIX B: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS

Hypothesis	Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Cost of War	Logged – Number of	.093	.097	.109	.118
	Deaths	(.066)	(.066)	(.066)	(.067)
	Duration of Conflict	-.008	-.002	-.006	-.003
		(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
	Stalemate	.493	.507	.472	.363
		(.268)	(.269)	(.271)	(.278)
	Territorial Control	1.108	1.242	1.219	1.179
		(.165)	(.166)	(.166)	(.171)
Reputation	Number of Actors	-.141			
		(.041)			
Legitimacy	Political Link		-.535		
			(.169)		
Valid Spokesman	Low Level Leadership			-.384	
				(.237)	
	Moderate Level			-.095	
	Leadership			(.178)	
External Pressure	Transnational Link				.668
					(.198)
	State Military Support				.358
					(.162)
	Non-State Military				-.757
	Support				(.197)

Terrorism	Terrorist Organization				
	Terror x Negative Rep.				
	Terror x Target Rep.				
Military	Intervention				
Intervention	Intervention x unbiased				
Human Rights	Physical Integrity Index				
	Empowerment Index				
Type of Conflict	Territorial	-.423 (.166)	-.558 (.163)	-.596 (.167)	-.678 (.171)
	Minor Conflict	.047 (.248)	.081 (.248)	.065 (.248)	.115 (.253)
	Internationalized	.186 (.233)	.253 (.235)	.230 (.235)	.352 (.240)
Constant		-1.406 (.528)	-1.713 (.514)	-1.760 (.538)	-2.161 (.523)
MODEL SUMMARY					
Chi-Square (Change in – 2 log likelihood) ***		114.243	111.542	103.980	124.802
Cox-Snell R-Square		.109	.107	.100	.119
Nagelkerke R-Square		.157	.154	.144	.171
N (Number of Observations)		988	988	988	988

Note: Coefficients and standard errors are presented in the first and second rows, respectively.

Hypothesis	Variable	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Cost of War	Logged – Number of	.116	.110	.124	.131
	Deaths	(.065)	(.066)	(.066)	(.066)
	Duration of Conflict	-.006	-.009	-.006	-.007
		(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)
	Stalemate	.521	.534	.322	.388
		(.269)	(.271)	(.277)	(.279)
	Territorial Control	1.184	1.162	1.162	1.165
		(.164)	(.165)	(.165)	(.166)
Reputation	Number of Actors				
Legitimacy	Political Link				
Valid Spokesman	Low Level Leadership				
	Moderate Level				
	Leadership				
External Pressure	Transnational Link				
	State Military Support				
	Non-State Military				
	Support				
Terrorism	Terrorist Organization	-.058	-.766		
		(.163)	(.544)		
	Terror x Negative Rep.		.300		
			(.134)		
	Terror x Target Rep.		-.146		
			(.187)		

Military	Intervention			.677	.459
				(.164)	(.191)
	Intervention x unbiased				.669
					(.283)
Human Rights	Physical Integrity Index				
	Empowerment Index				
Type of Conflict	Territorial	-.544	-.523	-.512	-.476
		(.162)	(.162)	(.163)	(.165)
	Minor Conflict	.044	.040	.039	.028
		(.247)	(.250)	(.248)	(.249)
	Internationalized	.215	.198	.042	.100
		(.234)	(.236)	(.242)	(.243)
Constant		-1.879	-1.828	-2.135	-2.172
		(.512)	(.516)	(.518)	(.520)
MODEL SUMMARY					
Chi-Square (Change in – 2 log likelihood)		101.302	106.901	117.908	123.521

Cox-Snell R-Square		.097	.103	.112	.118
Nagelkerke R-Square		.140	.148	.162	.169
N (number of observations)		988	988	988	988

Note: Coefficients and standard errors are presented in the first and second rows, respectively.

Hypothesis	Variable	Model 9	Model 10
Cost of War	Logged – Number of Deaths	.141 (.004)	.074 (.082)
	Duration of Conflict	-.006 (.000)	-.008 (.010)
	Stalemate	.711 (-.008)	.122 (.457)
	Territorial Control	1.208 (.009)	1.200 (.204)
Reputation	Number of Actors		-.154 (.049)
Legitimacy	Political Link		-.024 (.201)
Valid Spokesman	Low Level Leadership		-.519 (.288)
	Moderate Level Leadership		-.077 (.208)
External Pressure	Transnational Link		.774 (.232)
	State Military Support		.658 (.194)
	Non-State Military Support		-.949 (.233)
Terrorism	Terrorist Organization		-.990 (.614)
	Terror x Negative Rep.		.438 (.155)
	Terror x Target Rep.		-.171 (.205)
Military	Intervention		.449 (.225)
Intervention	Intervention x unbiased		.866 (.323)
Human Rights	Physical Integrity Index	.052 (.000)	.000 (.065)
	Empowerment Index	.032 (.001)	.083 (.026)
Type of Conflict	Territorial	-.618 (-.008)	-.692 (.212)
	Minor Conflict	.016 (.004)	-.034 (.305)
	Internationalized	.109 (-.010)	.159 (.306)
Constant		-2.296 (-.037)	-2.172(.715)

MODEL SUMMARY

Chi-Square (Change in $-2 \log$ likelihood) ***	89.991	167.850
Cox-Snell R-Square	.096	.172
Nagelkerke R-Square	.140	.251
<hr/>		
N (number of observations)	892	892

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are presented in the table.

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ABSTRACT**PREDICTING THE PROBABILITY OF NEGOTIATION IN CIVIL CONFLICTS:
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF INTRASTATE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
1989 AND 2008**

by

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Since the end of Cold War, more civil conflicts have been settled by negotiated settlements, as compared to previous eras. While the extant literature has offered various explanations of this trend by examining the costs and types of war, scholars' primary focus has been on researching the determinants of conflict resolution. Yet, what brings the parties of civil conflicts to the negotiation table in the first place has remained largely unexplored. In particular, previous scholarship has failed to grasp negotiation as a process and costly choice in itself. This dissertation lays out the conditions paving the way for negotiations in civil conflicts, by offering a better understanding of the costs and benefits of negotiations to the parties. By rejecting the assumption from the previous literature that negotiation is a costless choice, this dissertation explains how the leaders of both government and insurgent groups perceive the negotiation process as the cost-benefit calculus. The study relies on a logistic regression analysis of the occurrence of negotiations in civil conflicts that occurred during 1989 - 2008, as well as four case studies, including conflicts between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM/A); the Indian Government and the Kashmir Insurgency; the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE). Both quantitative and qualitative analyses support the argument that negotiations are a risky choice and they bare some costs and benefits to the parties in civil conflicts. Accordingly, the negotiation calculation includes the assessment of prospective gains and losses in terms of parties' reputation, legitimacy, and status quo. Among others, the study found strong support for the role of third parties in predicting the negotiation likelihood. The dissertation presents a coherent theoretical framework that offers novel ways of conceptualizing the negotiation process. It also offers substantive recommendations for future research, to further improve scholarly understanding of the costs and benefits of negotiations in civil conflicts.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Ilker Kalin obtained his B.S. in Systems Engineering from the Turkish Military Academy, Ankara, Turkey in 2013, and graduated as a Second Lieutenant. Within the same year, he won a scholarship from the Turkish Armed Forces and came to the US to pursue a PhD degree in Political Science. His dissertation provided insight into the understanding of negotiation in civil conflicts. His primary research focus is on peace and security studies. In particular, Dr. Ilker is interested in the topics of negotiation, mediation, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict resolutions in both internal and international conflicts.